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ABSTRACT 
ABSTRACT 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 aimed to improve listed companies' financial 
reporting standards and protect shareholders' interests. However, most of the 
provisions are perceived to be costly to U. S. issuers and benefits of the Act have 
continued to be the subject of much debate. This thesis utilises a unique 
corporate governance dataset that covers both the pre- and post-SOX periods 
and attempts to first, investigate what changes have there been in corporate 
governance practices since SOX was implemented, and second, to analyse the 
consequences of any changes in corporate governance practices post-SOX, and 
whether these changes are beneficial to shareholders. To achieve these two 
objectives, the thesis investigates the impact of SOX in four empirical chapters. 
The main findings of this thesis suggest that companies opted to follow a 
box-ticking procedure in selecting their corporate governance structures post- 
SOX. SOX did not achieve its objectives of improving financial reporting quality, 
but it had, albeit unintentionally, enhanced corporate value for some firms. 
Overall audit conu-nittee effectiveness decreased during the SOX period, but it 
increased in the post-SOX period, which indicates, in terms ot corporate 
governance, SOX was beneficial to shareholders because it improved the overall 
audit committee effectiveness. Finally, earnings informativeness improved after 
SOX was enacted. However, this improvement may not be attributable to the 
changes in audit committee effectiveness. 
The thesis concludes that SOX improved U. S. companies' financial 
reporting quality, financial account usefulness and audit committee effectiveness. 
However, the improvements of financial reporting quality and financial account 
usefulness seemed not to be attributable to the changes in corporate governance 
practices, but it was more likely to be attributable to other internal control 
requirements, i. e. Section 404 "Assessment of internal control", Section 302 
"Internal control certifications" and Section 201 "Services outside the scope of 
practice of auditor". 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
The Satbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOXý introduced regulations aimed at 
unproving corporate financial and governance practice. The Act aimed to change 
US regulations from a discretionary disclosure regime to a mandated corporate 
governance mechanism that was designed to restore investor confidence after 
several accounting scandals. However, many of the requirements and their 
impacts are controversial and lack the support of empirical evidence'. This 
therefore motivates the research in this thesis. 
This thesis has two objectives: 
to investigate what has changed in corporate governance practice 
since the Act has been implemented; 
and 
2) to investigate the consequences of the changes of corporate 
governance practice post-SOX, and analyses whether the Act is 
beneficial to a company's shareholders. 
In order to achieve the two objectives, the thesis focuses on the impact of 
the Act on audit committee practice. This is because a) audit committee practice 
is one of the most relevant governance practices to restore investors' confidence 
For example, it is argued that Section 404 of SOX substantially increases listed companies compliance costs, 
but it can also enhances a company's financial reporting quality. However, whether the overall benefits 
from higher quality financial reporting outweigh the overall costs from compliance is still debatable and 
lacks of empirical evidence. 
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after the accounting scandals PeZoort, Dana, Deborah and Scott 2002, DeFond 
and Francis 2005) and b) the Act has paid a reasonably large amount of attention 
on improving the requirements of audit cornniittee compositions (SEC 2002a, 
SEC 2002d., SEC 2002c). Investigating the changes of audit committee practice 
from pre- to post-SOX and its consequences provides insightful knowledge on 
the impacts of Act. 
The thesis therefore examines four empirical research questions. First, have 
the determinants of audit committee financial expertise changed after SOX? 
Secondly, have the changes in audit committee financial expertise led to higher 
firm value and financial reporting quality? Thirdly, has overall audit committee 
effectiveness changed after SOX? Finally, have the changes in overall audit 
conu-nittee effectiveness led to more informative earnings? Due to limited 
research in this area, each of these four questions is original and the research 
outcomes significantly contribute to the audit committee literature. 
The structure of the thesis is organised as follows. It starts with a literature 
review in Chapter 2 and a detailed discussion of the SOX in Chapter 3.1 provide 
a basic analysis of the sample data in Chapter 4. The empirical analyses of the 
above four questions are provided in Chapter 5 to Chapter 8, and the final 
chapter concludes and discusses future research opportunities. 
Chapter 2 reviews the major auditing literature from the 1970s to 2008. 
Based on an examination on the results in previous studies, the chapter 
summarises answers to the following questions. These questions are a) What 
motivates executives to manipulate earnings information? b) Can external 
auditors constrain financial malpractices and reduce agency costs? c) Can audit 
committees constrain financial misconduct? and d) What influences the quality of 
external auditors and audit committees? 
2 
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The review shows that the separation of corporate ownership and control 
generates agency costs that impair a company's value and performance. The 
agents (corporate managers) tend to manipulate financial reports to improve their 
own benefits over remote shareholders' interest. In order to constrain a manager 
from window dressing, corporate stakeholders therefore appoint external auditors 
and audit committees to oversee firm managers. The review also suggests that for 
external auditors, the potential litigation costs, service fees, and affiliations 
between clients and auditors determined the auditor quality, whereas for audit 
committees, the existing governance structure and potential litigation and 
reputation costs are the main determinants of their overall quality. Finally, the 
review shows that previous studies suggest higher auditor or audit committee 
quality led to higher the financial reporting quality. 
Chapter 3 describes main provisions in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and 
discusses the potential impact of those provisions. The discussion is divided into 
four parts. The first part discusses provisions that relate to corporate internal 
control, especially Section 404, and the impact on issuers. This part shows that 
Section 404 caused issuers to exert millions of dollars to enhance internal control 
fimctions immediately after SOX. However, these compliance costs decreased in 
the followmg years. This implies that the marginal benefits of Section 404 started 
to increase from the second year. 
The second section discusses provisions that relate to auditor independence, 
which include Section 201 and 203. Section 201 prohibits auditors to provide 
certain types of non-audit services, whereas Section 203 requires issuers to change 
auditors every five years. Previous empirical studies found that non-audit services 
fees decreased substantially post-SOX. However, statistics show that auditors 
have tried to compensate the reduction of non-audit fees by increasmg audit 
3 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
services fees so that their total revenues (audit fees plus non-audit fees) did not 
change substantially post-SOX. 
The third section discusses requirements on audit committee effectiveness 
and some relevant research concerns and questions. This section mainly covers 
Section 202,204) 301 and 407. Section 202 and 204 are requirements for the 
interactions and communications between auditors and audit committees. Section 
301 imposes requirements on audit committee independence, whereas Section 
407 imposes requirements on the disclosure of audit committee financial 
expertise. The last section discusses criminal penalties of the Act under Title VIII, 
"Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability", Title IX "WAlite CoHar Crime 
Penalty Enhancement" and Title XI which has provisions on "Corporate Fraud 
Accountability". 
Chapter 4 describes the process of the corporate governance data collection 
and the construction of the corporate governance data sample in this thesis. It 
also provides some descriptive statistics on the corporate governance variables, 
firm characteristics variables, and auditing and non-auditing services variables. In 
addition, it investigates the changes of corporate governance from pre- to post- 
SOX on a yearly basis. The statistics show that the US corporate governance 
system kept improving from 2001 to 2005, and SOX attributed significantly to 
this improvement. 
Chapter 5 is the first empirical chapter and considers the first question which 
is "Have the determinants of audit committee financial expertise changed after 
SOX"? Using manually collected audit committee data that covers both pre- and 
post-SOX, this chapter examines the impact of SOX on the determinants of 
audit committee financial expertise. It starts with a discussion of the SOX 
requirements and defines the term "financial expertise" that is used in this study. 
It then analyses the differences in the probabilities of a company that included at 
4 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
least one financial expert to the audit comrmttee between pre- and post-SOX. It 
also analyses the changes of the impact of the existing corporate governance 
mechanisms and ownership structure on the level of audit committee financial 
expertise from pre- to post-SOX. 
The results show that there were more companies that employed at least one 
financial expert post-SOX. I hypothesise that if this change was totally caused by 
SOX, the decision that a company employs at least one financial expert ("the 
decision" hereafter) would not be affected by the firm's economic performance 
and existing corporate governance post-SOX. Consistent with this hypothesis, 
the logistic analysis shows that issuers' economic performance and existing 
corporate governance were statistically significant M determining the decision 
pre-SOX, but lost statistical power post-SOX. This suggests after SOX was 
enacted, companies decided to include at least one financial expert mainly to 
comply with the Act, whereas pre-SOX issuers made this decision based on 
individual company requirements. 
In addition, I hypothesise that if the increase in financial expertise is totally 
caused by SOX, the magnitude of the impact of existing governance mechanisms 
and ownership structure on the level of audit committee financial expertise would 
decrease post-SOX. I employ the Two Stage Least Square Regression with 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) iteration to obtain estimates of the 
audit committee financial expertise determinants model. The results show that 
coefficients of governance variables and ownership structure variables decreased 
significantly post-SOX. Incorporating this result with results from the logistic 
analysis, after SOX was enacted, an issuer was mainly motivated to employ 
financial experts by complying with Section 301 and 407 of the Act, but not by 
the companies' requirements. In addition, results also show that issuers employ 
5 
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financial experts to complement existing governance pre-SOX2. In contrast, post- 
SOX issuers employ financial experts to substitute existing governance'. 
Chapter 5 shows that SOX has successfully achieved its goal Mi enhancing 
issuers' corporate governance structure. Financial expertise of issuers' audit 
committees increased substantially after the Act was implemented. However, 
there is no research investigating the consequences of the increases of financial 
expertise from pre- to post-SOX. Therefore this motivates investigations in 
Chapter 6. 
Chapter 6 extends the analysis in Chapter 5 and investigates the 
consequences to companies that increase financial expertise post-SOX. 
Specifically, it examines whether the issuers' firm value and financial reporting 
quality have been improved / impaired after they appointed / dismissed financial 
experts to /from the audit conunittee. 
The sample in Chapter 6 consists of 630 finn-years, with 315 observations 
pre-SOX and 315 observations post-SOX. The sample is then divided into four 
portfolios: the NN portfolio, the FF portfolio, the NF portfolio and the FN 
portfolio. The NN portfolio consists of companies that did not Mclude any 
financial expert either pre- or post-SOX. The FF portfolio consists of companies 
that included at least one financial expert both pre- and post-SOX. The NF 
portfolio consists of companies that did not include a financial expert pre-SOX 
but they included a financial expert post-SOX; and the FN portfolio consists of 
companies that included a financial expert pre-SOX but they did not include any 
financial expert post-SOX. 
21 define "complement" here as that the combination of existing governance and additional audit committee 
financial experts makes the governance system more efficient thus adds more value to the firm. 
31 define "substitute" here as companies appoint new financial experts on the audit committee instead of 
using existing governance mechanisms to maintain or improve the efficiency of the firm's governance 
system thus add more value to the firm. 
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The sample distributions show that the majority of issuers chose to follow 
the spirit4of the Act both pre- and post-SOX, i. e. include at least one financial 
expert In both periods. I further examine which portfolio had greater 
improvements in financial reporting quality. The results show that companies that 
maintained or switched to include at least one financial expert post-SOX had 
lower improvements in financial reporting quality than companies that 
maintained not to appoint financial experts. Inconsistent with the hypothesis that 
firms retain appointing financial experts have greater increase in financial 
reporting quality, both the FF and NF portfolios had lower increase in financial 
reporting quality relative to the NN portfolio from pre- to post-SOX. In addition, 
financial reporting quality improved when the audit committee became more 
active, and the changes were mote obvious for companies that maintained not to 
follow the rules in Section 407, such as the NN portfolio. However, all results 
suggest that companies that switched from having financial experts to not having 
financial experts had lowest financial reporting quality. 
In the context of firm value, the descriptive statistics show that companies in 
the NF portfolio had highest finn value both pre- and post-SOX. In contrast, 
companies in the FN portfolio had the lowest firm value pre- and post-SOX. 
Firm value of the FF and the NN portfolios are between firm value of the NF 
and the FN portfolios. Further, the regression analysis shows that firms that 
chose to follow Section 407 post-SOX, e. g. the FF portfolio and the 
NF 
portfolio, had a greater increase in firm value than firms that did not 
follow the 
rules post-SOX. 
4 Section 407 does not mandate issuers to appoint financial experts. Instead, 
it requires issuers to disclose 
whether they have financial experts on the audit commýittee and explain 
the reason if they do not have one. 
This indicates issuers have discretions to appoint financial experts. Further, there is no requirement on audit 
committee financial expertise pre-SOX. 
Tberefore if issuers appoint a financial expert to the audit 
comn'11ttee, I define them as 'following the spirit' or 
'following the rules' of the Act. 
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'Me results generally indicate that SOX is beneficial to 'investors in that, 
overall, both firm value and financial reporting quality has been improved post- 
SOX. In the context of firin value, the improvements were more substantial for 
firms which include financial experts post-SOX. However, in terms of financial 
reporting, Section 407 has not achieved its intended improvements in financial 
reporting quality through appointing financial experts. 
Further, the results in Chapter 6 show that both audit committee expertise 
and activity are critical in enhancing financial reporting quality. There is until now 
no method to measure the collective impacts of audit committee compositions, 
expertise and activities. This motivates the study in Chapter 7, which shows the 
construction of a composite measure of the overall audit committee effectiveness. 
Chapter 7 therefore provides a practical method to construct an overall audit 
conunittee effectiveness index. It also investigates the impact of SOX on overall 
audit committee effectiveness. Among the various measurements of financial 
reporting quality, I chose the discretionary accruals as a benchmark to evaluate 
the audit committee effectivenesS5. Utilizing three comprehensive discretionary 
accruals models 6 and a unique sample of audit committee data, the audit 
committee characteristics are ranked according to the magnitude the discretionary 
accruals deviate from zero7. The overall audit committee effectiveness index (A- 
Index hereafter) is then calculated as the sum scores from the rankings. 
Detailed discussions of why I choose discretionary accruals as a benchmark are discussed in Section 7.2. 
6 The three models include the performance-matched modified Jones Model Uones 199 1, Kothari, Leone and 
Wasley 2005), the performance-matched Lag model and the performance-matched Growth model derived 
from Dechow, Richardson and Tuna (2003) 
7 Because discretionary accrual is the residuals from normal accruals, theoretically if financial reporting quality 
is a hundred percent credible and there is no earnings management, discretionary accruals should 
be equal to 
zero. T'herefore the less discretionary accrual deviates from zero, the higher 
financial reporting quality. 
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After constructing the A-Index, a probit analysis is conducted to examine the 
relationship between overall audit committee quality and various audit conuilittee 
characteristics. The analysis shows that more effective audit committees are 
larger, have a higher level of financial expertise and independence, and work 
more efficiently in the committee meetings. In addition, when companng two 
audit committees, ceterispatibus, a larger, more independent, more expert, or more 
active audit committee is more effective. 
In addition-, I construct a score (the "SEC score" hereafter), based on the 
SEC requirements and the methods in previous studies (DeFond, Hann and Hu 
2005, Carcello, Hollingsworth, Klein and Neal 2006a, Abbott, Parker and Peters 
2004), and examine its capability in reflecting overall audit comniittee 
effectiveness. I compare the SEC score with the A-Index and find that the SEC 
score is weakly correlated with the A-Index, and it does not reflect the same 
changes as A-Index over dine. While the A-Index shows that overall audit 
committee effectiveness decreased during the SOX period, the SEC score reports 
contrasting results. This implies that, the SEC score and the A-Index could not 
substitute with each other in reflecting the overall audit committee effectiveness. 
Chapter 5,6 and 7 investigate the impact of SOX on the determinants of 
audit committee effectiveness, the consequences and its developments from pre- 
to post-SOX respectively. However, there still lacks research on the impacts of 
SOX on investors' response to financial reporting quality conditional on the audit 
conu-nittee effectiveness. Chapter 8 therefore investigates this last question. 
Chapter 8 investigates the impact of SOX and the audit committee on the 
stock market's response to the earnings announcement. Using the A-Index that is 
constructed in Chapter 7, the chapter examines the differences in earnings 
response coefficients (ERC) between firms with different quality audit 
9 
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conunittees. It also investigates the changes In ERC from pre- to post-SOX 
conditional on the audit committee effectiveness. 
By incorporating the audit committee effectiveness with the revised earnings 
responses model that captures the S-shape earnings-return relation, the analysis 
find that first, in contrast to Ahmed, Hossain and Adams (2006) and Begley, 
Cheng and Gao (2007), SOX has improved listed companies' financial reporting 
quality and thus increased the usefulness of accounting earnings to investors. The 
results show that the earnings response coefficients (or "ERC") increased 
significantly from pre- to post-SOX. This implies that SOX is beneficial to 
shareholders because it enhanced the earnings usefulness to shareholders. 
Secondly, consistent with the hypothesis that firms with superior governance 
structures have higher earnings information quality, I found that before SOX was 
introduced, the ERC is significantly greater for firms with more effective audit 
committees. This is consistent with previous studies (Ahmed et al 2006, 
Anderson, Deli and Gillan 2003, Vafeas 2000) and suggests that in a less strict 
legal environment, a more effective audit committee is better at reducing the 
noise embedded in accounting earnings. 
Thirdly, the results also show that, however, after SOX was introduced, 
there is no difference in the ERC between more effective audit conu-nittees and 
less effective audit committees. This implies that first, other sections of the Act 
e. g. Section 404, Section 302 and Section 201 rather than Section 407 enhanced 
earnings quality and thus the earnings informativeness. Other sections of the Act 
may have improved earnings informativeness to the minimum required level, so 
that the improved audit committee effectiveness post-SOX did not add marginal 
credibility to the earnings. Secondly, the result also implies that the Act may 
increase the conservatism of corporate managers. Post-SOX, corporate 
executives are concerned about higher reputation costs and legal liabilities, they 
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may not release irrelevant information to the public until they fully verify the 
financial accounts, which in turn increased the earnings useffilness to investors. 
Finally, the results also imply that the relation of corporate governance and the 
ERC may no longer hold post-SOX. 
The final chapter concludes the results and discusses the limitations of this 
thesis. The thesis has answered the four research questions empirically and found 
that first, SOX has changed the determinants of audit committee financial 
expertise, and listed companies appoint financial experts mainly for regulatory 
compliance post-SOX. Secondly, maintaining appointing financial experts to the 
audit committees pre- and post-SOX led to higher firm value, but not financial 
reporting quality. Thirdly, the overall audit conuTdttee effectiveness increased 
significantly after SOX was introduced. Finally, SOX led to more informative 
earnings, but it is not attributable to the higher quality audit conuidttees. 
Bringing all results together, the thesis concludes that SOX was beneficial to 
a company's shareholders in terms of improving a company's financial reporting 
quality, firm performance, corporate governance and earnings informativeness. 
However, the results in this thesis seem to indicate that the improvements of 
financial reporting standards and earnings informativeness were not attributable 
to provisions that alm to improve audit conu-nittee effectiveness. 
11 
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2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The separation of ownership and control dominates characteristics of modern 
corporations, where corporate owners have a company's ownership but they do 
not manage the company's daily operation. Instead they appoint agents to run the 
company to maximise the firm value. However, while agents try to maximise finn 
owners' interests, they may also manipulate financial accounts to optimize their 
own benefits through increased compensation and job security. Enhancing 
executives' compensations, inflating stock prices, securing job positions, avoiding 
lending contracts violations and avoiding potential litigious costs are motivations 
for executives to manipulate financial accounts. 
In order to constrain corporate managers from accounting manipulation, 
corporate shareholders appoint external auditors and audit committees to oversee 
the financial reporting procedures and information disclosures of the firm. 
Previous studies find that this reduces the likelihood of corporate managers 
having accounting anomalies. Further, the quality of external auditors and audit 
committees also significantly affects the credibility of accounting information 
released to the public. In sum, auditors and audit committees, especially more 
qualified auditors and audit committees, play a very important role in corporate 
governance in ensuring financial reporting quality. 
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2.1 What Motivates Executives to Conduct Accounting 
Manipulation? 
The separation of ownership and control in modem corporations gives managers 
opportunities to consume the firms' free cash flow for their own benefit Uensen 
and Meckling 1976). To align interests of managers (agents) with owners 
(principal), a '$igh]powered incentive scheme" (Aggarwal and Samwick 1999, page 
1999) is necessary to motivate agents to maximise the principals' wealth 
(Aggarwal and Sarnwick 1999). 
The principal-agent model suggests that linking executives' compensation 
with their performance is the primary means of motivating executives to 
maximise shareholders' interests (Aggarwal and Sarnwick 1999). Previous 
research finds that executives' pay is positively related to firm performance. For 
example, Murphy (1985) finds that executive compensation is positively related to 
firm performance and shareholders' wealth, whereas Jensen and Murphy (1990) 
find that increase in executive pay is positively related to increase in shareholders' 
wealth. Other executive compensation studies, e. g. Aggarwal and Samwick 
(1999), Hall and Liebman (1998) and Baker and Hall (2004), find similar and 
consistent results to support the positive association between executive pay and 
firm performance (Aggarwal and Samwick 1999, Hall and Liebman 1998, Baker 
and Hall 2004). In addition, managerial ownership studies show that, beyond a 
certain level of executive shareholdings, executives' interests are aligned with 
shareholders' interests. Morck, SI-Aeifer and Vishny (1988), Short and Keasey 
(1999) and Davies, Hillier and McColgan (2005) all find that corporate value 
relate positively to managerial ownership before a certain point. 
From the principal's Perspective, the purpose of linking executives' 
compensation to performance is to motivate corporate managers to act as 
13 
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entrepreneurs and to maximise shareholders' wealth Uensen and Meckling 1976). 
From the agents' perspective, the first order effect of the pay-performance 
linkage is to incentivize executives to work harder and achieve better 
performance. However, the second order effect is unintended,, where it 
incentivizes executives to manipulate firm performance to improve their own 
benefits and to lower their costs (Dechow et al 2003). 
The second order effect of the pay-performance relation reflects a 
dysfunctional response to the executive compensation schemes (Bushman and 
Smith 2001a, Abowd and Kaplan 1999). For example, Healy (1985) finds that 
corporate managers manipulate earnings' downwards when the pay-performance 
sensitivity is zero. Similarly, Holthausen, Larcker and Sloan (1995) find that 
managers would manipulate earnings downwards when they have achieved the 
maximum cap of their bonus plan. In addition, Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) 
and Dechow et al (2003) find that managers tend more to report small positive 
earnings than small negative earnings. They suggest that this might be caused by 
the managers' desire to increase firm performance (Dechow et al 2003). More 
recently, Cheng and Warfield (2005) and Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) find 
that executives with high equity incentives in their compensation scheme tend 
more to manage earnings upwards to inflate share prices and enhance their 
compensation. Burns and Kedia (2006) present evidence that firms are more 
likely to restate financial reports when the CEO's wealth is more sensitive to the 
firm's share price. 
It tends to be common for executives to manage earnings to affect their 
benefits. The common use of earnings manipulation is mainly due to the 
gment infinancial 8 According to Healy and Wahlen (1999), earnings management is defined as 'ýwanqgers usejud 
roorting and in structuring transactions to alterfinandal mports to eitber mislead some stakebolders about the underbiq 
. 
pend on reported accounting numbers" (Healy economieperformance of the cofloany or to inj7uence contractual outcomes that de 
and Wahlen 1999, page 368). 
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prevalence of accounting numbers in executive compensation contracts 
(Bushman and Sn-dth 2001b). As Cited in Bushman and SnIlith (2001b), Murphy 
(2000) shows that 91% of a sample of 177 firms uses accounting measures in the 
executive compensation schemes, and 'W of 68firms lbal use sin , gle 
per ormance f 
measure in their annual bonus plan, 65 use a measure of accounting profits" (Bushman and 
Smith 2001b, page 50). In addition, Ittner, Larcker and Rajan (1997) finds that 
312 out of 317 firms use at least one accounting or financial ratios as a 
performance measure in the executive bonus contracts (Ittner et al 1997 cited in 
Bushman and Smith 2001b). These financial ratios include earnings per share 
(EPS), Net Income, Operating Income before Tax and Return on Equity (Ittner 
et al 1997). Keating (1997) also find that accounting metrics are more important 
and more frequently used in evaluating managers' performance when the 
manager has greater impact over the firm and its divisions. 
However, enhancing executive compensation is not the only incentive for 
managers to conduct earnings management. Healy and Wahlen (1999) conclude 
that managers also manipulate earnings when they want 'ýo ivindow dressfinamial 
gs, to increase cooorate managers compensation and statements prior to public securities offerin 
g lending contracts, or to reduce regulatog costs or to increase job securio, to avoid violafin 
regulatog benefits" (Healy and Wahlen 1999, page 367). 
For example, earnings management enables corporate managers to inflate 
security prices prior to public offerings. Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998a) find that 
issuers of initial public offerings (IPO) who report aggressive earnings have 
higher short term stock returns but poorer long term stock returns post IPO 
compared to issuers that report more conservatively. The same results also apply 
to seasoned equity offerings (SEO) (Teoh, Welch and Wong 1998b). Results in 
these two studies imply that managers tend to inflate securities prices prior to 
equity offerings by managing earnings upwards. 
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Further, the next motivation for earnings management is to secure executive 
employment. Previous studies found that managers are more likely to be 
dismissed if they perform poorly. For instance, Weisbach (1988) finds that poor 
performance increases the likelihood of CEO turnover, and the likelihood is 
higher when the issuer's board of directors is more independent. In the context 
of UK firms, Hillier, Linn and McColgan (2005) find that forced CEO turnover 
is more likely in poorly performing companies when firms undertake equity 
offerings. Kaplan (1995) and Kang and Shivdasani (1995) document similar 
results for German and Japanese companies that CEO turnover rates increase 'in 
poorly performing companies. Therefore managing firm performance upwards 
enables corporate managers to reduce the likelihood of being dismissed. 
Managing earnings also enables managers to avoid violating lending 
contracts. Previous research finds that managers intend to avoid violating future 
debt-covenants by choosing income increasing earnings management strategy 
(Healy and Wahlen 1999). Further, both DeFond and jiambalvo (1994) and 
Sweeney (1994) show that corporate managers choose income increasing 
accounting procedures when their firms are close to debt covenant violation. 
In addition, avoiding potential regulatory costs also motivates managers to 
manipulate earnings. Cahan (1992) investigates earnings management activities 
during the monopoly related anti-trust investigation, and finds that managers tend 
to manipulate earnings downwards to avoid being prosecuted for anti-trust 
violation. Similar results are provided in Jones (1991) that corporate managers 
tend to manage earnings downwards during the import relief investigations. 
In sum5 the principal-agent model suggests linking executive pay with firm 
performance to motivate corporate managers to maximise shareholder wealth. 
However, the second order effect of this pay-performance relation is that 
executives may conduct accounting manipulation to influence 
firm performance 
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and their compensation. Besides, to inflate share prices prior to equity offerings, 
to secure job positions, to avoid lending contract violations, and to avoid being 
prosecuted during specific regulatory investigations are other motivations for 
executives to conduct financial malpractices (Healy and Wahlen 1999). 
2.2 Can External Auditors Constrain Financial Malpractices and 
Reduce Agency Costs? 
To constrain the agents from earnings management and financial fraud, the 
principal need to appoint independent external auditors to testify his firm's 
financial reports Uensen and Meckling 1976, Watts and Zimmerman 1983). The 
principal-agent model predicts that appointing an independent external auditor to 
certify financial reports can improve financial reporting quality and reduce 
information asymmetries (Watkins, Hillison and Morecroft 2004). Auditors can 
issue qualified opinions to firms who have aggressive accounting policies. For 
example, Francis and Krishnan (1999) find that auditors are conservative in 
issuing clean opinions to high-accrual firms, where they are more likely to issue 
modified opinions to these firms. Bartov, Gul and Tsui (2000) compare earnings 
management activities of firms that receive qualified opinions to firms that 
receive clean opinions from their auditors. They find the likelihoods of a client 
receiving an audit qualification increase with the level of earnings management. 
The prIncipal-agent model also suggests that appointing an independent 
external auditor can reduce agency costs. Blackwell, Noland and Winters (1998) 
examine the differences in the cost of debt capital between firms that hire 
auditors (or "audited firms" hereafter) to firms that do not hire auditors (or "non- 
audited firms" hereafter). They find that audited firms pay lower interest rates to 
their lenders than non-audited firms. This implicitly indicates that auditors reduce 
the firm's agency costs hence the total cost of capital. 
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Further, agency theory also suggests that greater agency costs would demand 
higher quality external audit (Watts and Zimmerman 1983, Watkins et al 2004). 
However, audit quality varies from big auditors to small auditors because auditors 
have different incentives and different levels of independence' (DeAngelo 1981 b, 
Watts and Zimmerman 1983). DeAngelo (1 981b) argues that 'Me larger the auditor 
as measured ýy number of clients, the less incentive the auditor has to behave opportunistically 
and the hiýber the perceived qualýty of the audit" because bigger auditors have greater 
reputation costs (DeAngelo 1981b, page 184). In addition, Dopuch and Simunic 
(1982) argue that big auditors have more characteristics that directly associate 
with audit quality. For example, big auditors would have more 'ýpeciali. Zed trainings 
andpeer reviews, than do non-bi auditors" (Krishnan 2003, page 111). Therefore the 
auditor qualitylo differs according to the size of the accounting firm. 
Previous studies have presented evidence of how big auditors differ ftom 
small auditors in reducing agency costs. Becker, Defond, jiambalvo and 
Subramanyam (1998) examine the relationship between auditor quality and 
earnings management. Using discretionary accruals as the proxy for earnings 
management, they show that firms audited by brand name auditors have lower 
level of earnings management than firms audited by small auditors. Francis, 
Maydew and Sparks (1999) find similar results and show that firms audited by 
brand name auditors have lower level of discretionary accruals in their financial 
reports than firms audited by small auditors. In addition, Krishnan (2003) fin-ther 
examine the differences in information quality of discretionary accruals between 
big and non-big auditors. The results show that discretionary accruals are more 
informative for firms audited by brand name auditors. 
9 Big auditor is defined as big four (2002 onwards) or big five (1998-2002) or big eight (before 1998) auditors. 
10 According to DeAngelo (198 1 b), auditor quality is defined as the Ivarket-assessedjointpmbabihýý that a, #ven 
auditor m411 both discover a breach in the client ý accounting gstem and report the 
breach" (DeAngelo 1981b, page 186). 
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There are also a number of studies presenting 'implicit evidence that brand 
name auditors are better at reducing agency costs. Pittman and Fortin (2004) and 
Mansi, Maxwell and Miller (2004) examine the relationship between auditor 
quality and the cost of debt. They argue that lenders would charge less for firms 
audited by brand name auditors because there are lower monitoring costs 
incurred. Further, Teoh and Wong (1993) examine the relationship between 
auditor quality and information quality. They argue that financial information 
audited by brand name auditors is mote accurate and less noisy. This implies that 
there ate lower agency costs incurred for firms which employed brand name 
auditors. 
In sum, previous research shows that appointing an external auditor can 
constrain executives' ability in conducting accounting maMPulations. Due to 
auditors' different reputation costs, expertise and incentives, auditor quality varies 
from firm to firm. In order to have higher quality monitoring, previous studies 
suggest employing a brand name auditor who is better at constraining executives 
from accounting manipulation and reducing agency costs. 
2.3 What Influences Auditor Quality? 
In this section 1 discuss possible factors that may influence auditor quality. 
Btiefly, previous studies suggest that a) auditors' economic dependence on their C? Cý 
clients; b) the auditor-client relationship; c) auditors industry specialization; and 
d) the legal environment are the main determinants to auditor quality. 
. 
pendence 23.1 Economic De 
Auditors' economic dependence on their clients is mainly due to their need for 
audit fees and non-audit fees. One of the economic dependence examples is the 
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low-bafling practice which is perceived to impair auditor's independence 
(DeAngelo, 1981a). DeAngelo (1981a) states that auditors lower their initial 
engagement price and compensate the sunk costs from "client-Specific quaii-Irnts )12 
which would be earned in the future. Because there were sunk costs incurred in 
the initial engagement, incumbent auditors are "locked" to be economically 
dependent on their client's future quasi-rents. Tberefore Ne optimal level o auditor 9f 
independence is less than perfect independence " (DeAngelo 19 81 a, page 126). 
Previous studies find evidence of the low-balling phenomenon. Francis and 
Simon (1987) use a dummy variable to proxy for initial audit engagement in their 
audit pricing model. They find significant price cutting for the initial audit 
engagement. Baber, Brooks and Ricks (1987) find similar results in the public 
sector. Simon and Francis (1988) further examine the low-balling practice by 
using a larger sample with longer sample period. They find that low-balling 
practices exist for the first three years of audit engagement, and audit prices do 
not return to normal level until the fourth year. Specifically, audit fees are 25% 
lower than the normal level in the first year, and 15% lower in the second and 
third year (Simon and Francis 1988, Ettredge and Greenberg 1990). 
Auditors' economic dependence on their clients not only reflects on audit 
services fees, but also non-audit fees. Debates about whether an auditor should 
provide non-audit services date back to the 1980s. Simunic (1984) argues that 
auditors would improve their audit efficiency in providing both audit and non- 
audit services because the knowledge spills over between the two services. If Ne 
production of auditing generates knowledýe useful in AL4S Management Adzice Seivices) 
production and/ or the production of AL4S reduces the marginal cost of auditing and audit 
"Low balling" refers to the practice that auditors reduce the initial engagement audit price to their clients in 
order to obtain larger market shares (DeAngelo 1981 a). 
12 "Client-specific quasi-rents" refer to audit or non-audit services fees that auditors can receive from their 
clients (DeAngelo 1981a). 
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demand is relatively elastic" (Simunic 1984, page 698), then a positive relation 
between audit and non-audit fees would be observed. Both Simunic (1984) and 
Palmtose (1986) examine this relationship and provide evidence to support this 
argument. Davis, Ricchiute and Trompeter (1993) find similar results with 
Simunic (1984) and Palmrose (1986), but they interpret this relationship as 
auditors charging a premium for greater efforts exerted when they provide non- 
audit services to their clients. 
However, it is also argued that when auditors provide both audit and non- 
audit services, it may create conflicts of interest because auditors may be reluctant 
to disclose inefficiency in their non-audit services (Simunic 1984). This indicates 
that the more non-audit services the auditor provides the less independent the 
auditor may be. There are a number of studies examining this argument but 
results are mixed. 
On one hand, some studies find significant relations between non-audit 
services and impaired auditor independence. Frankel, Johnson and Nelson (2002) 
examine the relation between earnings management and non-audit fees. They 
find that clients paying more non-audit fees compromise their auditor's 
independence. Kinney, Palmrose and Scholz (2004) examine the relation between 
the likelihood of financial restatement and non-audit fees. They found that the 
more non-audit services provided by the auditor, the more likely it is that a fi-nn 
would restate its financial accounts. 
On the other hand, other studies could not find significant evidence that 
non-audit services impair auditor independence. Ashbaugh, LaFond and Mayhew 
(2003) replicate Frankel et al (2002)'s study, and they further control for firm 
performance in measuring earnings management. In contrast to Frankel et al 
(2002), they find that non-audit services do not affect auditor independence. In 
addition, DeFond, Raghunandan and Subramanyarn (2002) examines the relation 
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between the propensity of client firms receiving going concern opinions and non- 
audit services. However, they find no evidence that non-audit services impair 
auditor independence. 
23.2 Relationsbo Dependence 
Besides economic dependence, the auditors' relationship with its clients and the 
clients' internal auditor may affect audit quality. For example, Felix, Gramling and 
Maletta (2001) find that the closer an auditor works with the clients' internal 
auditor, the more efficient the audit is. There are limited studies that directly 
examine the impact of the relationship between internal and external auditors on 
auditing quality. However, Elliott and Korpi (1978), Stein, Simunic and 0 Keefe 
(1994) and Felix, Gran-ýing and Maletta (2001) suggest that the more internal 
auditors contribute to the financial audit, the less efforts are requited by the 
external auditors to audit financial reports, and this would be reflected in audit 
fees. Although Stein et al (1994) could not find evidence for this argument, both 
Elliott and Korpi (1978) and Felix et al (2001) find that audit fees ate significantly 
lower when internal auditors contribute more to the financial audit. 
In contrast, Lennox (2005) and Menon and Williams (2004) suggest that the 
more affiliate auditors work with their clients, the less likely the auditor provides 
high quality audit. Menon and Williams (2004) find that if the clients' former 
audit partner" becomes the client's board director or executive officers, the firm 
is more likely to manipulate accounting information. Further, they find that these 
firms report larger discretionary accruals than other firms. Lennox (2005) also 
finds that firms with auditor affiliation have greater probabilities of receiving 
clean audit opinions than firms with no affiliation. Ibis indicates that auditor- 
client affiliation impairs auditor quality. 
13 Fortner audit partner is defined as a profession who engaged in the client's audit before. 
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23.3 Industg Spetiali, -wfion 
Previous studies also suggest that industry specialization influences auditor 
quality. Craswell, Francis and Taylor (1995) argue that 'ýiuditor industg jPe(iaA, -? 'afiOn 
uill lead to a biýber level of audit assurance " if the industry requires '! Oecialized contracts 
and accountinT tecbnologies', ' and this will be reflected in audit prices (Craswell et al 
1995, page 301). They present evidence that audit fees for industry specialists 
are significantly higher than non-specialist auditors. This supports the existence 
of industry specialization and implies a higher level of audit assurance for 
industry specialists. Ferguson, Francis and Stokes (2003) further examine this 
argument after the merger of some big auditors. Their findings suggest that 
auditor-mergers improve audit efficiency so that the costs of investments are 
partially offset by the benefits from economies of scale. Hence they find limited 
evidence of audit price premiums for industry specialization. 
More recent research in this area examines whether auditor industry 
specialization improves financial reporting quality. These studies generally 
indicate that industry specialist auditors provide higher quality audit. For 
example, Owhoso, Messier and Lynch (2002) find that auditors work more 
efficiently in detecting errors within industries that they are specialized in. In 
addition, Balsam, Krishnan and Yang (2003) finds that industry specialist 
auditors improve financial reporting quality by constraining managers from 
earnings management. They also find that earnings response coefficients ("ERC" 
hereafter), which is a proxy for information quality, is greater for firms audited 
by industry specialists. Further, Dunn and Mayhew (2004) document evidence 
that specialist auditors assist their clients in enhancing financial disclosures 
quality. They find that financial disclosure quality for firms that employ industry 
specialist auditors is ranked higher by financial analysts. 
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2 3.4 4, Sal E mironment and Litigation Costs 
Previous studies assert that the legal environment win influence auditor quality. 
While auditing clients' financial statements, auditors would concern with potential 
legal liabilities when their clients go bankrupt (Lee and Mande 2003, Watkins et al 
2004). Under circumstances where auditors face higher probabilities of being 
sued-, they are more likely to choose conservative accounting (DeFond and 
Subramanyarn 1998). This indicates that auditors are more likely to enhance their 
clients' financial reporting standards within stricter legal environment. 
Auditors also adjust their auditing standards according to their clients' 
litigation risk threat. DeFond and Subramanyarn (1998) examine the changes of 
discretionary accruals when companies change their auditors. They found that 
auditors tend to adjust earnings downwards through income decreasing accruals 
in the last year they audit the client's financial reports, and these 'are concentrated 
among the sample partitions that are mpected to pose the greatest client Iiiigation risk tbreat 
to the auditor" (DeFond and Subramanyarn 1998, page 37). In addition, Lee and 
Mande (2003) examine auditors' impacts on earnings managements pre- and post 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA). The Act eliminated 
the >int and several liabilities"" and abolishes the auditors' legal responsibilities. 
Lee and Mande (2003) find that income increasing discretionary accruals are 
significantly higher post PSLRA. 'niis implies that a less strict legal environment 
allows auditors to lower their audit quality. 
Other indirect evidence is documented in Seetharaman, Gul and Lynn 
(2002). Seetharaman et al (2002) find that "UK auditors cbarge bigberfeesfor their 
14 According to Lee and Mande (2003) and Watkins et aZ (2004), prior to 1995, auditors may need to 'ýqýv the 
enfirv amount of kabififies iftbeir client was bankr*t" even if the clients' investors think they are only responsible 
for a small fraction of the entire damage (Lee and Mande page 166, Watkins et al. 2004 page 94). However, 
after the Act was implemented, auditors are responsible for proportionate liabilities. 
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sen4ces wben their clients access US, but not non-US, capital markets" (Seetharaman et al 
, page 93). Their findings suggest that auditors account for litigation costs 'in the 
fees of audit services, and they will charge a risk premium in a stricter legal 
environment. Francis (1984) examine the low-balling practices in Australia, where 
audit fees are mandated to disclose to the public. However, they find no evidence 
that auditors conduct low balling practices in stricter legal environments. All these 
studies suggest that the legal environment affects the auditor's concerns of their 
legal liability and hence their efforts and quality in conducting audit. 
23.5 Summag 
In sum, both audit and non-audit services studies show that auditors tend to be 
economically dependent on their clients. Previous studies found that low-balling 
practices do exist for US companies. In addition, there is some evidence that 
non-audit service fees lower auditor independence. Both audit and non-audit fees 
studies indicate that auditors' independence is affected by the economic 
dependence on their clients. Besides, auditor-chent affiliations may impair auditor 
independence as well, which in turn lower the audit quality. Previous studies also 
suggest that auditors invest a large amount of resources in improving their 
industry specializations, which in turn yield higher audit efficiency due to 
economies of scale. In addition, empirical evidence shows that 'industry 
specialist auditors are of higher quality in improving financial reporting 
standards. Finally, legal environment also impacts on auditor's accounting choice 
and auditing standard. 
2.4 Can Audit Committee Constrain Accounting Manipulation? 
The principal-agent model predicts that shareholders appoint a board of directors 
to monitor executives. "Tbe board of directors delegates some of its overýTbt responjibilifies 
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to the audit committee" due to the board's diverse responsibilities. PeZoort et al 
2002, page 40). Delegating part of the responsibiEties to the audit committee has 
two advantages for the board. According to Menon and Williams (1994), the first 
advantage is to improve the independence of the oversight body, where both 
internal and external auditors have to report to a group of directors who are 
independent from the firm's executives. The second is to improve board 
efficiency in monitoring corporate managers from earnings management, since 
'Wequate attention can be paid to the boardfunctions of revieu)iig finandal reporting polities 
and coordinatiq ýaitb auditors only ýf a subset of the board cbarTes ýaith these reiponsibilifies" 
(Merchant 1987 cited in Menon and Williams 1994, page 123). 
The major responsibilities of the audit committee include overseeing 
financial reporting; internal controls to address key risks and auditor activity 
(DeZoort et al 2002). After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was introduced, there 
are new responsibilities for audit committees. Brodsky, Baker, Grochowski and 
Huber (2003) state that post-SOX, 'Me relationsbo between manaTement and outjide 
auditors is largely replaced ýy one between the audit committee and outjide auditors. The audit 
committee now is directly resonsiblefor the appointment, compensation, retention, and oversýgbt 
of inde pendent auditors, who report directly to the audit committee" (Brodsky et al 2003, 
page 1)". 
This raises an empirical research question, "Is audit committee effective 16 in 
overseeing and preventing corporate executives from accounting anomalies". 
Previous studies generally find that audit committees ate effective in constraining 
corporate managers from accounting manipulation. For example, a more 
15 A detailed discussion of the rules regarding audit committee and financial reporting in the Sarbanes Oxley 
Act 2002 would be discussed in the Chapter 3. 
16 According to DeZoort et al. (2002), 'an effective au&I committee bas qualified members ivith the auzboriýv and resourres 
ýv ng rep rYi g, in ern rols gh its to protect stakebolder interrsts ensu n rehable financial on't al cont , and risk management throu 
, gbt efforts" 
(DeZoort et al. 2002, page 41). &4genf oversi 
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qualified audit committee is more effective in reducing earnings management and 
the propensity of financial statement frauds and earnings restatements. 
Previous studies mainly look at the impact of independence, financial 
expertise and activity of the audit committee on the monitoring functions, and 
these are discussed in the following sections. 
24.1 Inde pendence 
A number of studies examine whether independent audit committees could 
constrain earnings management. K'lein (2002a) argues that audit comnlittees act as 
an arbiter between corporate managers and external auditors and 'ýVeigb and broker 
gent views of botb parties to produce ultimatel XcMcd ýUein diver ya ba an ed, ore a curate repo " 
2002a, page 378). Therefore a more independent audit committee would provide 
more objective views on the financial report. K'lein (2002a) examines the 
relationship between audit committee independence and the magnitude of 
discretionary accruals, and finds that the two variables are negatively related. The 
findings also suggest that this relation is most profound when the board and audit 
comt-nittee compromise a majority of independent directors J, '-lein 2002a). 
Bedard, Chtourou and Courteau (2004) also investigates this relation, but they 
find that only an audit committee with 100% independence is sufficient in 
constraining earnings management (Bedard et al 2004). 
In addition, another group of audit committee studies examines whether 
independent audit conu-nittees could reduce the propensity of extreme accounang 
manipulation. For example, McMullen and Raghunandan (1996) compare audit 
committee characteristics between firms with financial reporting problems 
("'problem firms"" hereafter) to firms without financial reporting problems ("no- 
17 Problem firms are defined as firms with SEC enforcement action or material restatements of quarterly 
earnings in McMullen and Raghunandan (1996). 
27 
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
problem fims" hereafter). They find that audit committee independence is 
negatively related with financial misconducts. Specifically, 86% of no-problem 
firms have solely independent audit committee, where only 67% of problem 
firms have solely independent audit committee. However, using governance data 
after 2000, Agrawal and Chadha (2005) could not find significant relation 
between audit committee independence and financial reporting problems. This 
possibly reflects the decreasing marginal effect of audit committee independence 
post 1999, when the Blue Ribbon Commission recommendations in 1999 
suggested audit comn-iittees should be composed of solely independent directors. 
Moreover, controlling for audit committee activity, Abbott et al (2004) find that 
firms with independent audit conu-nittee have lower chances to restate their 
financial statements. 
Other studies investigate the dynamics between audit committees and 
external auditors. Carcello and Neal (2000) examine the probability of auditors 
issuing going-concern opinions to a sample of financially distressed companies 
conditional on audit committee characteristics. They find that firms with higher 
proportion of affidiate directors on the audit committee are less likely to receive 
going-concern opinions from their auditors. They explain that independent audit Cý CI 
conunittees could mitigate management pressure on auditors which allows 
auditors to provide objective opinions on the financial reports (Carcello and Neal 
2000). Carcello and Neal (2003a) further examine if independent audit committee 
can shield auditors from being dismissed if they issue going-concern opinions to 
their clients. They show that more independent and expert audit committees are 
more effective in shielding auditors from dismissal (Carcello and Neal 2003a). 
Their results are consistent with Archambeault and DeZoort (2001)'s findings 
that companies with 'ýuspicious auditor switches" have a less independent audit 
committee. Moreover, Abbott and Parker (2000) find independent audit 
committees are more likely to appoint industry specialist auditors. 
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2.4.2 E4eiYise andActitio 
A growing body of literature suggests all or at least one of the audit conuynittee 
members should be financially literate (Cohen, Krishnamoorthy and Wright 
2004b, DeZoort et al 2002, DeFond and Francis 2005). SOX also requires that 
issuers should disclose whether their audit conuiiittees have at least one member 
that is financially expert (SEC 2002j) ". The primary reason for Mcluding a 
financial expert is that it improves the committee's efficiency in evaluating the 
quality of financial accounts and discovering errors and manipulation in financial 
reporting. McDaniel, Martin, Maines and Peecher (2002) examine the differences 
in evaluating financial reporting quality between financial experts and financial 
literate. They find that financial experts concentrate more on the underlying 
quality of financial reports, but financial literates pay more attention to reporting 
treatments for business activities that are prominent in business press (McDaniel 
et al 2002). They suggest including a financial expert to the audit committee 
would change the focus of the conuilittee and therefore affect financial reporting 
quality (McDaniel et al 2002). 
Prior literature provides empirical evidence to support that audit committee 
expertise is positively related to financial reporting quality and finn performance. 
Xie, Davidson and DaDalt (2003) and Bedard et al (2004) examine whether 
including a financial expert in the audit committee constrains earnings 
management. They argue that audit comn-iittees with financial experts are more 
likely to support external auditors in the disputes with management PeZoort 
and Steven 2001), and focus on concerns that are critical to financial reporting 
quality (Bedard et al 2004, McDaniel et al 2002). Therefore a more expert audit 
committee is more likely to improve financial reporting quality. Consistent with 
their arguments, they found that audit committees that include financial experts 
18 SEC is the short form of the U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
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have lower level of earnings management, which in turn indicates a higher level of 
financial reporting quality. 
Moreover, Agrawal and Chadha (2005) find that audit committees which 
include independent financial experts are less likely to restate financial statements. 
DeFond et al (2005) examine the stock market reaction to the appointment of 
financial experts to audit committees. They find that the market reacts positively 
to the appointments of the financial expert. This suggests the market believes that 
financial experts add value to the firm. 
Literature on audit committee activity argues that an audit committee would 
be dysfunctional if they lack in diligence (DeZoort et al 2002, Cohen et al 2004b, 
DeFond and Francis 2005). Research in this area in general suggests audit 
committees become more effective if the committee is more active. For example, 
Abbott et al (2004) find that audit conu-nittees are less likely to be sanctioned by 
the SEC if they meet at least twice a year. Abbott and Parker (2000) find that 
committees that meet at least twice a year are more likely to appoint brand name 
auditors who show higher audit quality. In addition, Abbott et al (2004) also find 
that audit committee activity is significantly negatively related to earnings 
restatement. However, Bedard et al (2004) examine whether audit committees 
that meet at least twice a year could constrain earnings management activities, but 
they do not find any significant relation. 
24.3 Summag 
Overall, previous audit committee research examines whether increasing audit 
committee independence, financial expertise and diligence could mitigate agency 
costs and constrains accounting manipulation. The results are in general 
consistent with the SEC expectations that a more qualified audit committee is 
more effective in constraining accounting manipulation. 
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2.5 Conclusions 
This chapter starts with reviewing literature on executives' incentives of 
accounting manipulation. Using the principal-agent model, previous studies state 
that although corporate shareholders try to incentivize managers to maximise 
firm value by linking executive pay to firm performance, managers still have other 
incentives of financial misconducts. Enhancing executives' compensations, 
inflating stock prices, securing job positions, avoiding lending contracts violations 
and avoiding potential litigious costs are motivations that executives have 
accounting manipulation. 
To reduce the above agency costs, corporate directors appoint external 
auditors and audit committee to monitor managers and prevent them from 
window dressing. I then review literature on the impact of external auditors and 
audit conu-nittees on overseeing corporate managers respectively. Previous studies 
in general suggest that external auditors are effective in constraining mangers 
from accounting manipulation, especially brand name auditors. However, there 
are several factors that might affect the quality of external auditors. These factors 
include the low-balling practices, the provision of non-audit services, affiliation 
between auditors and clients, industry specialization and the legal environment. 
I further review literature on audit committee effectiveness, and exanuine 
whether audit conu-nittees are effective in monitoring corporate managers. Prior 
literature mainly focuses on examining the relation between characteristics of the 
audit committee and accounting anomalies. The results generally suggest that 
audit committees are effective in overseeing corporate managers and preventing 
them from earnings management. Specifically, conumttees that are more 
independent, with more expertise and are more active can better constrain 
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managers from earnings management, and reduce the propensity of earnings 
restatement and financial fraud. 
In the next Chapter, I will discuss the provisions in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
2002 with respect to changes in corporate governance, and its impacts on listed 
companies after the Act was Introduced. 
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3 
EVALUATING CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE MANDATES IN THE 
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT 2002 
'Tbe Sarbanes-Oxly (SOX) Act of 2002, in wbicb Congrvss introduced a seties of corporate 
governance initiatives into tbefederal securities laws, is notjust a considerable change in law, but 
also a depaiYure in the mode of regulation. Tbefederal re ime bad until then consistedprimarily, ,g 
of disclosure requirements rather than substantive corporate governance mandates, whicb were 
traditionally left to state co; porate law" (Romano 2005, page 1523). 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 (SOX or the "Act" hereafter) has brought M 
several new mandates aimed at improving corporate financial reporting quality. 
These includes provisions that enhance internal control over financial reporting 
(Section 404), auditor independence (Section 201 and 203), audit committee 
effectiveness (Section 202,204,301 and 407), and corporate executives' and 
directors' litigation costs (Section 302,807, and 906). This chapter discusses the 
above provisions and their impacts on U. S. issuers post-SOX. 
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3.1 Key Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 
The Satbanes-Oxley Act 2002 was introduced in 2002 in response to a 
number of accounting scandals in the United States. It was formed by reconciling 
the Representative Nfichael G. Oxley's bill (H. R. 3763) and the Senator Paul 
Sarbanes's bill (S. 2673) by a Conference Committee, that was formed by the 
United State House of Representatives (the House) and the United State Senate 
(the Senate) (Zhang 2007). The final bill was approved by the Conference 
Committee on 24thjuly 2002 and named as "the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002". It 
was later signed by President George W. Bush on 30th ji: tly 2002 (Zhang 2007). 
SOX applies to issuers that: 
1) 'ýýave registered securities under the U. S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(1934 Act)'Ip 
2) 'ýme required tofile reports under Section 13 (d) of the 1934 Act"; and .P 
3) 'ýýave filed a registration statement under the U. S. Securities Act 1933 (1933 
Act)" (Cohen and Qainimaqarni 2005). 
It includes mandates that aim at improving financial reporting quality under 
eleven tides, which are listed as follows: 
1) Tide I- "Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)"; 
Title II - "Auditor Independence"; 
3) Title III - "Corporate Responsibility"; 
4) Tide IV - "Enhanced Financial Disclosures"; 
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5) Title V- "Analyst Conflicts of Interest"; 
6) Tide VI - "Comrmssion Resources and Authority"; 
7) Tide VII - "Studies and Reports"; 
8) Tide VIII - "Corporate and Crin-ýinal Fraud Accountability"; 
9) Tide IX - "White Collar Crime Penalty Enhancement"; 
10) Tide X- "Corporate Tax Returns"; and 
11) Tide XI - "Corporate Fraud Accountability"19 - 
The key provisions that relate to corporate governance are under Tide 11,111 
and IV. Specifically, mandates under Tide 11 ('Auditor Independence") aitn to 
impose requirements on external auditors to Mcrease their independence from 
corporate managers, and limit conflicts of interest that arise from providing 
different services to the companies. It also establishes requirements for the audit 
committee to approve audit and non audit services. Provisions that relate to 
corporate governance include Section 201,202,203 and 204. Section 201 
regulates the type of "services outside the scope of practice of auditors" (SEC 
2002c), such as management consultancy. Section 202 requires audit committees 
to pre-approve services provided by auditors. Section 203 regulates the 
incumbent auditors' tenure, and Section 204 requires auditors to provide timely 
reports to the audit committee regarding material accounting policy and 
treatment. 
19 Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002 Sections, available at: 
hj. t): //w 
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Mandates under Tide III ("Corporate Responsibility") imposed requirements 
on the responsibilities of corporate officers to ensure financial reporting accuracy 
and validity. It also imposed requirements on the interaction between corporate 
audit committees and its external auditors. Sections that relate to corporate 
governance include Section 301 and 302. Section 301 imposes requirements on 
the compositions of issuers' audit committee and defines the term 
"independence" in the Act. Section 302 requires corporate executives to approve 
and certify the integrity of the annual or quarterly reports (Romano 2005). 
Mandates under Tide IV ("Enhanced Financial Disclosures") impose 
requirements that airn to enhance financial disclosure and internal control within 
the firm. Sections that relate to corporate governance include Section 404 and 
407. Section 404 has requirements on internal control over financial reporting, 
while Section 407 requires the issuer to disclose whether they have a financial 
expert on the audit committee. 
In addition, mandates under Title VIII C'Corporate and Criminal Fraud 
Accountability"), Tide IX ("White Collar Crime Penalty Enhancement") and Tide 
XI ("Corporate Fraud Accountability") are important in improving corporate 
governance. Sections under these three titles address criminal penalties for 
corporate managers who undertake financial fraud. These mandates therefore 
may make corporate managers more risk-averse post-SOX. Provisions that are 
discussed in the thesis include Section 302, Section 807 and Section 906. 
The next section discusses the above provisions and their impact on U. S. 
issuers post-SOX. 
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3.2 Evaluating SOX Provisions 
There is a growing literature discussing the benefits and costs of SOX. Li, Pincus 
and Rego (2008) and Jain and Rezaee (2006) find the SOX added firm value to 
issuers, whereas Zhang (2007) and Chhaochharia and Grmistein (2007) find that 
the Act brought negative effects to listed companies. In addition, Leuz, Triantis 
and Wang (2008) and Engel, Hayes and Wang (2007) find that more issuers, 
especially smaller issuers, chose to go-dark or go-private post-SOX, which 
suggests that some companies tried to avoid the heavy compliance costs of the 
Act. 
This section evaluates main provisions that would increase compliance costs 
as well as provisions that add value to issuers. The SOX provisions would be 
discussed within four domains, which are first, internal control over financial 
reporting; secondly, auditor independence; thirdly, audit conu-nittee effectiveness 
and finally executives' and directors' litigation costs. 
ponfin ,g 
3.2 1 Section 404 - Internal Control over Financial Re 
Section 404 of SOX is perceived to be the most costly provision for listed 
companies to comply with. It requires the issuer to provide an internal control 
report in their annual/ quarterly financial reports (Cohen and Qaimmaqanii 
2005). Specifically, it is required that the internal control report: 
"(a) RULES REQUIRED- The Commission sballprescribe rules requiring each 
ge Act of 1934 annual report required by section 13 of the Securities Excban 
(15 U. S. C, 78m) to contain an internal control report, whicb sball- 
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(1) state the responsibiho of managementfor establishing and maintainiq an 
adequate internal control structure and procedures forfinancial reporting 
and 
(2) contain an assessment, as of the end of the most recent fiscalyear of the 
issuer, of the effectiveness of the internal control structure andprocedures of 
the issuerforfinancial reportin , g. 
(b) INTERNAL CONTROL EVALUAT70N AND REPORTlNG- 
With respect to the internal control assessment required by subsection (a), each 
registered public accounfingfirm thatprepares or issues the audit reportfor the 
issuer shall attest to, and report on, the assessment made by the manqgement of 
the issuer. An attestation made under this subsection shall be made in 
accordance m4tb standardsJor attestation eqqgements issued or adopted by the 
Board. Any sucb attestation sball not be the subject of a separate e)ý: gqgement"20 
(SEC 2002i). 
In the managements' annual assessment report, managers must provide the 
following statements and assessments on internal control for financial reporting: 
'A statement of management's reiponsibilio for establishiq and maintaining 
adequate internal control overfinancial reporting 
,g 
the framework used by manqgement to evaluate the A statement identi , 
Oin 
porting; effectiveness of the issuer's internal control overfinancial re 
ManaTement's assessment of the effectiveness of the issuer's internal control over 
financial reporting as of the end of The most recentfiscalyear, includinT a statement 
as to wbetber or not the issuer's internal control overfinancial reporfiq is effective. 
20 The discussion presented in Italic in this chapter is taken directly from the Sarbanes Oxley Act and the 
SEC, so the section and subsection notations follow the original text. 
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The statement must also include disclosure of any material weakness in the issuer's 
internal control overfinancial reportiq identified by management Management is 
notpermitted to conclude that the issuer's internal control overfinancial reporting is 
effective if there are one or more material weaknesses in internal control; 
A statement that the independent auditor that audited the financial statements 
included in the annual report has issued an attestation report on mana ement's ,g 
assessment of the issuer's internal control overfinancial reporting (the independent 
auditor's attestation report must also he provided in the annual report) " (SEC 
2002b). 
Section 404 is argued to be the most costly provision because it enforces 
issuers to exert internal and external resources to prepare periodic financial 
statements (SEC 2002b). The SEC estimated that the compliance costs of Section 
404 would be $91,000 per company (SEC 2002b). However, A. R. C. Morgan 21 
reported that the actual compliance costs ranged from USD 1.56 million to USD 
10 million (A. R. C. Morgan 2005). This is consistent with findings of the Financial 
Executive Institute (FEI) survey 2004 (FEI 2004), where the compliance costs 
reported by the A. R. C. Morgan and the FEI were much higher than the SEC 
estimates. Detailed disclosed compliance fees are listed in Table 3-122. 
According to a survey from PricewaterhouseCoopers C'PWC" hereafter), 
executives estimate that 76% of these compliance costs are from internal 
resources whereas the remaining 24% are from external assistance (pWC 2003). 
The survey also asserts that these costs mainly come from "documentation (whicb is 
mentioned by 74% of executives), k: gal requirements (7201o), detailedpolig development (6501o), 
21 A. R. C. Morgan is a company which provided reports that investigates issuers' compliance costs of SOX 
Section 404. 
22 Table 3-1 is directly taken from A. R. C. Morgan (2005) 
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seýf-assessment (62'lo), allestin ,g requirrments and certifications 
(5901o), staff trainin g (5 6 01o) 
and cost of new tools and tecbnolo , gy 
(4 1 Olo) " (PWC 2003, page 2). 
Table 3-1 Disclosed compliance fees by company size 
Average Company Annual Sales in 
US$ 
Average Cost of Section 404 
Compliance for External Resources 
only 
0- 250 Million US$ 1.56 n-0ion 
250 - 500 Million US$ 1.71 million 
500 - 750 Million US$ 1.78 nifflion 
750 -1 Billion US$ 2.03 n-ýlhon 
1-2 Billion US$ 2.4 inilhon 
.2-7 
Billion Insufficient data 
17 - 10 Billion 1US$ 10 million 
Source: A. R. C. Morgan, Sarbanes-Oxley Implementation Costs, What companies are reporting in their 
SEC Filings, February 2005 
Compliance of Section 404 is perceived to be more costly for small 
companies. According to the SEC, small size companies have '5wore limited 
resources, fewer internal personnel and less revenue with which to offset both implementation 
costs and the disproportionate fixed costs of Section 404 compliance" (SEC 2006). In 
addition, small size companies also face problems such as lacking clear guidance 
on Section 404 compliance, unfamiliarity with regulatory environment and a 
lack of sufficient resources and competencies in areas that the company did not 
emphasize before (SEC 2006). These problems are perceived to burden small 
companies. Moreover, since small size companies 'ýejl to agreater dý: gree on the tone 
'porting" 
(SEC 2006), improving corporate at the top to facilitate accurate financial re 
internal control add less value to these firms compared to larger companies. 
Concerning the marginal benefits of compliance, small size companies therefore 
are more likely to delist from the stock market after SOX (Leuz et al 2008). 
The FEI report also shows that Section 404 compliance costs fell after the 
. Litial 
implementatlon. The FEI 2006 survey found that the average SOX 404 ir 
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compliance costs M 2005 was 3.8 million, a decrease of 16.3% in 2004 (FEI 
2006). Specifically, internal staff time decreased by 11.8%, external costs dropped 
by 22.7% and the auditor attestation costs dropped by 13%. The compliance 
costs went further down in 2006, where the average compliance costs were 2.9 
million, a decrease of 23.2% from the previous year (FEI 2007). 
In surn, tbis section discusses provisions that relate to corporate internal 
control, especially Section 404, and their impact on issuers. This section reports 
that Section 404 of the Act caused issuers to allocate a higher proportion of 
resources to enhance its internal control functions immediately after SOX. This 
in turn costs issuers millions of dollars to comply with the rules especially more 
costly to small firms. However, the compliance costs have started to decrease 
from the second year and this trend continued in subsequent years. 
3.22 Section 201 and 203 -Auditor Independence 
Sections 201 and 203 are provisions that airn at improving auditor independence. 
Since non audit services are perceived to impair auditor independence, Section 
201 prohibits 9 categories of non-audit services. These services Mclude: 
"(1) bookkeepin g records orfinancial ,g or other senices related 
to the accounfin 
statements of the audit client; 
(2)finaneial information gstems design and implementation; 
ppraisal or valuation senices, fairness oPinions, or contribution -in-kind reports; (3) a 
(4) actuarial services; 
(5) internal audit outsourdq sem-ces; 
(6) manaTementfunctions or buman resources; 
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(7) broker or dealer, investment ad; viser, or investment bankin se 'ces; ,g 
(8) le 
, gal sem'ces and e, %, tetY services unrelated to the audit; and 
(9) an y otber sertice that the Board determines, by rqgulation, is impermissible 
(SEC 2002c). 
Section 201 assumes that fees for the above 9 categories of non-audit 
services impair auditor independence. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, 
previous studies find mixed results for the impact of non-audit services on 
auditor independence. While some studies found that the level of non-audit 
services is significantly and positively related to auditor inefficiency (Frankel el al 
2002, Kinney et al 2004), others found this relation not significant (Ashbaugh et 
al 2003, DeFond et al 2002). Therefore the introduction of Section 201 still lacks 
substantial empirical support. 
Figure 3-1 "Non-audit services fees, which are classified as other fees in Ciesielski, J. T, and T. R. 
Weirich. 2006, from 2001 to 2004" 
$2.5 
$2.0 
$1.5 
$1.0 
$0.5 
0 
2001 2002 2003 2004 
PWC EM 
MT KPMG 
EM AA [_I Ollier 
Source: Cicsiclski, J. T., and T. R. Wei-rich. 2006. Ups and Downs of Audit Fees since the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act: A Closer Look at the Effects of Compliance 
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One of the impacts of Section 201 is it caused substantial reduction in non- 
audit services provided by auditors. Ciesielski and Weirich (2006) investigate the 
changes of audit fees and non-audit fees from pre- to post-SOX. As shown in 
Figure 3_123, there was a significant drop of non-audit services after the Act was 
enacted. They found that non-audit services fees dropped from $2.3 billion M 
2001 to about $100 million in 2004 (Ciesielski and Weirich 2006). These results 
are consistent with statistics reported in Table 4-5 in Chapter 4. 
Since non-audit fees are one of the major revenues for auditors (Frankel et al 
2002, Kinney et al 2004, Ashbaugh et al 2003, DeFond et al 2002), the substantial 
reduction of non-audit fees might incentivize auditors to increase audit fees to 
compensate for the loss in non-audit fees post-SOX. A number of studies find 
there was substantial increase in audit fees after SOX. For example, Asthana, 
Balsam and Kim (2004), Eldridge and Kealey (2005) and Ciesielski and Weirich 
(2006) all find that audit fees increase substantially after SOX. 
One possible reason that audit fees increased post-SOX might be that 
Section 404 increased audit hours. Section 404 requires an attestation of audit 
report on the internal control of the firm. In addition, the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board ('PACOB" hereafter) requires the internal control 
audit to follow Auditing Standard No. 2. These requirements would increase the 
audit hours and hence audit fees because audit efforts are the main determinants 
of audit prices (Simunic 1980). 
Another possible reason might be that auditors try to compensate the loss of 
non-audit services by increasing audit fees. Table 3-2 24 and statistics in Table 4-5 
in Chapter 4 discover that, the total fees (audit fees plus non-audit fees) did not 
23 Figure 3-1 is directly taken from Ciesielski and Weirich (2006). 
24 Table 3-2 is directly taken from Ciesielski and Weirich (2006). 
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change greatly from pre- to post-SOX. Since total fees did not change greatly but 
audit fees increased substantially from pre- to post-SOX, it indicates auditors' 
intended to increase audit fees to compensate the reduced revenues from non- 
audit services. 
Table 3-2 Total fees to auditors from 2001 to 2004 
($ in milhons) 2001 2002 2003 2004 
AA $ 575.2 $- N/A $- N/A $- N/A 
D&T $ 876.8 $ 927.7 5.8% $ 920.8 -0.7% S 1,130.0 22.7% 
E&Y $ 754.2 $ 912.5 21.0% $ 899.5 -1.4% S 1,088.0 21.0% ' KPMG $. ý1 $ 520.2 17.1% $ 5'84.0 12.3% 754.5 29.2 % 
Pwc $ 2,175.2 1$1,727.8 -20.6% $ 1,468.9 
=0%. 1,842 *7 25.4% 
Other $ 18.6 1$ 168.2 1 804.3% $ 143.81 -14.5% S 97.1 -32.5% 
JAA: Arthur Andersen LL PI D&T: Deloitte & Touche; E&Y: Emst & Young; PWC: PricewaterhouseCoopers 
Source: Ciesielskij. T., and T. R. Weirich. (2006). Ups and Downs of Audit Fees since the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act: A Closer Look at the Effects of Compliance 
Section 203 requires that issuers have to change other public accounting 
firms to audit their financial reports in each of the 5 previous years. The detailed 
mandate is as follows: 
'ý) AUDIT PARTNER ROTATYON- It shall be unlamý'ulfor a qgistemd 
public accounting firm to proidde audit sertices to an issuer if the lead audit 
ponsibilio for the audit) or the audit partner ,g primag res parmer 
(batin 
responsiblefor retieuing the audit that is assigned to perform those audit senices 
basperformed audit serticesfor that issuer in eacb of the 5pretiousfiscalyears of 
that issuer" (SEC 2002e). 
Previous studies argue that auditor tenure might impair auditor 
independence. One argument is if the auditor expects longer audit tenure, they 
would charge a lower initial engagement price. 
Auditors then become more 
economically dependent on their clients because they 
have to recover the sunk 
costs PeAngelo, L. E. 1981a). Therefore 
Section 203 intends to shorten the 
auditors' tenure and hence indirectly -reduce 
low-balling practices and improve 
auditor independence. 
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In sum, this section discusses provisions that relate to auditor 'independence, 
which include Section 201 and 203. Section 201 prohibits auditors from 
providing certain types of non-audit services, whereas Section 203 requires issuers 
to change principle auditors every five years. Previous empirical studies find that 
non-audit service fees decreased substantially post-SOX. However, statistics show 
that auditors increased audit service fees post-SOX In order to compensate the 
greater efforts required by the Section 404 and/or the reduction in non-audit fees 
required by the Section 201. 
3.23 Section 202,204,301 and 407 - Audit Committee Effectiveness 
Section 202,204) 301 and 407 of the Act collectively regulate the requirements of 
the issuers' audit committee composition and its interaction with external 
auditors. These sections mainly extend or amend Rule 10A of the US Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act" or "1934 Act" hereafter). Section 
301 and 407 regulate the composition and responsibilities of the audit conunittee 
while Section 202 and 204 regulate activities and the interaction between audit 
committee and the external auditor. 
Section 301 adds the foRowing to the Rule 10A of the Exchange Act: 
'"I AI IN GENERAL- Each member of the audit committee of the issuer shall be 
a member of the board of directors of the issuer, and shall otheru4se be 
'pendent. 
inde 
((BD)) CRITERM- In order to be considered to be independent for putposes of this 
grapb, a member of an audit committee of an issuer may not, otber than in _Para 
bis or ber capacio as a member of the audit committee, the board of directors, or 
any otber board committee- 
N accePt any consulting, adidsog, or other coVensatogfeefrom the issuer; or 
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(ii) be an affiliatedperson of the issuer or any subsidiag thereof. 
(C) EXEMP77ON A UTHORITY- The Commission ma y exempt from the 
requirements of subparagrapb (B) a particular relationsbip u4tb trspect to audit 
committee members, as the Commission determines appmpfiale in ýigbt of the 
tircumsfances" (SEC 2002g). 
These additional requirements further ensure audit committee *. independence 
which in turn should enhance financial reporting standards (Klein 2002a, Abbott, 
Park and Parker 2000, Carcello and Neal 2003b). As reported in Chapter 2, a 
number of studies have found that more independent audit committees are more 
capable in reducing earnings management (Klein 2002a, Bedard et al 2004) and 
accounting manipulation (Carcello and Neal 2000, Carcello and Neal 2003a). 
Section 301 therefore prevents issuers from having affiliate directors on the audit 
conunittee and hence forces issuers to have a totally independent audit 
committee. 
The second issue in improving audit committee quality is about to increase 
the number of financial and accounting expert on the audit con-irmittee. The 
financial scandals in 2002 have awakened investors and regulators to the 
importance of financial experts in protecting shareholders' interests. In response 
to these accounting scandals, the SEC introduced Section 407, which requires 
disclosure of a company's audit committee financial expertise. 
In particular, the final rule of Section 407 defines the term financial expert as 
follows: 
CONSIDERATIONS- In defining the term financial expert'jor purposes 
of subsection (a), the Commission sball consider whether a person bas, tbMI(gb 
education and exten'ence as a public accountant or auditor or a principal 
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financial officer, comptroller, orptincipal accounting officer of an issuer, orfrom 
a position invoking the performance of similarfunctions - 
(1) an understanding of generally accepted accountiq pfinciples andfinancial 
statements; 
(2) e, %, terience in - 
(A) the preparation or auditing of financial statements of generally, 
comparable issuers; and 
(" D the a _p , 
plication of such principles in connection u4tb the accounting for 
estimates, accruals, and reserves; 
(3) experience witb internal accounfinT controls; and 
(4) an understanding of audit committeefunctions. " (SEC 2002j). 
There are a number of concerns in employing financial experts to the audit 
committee and the impact that will have on disclosure. First, is including a 
financial expert beneficial to investors? There would be a trade-off between 
improved financial reporting quality and increased costs of auditing and 
regulatory compliance. For example, concerned with their reputation, a financial 
expert may require the issuer to appoint a brand name auditor to perform the 
audit. This would in turn increase the accuracy and standard of financial reports 
and reduce litigation risks, but it would also incur higher audit fees in employing a 
brand name auditor. 
Secondly, would there be a negative impact on share prices if the issuer 
discloses that its audit committee does not include a financial expert? If disclosure 
of financial experts signals to investors that the companys financial reporting 
standards are higher, investor may downgrade the credibility of financial reports 
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of issuers that do not disclose or do not have financial expert on their audit 
committees. The stock market may therefore response less favourably to issuers 
who do not disclose or do not have financial expert on their audit committee. 
DeFond et al (2005) find some evidence to support this argument. They find that 
the stock market responded favourably to issuers who announced they employed 
a new financial expert to the audit committee. 
The third concern is that there might not be sufficient supply of financial 
experts in the labour market because fi-rst, being a financial expert requires 
specialist knowledge and secondly, the potential high litigation costs of SOX may 
prevent financial experts from voluntarily joining the audit committee. Deloitte 
(2003) investigated issuers' disclosure practices after the Act was implemented. 
The report shows that of those companies that have at least one financial expert, 
only half of them decided to disclose all financial experts' name to the public. 
Carcello, Hollingsworth and Neal (2006b) find similar results and suggest that 
companies are conservative in disclosing full information of financial experts in 
their audit committees. These findings imply that being a financial expert on the 
audit committee is perceived to incur high litigation costs, because financial 
experts may receive more attention from investors if regulators once financial 
fraud occurs 25 . 
Section 301 also has the foHowing requirements for the audit committee's 
responsibilities, complaints procedure and its authority to engage independent 
advisors: 
"(2) RESPONSIBILITlES RELA77NG TO REGISTERED PUBLIC 
ACCOUN77NG FIRMS- The audit committee of eacb issuer, in its capacity 
25 Other concerns also include the impact of Director and Officer Insurance P&O Insurance) on mitigating 
directors' litigation risk, where this would increase the likelihood of successful appointment of a financial 
expert to the audit conunittee in the post SOX era. 
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as a committee of the board of directors, shall be direal onsible for the y tvsp 
a ppointment, compensation, and oversi giste d public ght of the work of any re Ir 
accounfingfirm emplqyed ýy that issuer (including resolution of disa greements 
between mana gement and the auditor rýXaraiq financial re Porting) for the 
pwpose ofpirpafiq or issuing an audit riport or related work, and each such 
re , gisteredpublic accounfingfirm shall re port 
directly to the audit committee. 
(4) COMPLAINTS- Each audit committee shall establisbproceduresfor - 
(A' the receot, retention, and treatment of complaints received bg the issuer 
rý: garding accounfin& internal accounting controls, or audifiq matters; 
and 
((BD)) the confidentia4 anonymous submission by emplqyees of the issuer of 
concerns rý: garding questionable accountiq or audifing matters. 
(5) A UMORITY TO ENGAGE AD 117SERS- Each audit committee sball 
have the autborio to eqqge inde pendent counsel and other adidsers, as it 
determines necessag to cany out its duties" (SEC 2002g). 
Since non-audit services provided by auditors may impair the auditors' 
independence, Section 202 has the following requirements for the pre-approvals 
of audit and non-audit services by the audit conunittee. 
ttlA 1 AUDIT COAMITTEE A MON- All auditing semces (wbkb miy entail 
promding comfort letters in connection uitb secutifies underwfifiigs) and non- 
pb (B), protided to an issuer audit ser7ýces, otber than as prozided in subparaTra 
by the auditor of the issuer sball be preap prvved ýy the audit committee of the 
issuer" (SEC 2002d). 
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In addition, Section 204 requires external auditors to provide timely report to 
the audit committee for any critical and/or material accounting policies and 
treatments: 
""' ( REPORTS TO AUDIT COAMI77EES- Eacb rýgistered public IC) 
accounlinT firm that performs for any issuer ag audit required by this title 
shall timely report to the audit committee of the issuer-- 
(1) all aitical accountingpoli6ies andpractices to be used; 
(2) all alternative treatments offinancial information witbin generally accepted 
accounting principles that bave been discussed witb management oficials of the 
issuer, ramocations of the use of sucb alternative disclosures and treatments, 
and the treatmentpreferred by the rvgisteredpublic accountinTfirm; and 
(3) other material written communications between the registered public 
accounting firm and the management of the issuer, sucb as an Tement y mana 
letter or schedule of unadjusted dýyerences " (SEC 2002 ý. 
Section 301,202 and 204 all aim to increase the issuer's audit committee's 
responsibilities, authorities and its interaction and communications with external 
auditors. This in turn will increase the workload of audit committees. Deloitte 
(2003) shows that the majority of audit committees met 8 to 9 times per year after 
the Act was implemented. This was twice as many times pre-SOX, where audit 
comrnittees met only 4 to 5 times per year. Linck, Netter and Yang (2008) find 
similar results showing that the number of audit committee meetings doubled 
from 3-4 times per year in 2001 to 5-8 times per year In 2004. These results are 
consistent with statistics in Table 4-8 of Chapter 4 
26 
. 
26 Table 4-8 in Chapter 4 also shows that after SOX was enacted, the number of audit coMIM'ttees meetings 
increased to nearly twice as many as pre-SOX. 
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This section summarises SOX requirements that alm at improving audit 
committee effectiveness. Section 301 imposed requirements of the composition, 
responsibilities and authority of the audit committee, whereas Section 407 sets 
requirements regarding disclosure of audit committee financial expertise. Section 
202 and Section 204 have rules regarding the interaction between audit 
conunittees and external auditors. Results of previous research show that the 
marginal impact of audit conu-nittee independence decreased post 1999. In 
addition, companies were reluctant to disclose information of all financial experts 
on the audit committee due to concerns of greater potential litigation costs. 
Further, the more responsibilities imposed by Section 202 and Section 204 has 
made audit conunittees increase their workload post-SOX, where post-SOX audit 
conu-nittees hold twice as many meetings as pre-SOX. 
3.2.4 Section 3 02,80 7, and 906 - Increased Criminal Penalties 
Section 302 and 906 are provisions that mandate corporate executives' 
responsibilities and/or the criminal penalties to corporate managers if financial 
frauds occur. Section 302 of the Act increases corporate executives' 
responsibilities in ensuring financial reporting quality. It has the following 
requirements: 
REGUL-47YONS REQUIRED. - The Commission sball, ýy rule, trquire, 
for each company fifig periodic reports under section 13(a) or 15(d) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1,934 (15 U. S. C 78m, 78o (d)), that the princpal 
executive officer or officers and the prinapalfinandal ifficer or ifficers, orpersons 
performing jimilarfunctions, certz)ý in each annual or quarterly reportfiled or 
submitted under eitber such section of such Act that - 
(1) the ý, gnij: g officer bas retiewed the repoe; 
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(2) based on the officer's knowledge, the repotf does not contain any untrue 
statement of a materialfact or omit to state a materialfact necessag in order to 
make the statements made, in lz, ýht of the 6ircumstances under wbich such 
statements were made, not misleadiig 
(3) based on sucb oficer's knowledge, thefinandal statements, and otberfinandal 
information included in the report, fairly present in all material respects the 
financial condition and results of operations of the issuer as of, andfor, the 
periods presented in the report; 
(4) the ji , gniq officers - 
, 'A I (-,, / are ruponsiblefor establishing and maintainiq internal contmis; 
(AD) have designed such internal controls to ensure that matefial information 
relating to The issuer and its consolidated subjidiaries is made known to 
such oficers ýy otbers witbin those entities, particularly during the period 
in wbicb tbeperiodic repods are beingpirpared; 
(C) have evaluated the effectiveness of the issuer's internal controls as of a date 
, ysprior to the report; and uitbin 90 da 
P) bave presented in the report their conclusions about the effectiveness of 
their internal contmIs based on their evaluation as of that date; 
,g oficers 
have disclosed to the issuer's auditors and the audit committee (5) the stroni n 
of the board of diactors (orpersonsfuOlliq the equivalentfunction) - 
(A) all jignificant do6iemies in the dej%ign or operation of internal contmIs 
wbicb could adversely, affect the issuer's ability to record, process, 
summatise, and nportfinancial data and bave identoedfor the issuer's 
auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and 
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(B) any fraud, wbetber or not matefial, that involves management or otber 
gnificant role in the issuer's internal controls; emplqyees who bave a si 
and 
(6) the siguning oficers have indicated in the report whether or not there were 
s: ignificant changes in internal controls or in otherfactors that could sýgnificantly, 
affect internal controls subsequent to the date of their evaluation, includiýg any 
gnificant deficiencies and material weaknesses" corrective actions u4th regard to si 
(SEC 2002h). 
Section 906 has similar requirements. It "added section 1350 to the U. S. federal 
criminal code" (Cohen and Qaimmaqami 2004) and require that: 
"(a) CERTIFICATYON OF PERIODIC FINANCL4L REPORTS- Eacb 
gfinamial statementsfiled ýy an issuer uitb the Securities periodic report containin 
Excbange Commission pursuant to section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities 
Excbange Act of 1934 (15 U. S. C, 78m(a) or 78o (d)) sball be accompanied by 
a wilten statement by the cbief executive officer and cbieffinamial officer (or 
equivalent tbereoj) of the issuer 
(b) COI\JENT- The statement required under subsection (a) sball certiýý that the 
periodic report containing the financial statements fully complies u4tb the 
g9 requirements of section 13 (a) or 13(d) of the Securities Excban e Act of 1 34 
(15 U. S. C 78m or 78o (d) and that information contained in the periodic report 
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of 
operations of the issuer" (SEC 20021). 
The difference between Section 302 and Section 906 is that Section 302 does 
not carry any criminal sanctions. According to Cohen and Qaimmaqanii 
(2004) 
and Cohen and Qaimmaqami (2005), for Section 302, any 
'Yalse certifications arv 
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suýiect to SEC enforcement action for zýolafiq the Excbange Act and also possibly to botb 
SEC andprivate litigation alle ging tiolations of the anti-fraudprotisions of the Excbange Act 
(e. g., Section 10 (b) of the Excbaqe Act)". 
However, if Section 906 is violated, there would be crirninal penalties to 
whornever: 
y statement as setfortb in subsections (a) and (b) of this section "(1) certifies an 
knoudn 
,g that the periodic report accompanyiq the statement 
does not com port 
uitb all the requirements set forth in this section shall be fined not more than 
$ 1,000,000 or imbrisoned not more than I Oyears, or botb; or 
y certifies any statement as setjortb in subsections (a) and (b) of this section (2) w ýfu // 
yhýrg the statement does not comport ,g 
tbal the periodic report accompan knou4n 
u4tb all the requirements set jortb in this section sball be fined not more than 
$5,000,000, or imptisoned not more than 20_years, or botb. " (SEC 20021). 
Moreover, Sections under Title VIII and Title XI have imposed crinýinal 
penalties to those who defraud shareholders. For example, Section 807 sets 
crinýinal penalties for defrauding shareholders of publicly traded companies 
against: 
'Wboever knowiýdy, executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or artifice 
(1) to defraud any person in connection m4tb any securio of an issuer m4tb a class of 
securities registered under section 12 of the Securities Excbange Act of 1934 (15 
ports under section 15(d) of the Securities U. S. C 781) or that is required tofile re 
Excbange Act of 1934 (15 U. S. C. 78o (d)); or 
(2) to obtain, ýy means offalse orfraudulent pretences, representations, or pmmises, 
y securio of an y mony orpmpen. ý in connection udtb thepumbase or sale of an an 
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issuer m4th a class of securities registered under section 12 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U. S. C 781) or that is required tofile reports under 
section 15(d) qf the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U. S. C 78o (d)); 
shall befined under this title, or iVrisoned not more than 10years, or both" 
(SEC 2002k). 
All of these sections aim to increase corporate executives' responsibilities 
and litigation costs, and reduce the possibilities of financial and accounting 
fraud. One possible result of these criminal sanctions is that corporate 
executives and board directors become more risk-averse in the post-SOX 
period (Cohen, Dey and Lys 2004a, Linck et al 2008). In addition, this would 
increase the expenses of hiring corporate directors. Linck et al (2008) show that 
average cash pay to corporate directors increased from $29,827 in 2001 to 
$37,500 in 2004, and equity-based pay increased from $31,927 in 2001 to 
$70,216 in 2004. The average increase of total pay to corporate directors from 
2001 to 2004 is about 51.4%. These figures suggest that corporate directors 
might have become more risk-averse post-SOX and charge a premium for 
director fees due to increased litigation risk. 
3.3 Conclusions 
This chapter describes provisions in SOX that receive the most attention from 
the stock market. I start with evaluating Section 404 of SOX, which requires 
issuers to invest resources to improve the internal control functions over 
financial reporting. A number of studies in industry find that Section 404 has 
caused issuers to spend millions of dollars to comply with the rules. However, 
research also shows that from the second year after SOX was implemented, 
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Section 404 compliance costs started to decrease and this trend continued in the 
third and fourth year. 
Section 202 and Section 203 set rules for the independence of external 
auditors. Section 202 prohibits auditors from providing several types of non- 
audit services to their clients while Section 203 does not allow issuers to employ 
accounting firms who was their principle auditor in the previous five years to 
audit their financial reports. The prohibition of non-audit services has caused 
substantial decrease of non-audit services after the Act was implemented. 
However, statistics show that external auditors tended to increase audit service 
fees to compensate the loss from the reduction of non-audit fees. This in turn 
caused the average total fees for audit and non-audit services to remain broadly 
similar from pre- to post-SOX. 
Next Section 301,4075 202 and 204 were discussed, which imposed 
requirements on the composition of the audit conu-nittee, the committee 
members' responsibilities and the committee's interaction and communication 
with the external auditor. Section 301 requires audit committees to be entirely 
composed of independent directors. Section 407 requires issuers to disclose 
whether they have a financial expert on the audit committee and if not, they 
should explain why. Section 202 requires the audit conuTiittee to pre-approve all 
audit and non-audit services-, whereas Section 204 requires external auditors to 
provide timely reports of material accounting policy and treatment to the audit 
committee. Research shows that the marginal impact of audit committee 
independence decreased post 1999. In addition, issuers are reluctant to disclose 
full information in relation to their financial experts on the audit comrruittee 
post-SOX. This is possibly because financial experts may concern that they 
have to bear greater responsibility once financial fraud occurs. The Act has also 
increased the workload of audit committees. 
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Finally I discuss the requirements that increase directors' responsibilities 
and potential litigation costs. Section 302 and Section 906 both require 
corporate executives to certify financial reports. However, Section 302 carries 
no criminal penalties whereas Section 906 does. In addition, sections under Title 
VIII, Title IX and Title X1 also increase criminal penalties on corporate 
executives and directors if financial fraud occurs. These sections increase 
directors' responsibilities as well as the degree of directors' risk-aversion. As a 
result, the expense of hiring corporate directors has increased substantially post- 
sox. 
The next chapter will describe the process of constructing the sample for 
the analyses in this thesis. It will also provide descriptive statistics on the 
corporate governance variables, firm characteristics variables, and auditing and 
non-auditing services variables from 2001 to 2005. 
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4 
DATA 
This chapter describes the process of constructing the data sample for the 
empirical analysis in this thesis. It also provides desc-t'Ptive statistics of the sample 
distributions, firm characteristics, governance structures and audit fees from 2001 
to 2005. The chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.1 describes how the data 
sample is constructed, and shows the annual sample distributions. It also presents 
statistics of the sample's industry distribution. Section 4.2 shows changes of 
sample firm characteristics from 2001 to 2005. Section 4.3 presents statistics on 
audit and non-audit fees from pre- to post-SOX. Section 4.4 shows how SOX 
impacted on corporate governance structures and especially audit committee 
compositions. It also illustrates some specific examples of how governance 
structures changes during the sample period. Section 4.4 finally compares key 
governance variables to prior studies and presents a picture of how U. S. 
corporate governance has changed over the last 15 years. The final section 
concludes. 
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4.1 Sample Construction 
My sample consists of S&P 500 non-financial firms from 2001 to 2005. This is 
because SOX was enacted in July 2002 and it affected the whole auditing industry 
as well as the U. S. corporate governance system. Choosing the period from 2001 
to 2005 enables me to capture the impact of the SOX on corporate governance in 
the United States. However, not all U. S. issuers comply with the Act immediately 
after it was introduced. Only accelerated filers, such as S&P 500 companies. were 
supposed to comply with the new regulation immediately. I therefore choose the 
S&P 500 from 2001 to 2005 to analyse the impact of SOX on leading U. S. 
issuers. 
All the corporate governance information was manually collected from the 
companies' proxy statements (Form DEF 14A), which can be accessed from the 
SEC website. Director information is provided in the "Election of directors" 
section. Audit committee composition, audit fees and non-audit fees information 
are provided in the "Audit Committee Report" section, while director ownership 
information is provided in the "Stock Ownership" section within the proxy 
statements. 
The sample is constructed as follows. The initial sample consisted of 3000 
firm-years from 2001 to 2006, but the final sample is reduced to 5 years from 
27 11_ 2001 to 2005 LiS is because issuers report directors' information for the 
current fiscal year, but they report audit fees, audit committee information and 
ownership information for the last fiscal year in the proxy statement in the 
current year. Therefore director information reported in the current year has to 
be matched with auditing and ownership information reported in the next fiscal 
27 Ile sample consists of all non-financial companies in the S&P 500 index, therefore it represents the 
population of the largest listed non-financial companies in the US stock market. 
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year. As a result, all director information in 2006 has to be dell--ted because there 
is not enough information on auditing and ownership in the 2007 proxy 
statements when I constructed this dataset28. Some observations in 2005 have to 
be deleted as well because some firms had not submitted their proxy statements 
to the SEC by April 2006. In addition, for newly nominated directors, only those 
directors who were successfully elected would be included into the dataset. 
Information about whether newly nominated directors were successfully elected 
is obtained from proxy statements in the next fiscal year. Finally, retired directors 
were excluded from the dataset. 
Panel A in Table 4-1 shows the year on year distributions of the sample. The 
initial sample has 500 companies in which there are 90 financial institutions. 
Therefore there are 410 non-financial firms each year. Statistics show that there 
are more missing proxy statements M 2001 (171 firms missing) compared to the 
other years. There are only 293 available proxy statements in 2001, whereas there 
are more than 300 proxy statements for the other four year. Further, there are 
slightly more firms lacking audit cornrylittee information in 2005 because some 
proxy statements were not available yet at the time I collected the data. 450 
observations for financial institutions and 414 observations with missing 
governance information were deleted from the original sample. Thereby the final 
sample consists of 1636 observations with a maximum of 346 observations in 
2005, and a minimum of 277 observations in 2001. 
Panel B in Table 4-1 shows the industry distribution of the sample. Industry 
sector codes were collected from DataStream. There are totally 8 sectors which 
include oil and gas, basic materials, industrials, consumer goods, healthcare, 
consumer services, telecommunications, utilities and technology. Ile table also 
shows the percentage of firms relative to the whole sample in the eight sectors. 
28 1 coflected this dataset in Apd 2006 
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80% of the sample consists of firms in the industrials, consumer goods, 
healthcare, consumer services and technology sector, while the rest of the sample 
is from oil & gas, basic materials, telecommunications and utility sector. 
Table 4-1 Descriptive statistics - sample distributions 
PaneIA: Diftribution byyear 
Missing Available Missing % Sample - Original Financtal Final % Year Proxy Proxy AudC '/o Original 
Sample Institutions Sample Sample 
Statement Statement Info. Sample 
2001 500 90 117 293 16 277 16.93% -3.07% 
2002 500 90 67 343 15 328 20.059/o 0.050/0 
2003 500 90 55 355 15 340 20.7K16 0.78% 
2004 500 90 51 359 14 345 21.09% 1.09% 
2005 500 90 44 366 20 346 21.15% 1.15% 
Total 2500 450 334 1716 80 1636 100.00% 0.00% 
Panel B: Distribution b ), industg 
% of Missing Available Missing % Sample - Original Final 0//0 
Industry Sector Original Proxy Proxy AudC % Original 
Sample Sample Sample 
Sample Statement Statement Info. Sample 
Oil & Gas 145 7.07% 36 109 10 99 6.05% -1.02% 
Basic Materials 120 5.85% 25 95 4 91 5,56% -0.29% 
Industrials 355 17.32ý, o 40 315 18 297 18.15% 0.84, o 
Consumer Goods 295 14.39% 37 258 1 257 15.71% 1.320ý16 
Healthcare 255 12.44% 38 217 13 204 12.479,16 0.030,16 
Coil sum er Seniccs 360 17.56% 33 327 15 312 19.07% 1.51% 
Telecommunication 50 2.44% 16 34 8 26 1.59% -0.85% 
Utihties 150 7.32% 39 ill 7 104 6.36% -0.96% 
Technology 320 15.6P, o 70 250 4 246 15. Wý'o -0.57% 
Total 2050 100.00% 334 1716 80 1636 10O. W/'O 0.00% 
The sample consists of up to 346 non-financial S&P 500 companies per year during the period 2001 to 2005. The 
sample is constructed by examining all S&P 500 companies with available corporate governance information filed in 
the proxy statements on the Secatities and Exchange Commission (SEC) website from 2001 to April 2006. Fu'xn 
years are omitted from the sample if information regarding audit committee composition, board and audit 
committee meetings at the year end is unavailable. The initial sample consists of 500 companies including 90 
financial companies each year. Missing Proxy Statement refers to the aggregate number of proxy statements missing 
from the SEC website. Missing AudC. Info refers to observations missed due to unavailable governance 
information in the proxy statements at the year end. The final sample consists of 1636 observations. The last 
column refers to the percentage of firms each year or each sector of the total number of firms in the final sample 
(1636). 
The last column of Panel B in Table 4-1, "%Sample-%Original Sample", 
shows the differences in industry distributions between my sample and the 
original sample. The oil & gas, consumer goods and consumer services sector 
have shghtly greater deviation from the original sample distribution than other 
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sectors. The differences are -1.02%, 1.32% and 1.51% for the three sectors 
respectively. The statistics show that my sample shows similar Mdustry 
distribution with the population. 
The rest of this chapter is set as foRows. Section 4.2 describes changes of 
sample finn characteristics from 2001 to 2005. Section 4.3 presents statistics of 
how SOX affected fees for audit and non-audit services. Section 4.4 shows how 
the SOX affected of the sample finn's corporate governance structure m the 
sample period. Section 4.5 concludes. 
4.2 Changes in Firm Characteristics from 2001 to 2005 
Table 4-2 presents the definitions of the key firin characteristics variables in this 
thesis. All accounting data was collected from WorldScope database provided by 
Thomson One Financial. The variables are defined as follows. 
Table 4-2 Definitions of firm characteristics variables 
Variable Definition Equation 
Assets Year-end total assets of the firm n/a 
Sales Year-end total sales of the firm n/a 
Income Year-end total income of the firm n/a 
ROA ROA is Income divided by total assets Income/Assets 
ROS ROS is Income divided by total sales Income/Sales 
E/P ratio 
E/P ratio is defined as the Income divided by the market value of Incorne/MV 
the equity 
Market Value (M`V) Year end market value of common equity n/a 
MKBV 
Ile market value of common equity plus book value of debt and 
' 
(MV+Debt)/Assets 
s total assets then divided by the book value of firm 
Debt Year-end total debt n/a 
Market leverage ratio Debt divided by the sum of Debt and MV Debt/Pebt+MV) 
Book leverage ratio Debt divided by book value of assets Debt/Assets 
Table 4-3 shows descriptive statistics of the sample finn characteristic from 
2001 to 2005, and Table 4-4 presents the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test and 
examines the significance of the annual changes in firm characteristics. 
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Table 4-3 shows that the Dot Com bubble, the terrorist attack on the Twin 
Towers, and a series of financial scandals during 2001 and 2002 led US firms to 
suffer significant losses during the sample period2'. Statistics in Table 4-3 show 
that the average firm market value decreased substantially from $20.31bn mi 2001 
to $15.96bn in 2002. The Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test in Table 4-4 shows that 
companies' market value decreased significantly at 1% by $3.46 (billion). Firm 
growth opportunities, measured by the Market to Book ratio (MKBV), dropped 
from 3.47 to 2.58. On average, MKBV dropped by 0.77 and was significant at 
1%. These statistics indicate that companies had poor stock performance and had 
fewer opportunities for growth in year 2002. 
Company capital structure also changed substantially in 2002. Table 4-3 
shows that firms tended to use more debt but less equity to finance projects. The 
firm's total debt level increased from $4.17bn in 2001 to $4.28bn in 2002. In 
addition, Table 4-4 shows that total assets increased by $0.3bn from 2001 to 
2002, and total debt increased by $0.21bn at the same time. This suggests that 
70% increase in total assets attributed to the increase in debt from 2001 to 2002. 
Further, the market leverage ratio increased by 0.03 and fbis increase is significant 
at 1%30. Incorporated with the fact that the stock market performed poorly in 
2002, these results imply that companies tended to finance projects with debts 
rather than equity in 2002. 
Firm operating performance also decreased significantly in 2002. ROA 
decreased from 4.32% to 3.39%, and ROS dropped from 4.04% to 2.15%. E/P 
ratio also dropped from 2.07% to 0.3%. Table 4-4 shows that from 2001 to 2002, 
29 Specifically, only the Consumer Goods, Consumer Services and the Healthcare industry did not experience 
decrease in operating performance from 2001 to 2002. AE other industries in my sample had negative 
changes in ROA and ROS from 2001 to 2002. 
30 Specifical-ly, the average Market Leverage ratio of A the eight industries increased from 2001 to 2002, while 
the Basic Materials, Consumer Goods, Consumer Services and the Healthcare 
industry have increased the 
total amount of Debt from 2001 to 2002. 
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ROA and ROS decreased by 0.17% (significant at 59/o) and 0.14% (significant at 
10/6) respectively, whereas the E/P ratio decreased by 0.33% (si0ficant at 1%). 
These statistics suggest that for investors' returns are lower for every dollar that 
invested in the company in 2002 compared to 2001". 
Table 4-4 Annual changes of firm characteristics from 2001 to 2005 
2002-2001 2003-2002 2004-2003 2005-2004 2005-2001 
Pairs = -9 74 Pairs=326 Pairs=337 Pairf=341 Pairs=273 
Assets ($bn) 0.30 1.05 0.87 0.71 2.93 
Sales ($bn) -0.25 0.88 1.37 1.29 2.82 
Income ($bn) 0.08 *** 0.15 *** 0.24 *** 0.18 *** 0.60 
ROA -0.17% 1.07% 1.83% 0.97% 3.09% 
ROS -0.14% 2.73% 2.50% 1.35% 5.15% 
E/P ratio -0.33% 1.78% 1.51% 0.38% 2.31% 
Market Value ($bn) -3.46 3.99 1.30 0.23 1.55 
MKBV -0.77 0.48 0.03 -0.02 -0.34 
Debt ($bn) 0.21 -0.08 -0.07 0.07 0.22 
Market leverage ratio 0.030 -0.044 -0.021 -0.003 -0.032 
Book leverage ratio 0.003 -0.018 -0.023 -0.003 -0.039 
The sample consists of up to 346 non-financial S&P 500 companies in the US during the period 
2001 to 2005. Aocounting data is collected from the Worldscope database. MV is the year-end 
market value of the firm. MKBV is defined as the market value of the equity plus book value of 
debt and then divided by the book value of firm's total assets. Debt / Assets is defined as year-end 
total debt divided by year-end total assets of the firm. Sales are the year-end total sales of the firm. 
Income is the yeat-end total inoome of the firm. Debt / (Debt + MV) is defined as year-end total 
debt divided by the sum of year-end market value of the firm and total debt. E/P ratio 
is defined as 
the Income divided by MV. ROA is Income divided by total assets. ROS is Income divided 
by total 
sales. Units of assets, sales, income, market value and debt are 
billion U. S. dollars. The Wilc: oxon 
Signed Rank test is performed to test the significance of the changes from year to year. and 
indicate the changes are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Firm performance started to recover in 2003. Companies have higher firm 
value, higher total income and higher profit margins from 2003 onwards. 
Both 
company total assets and market value increased significantly year on year after 
2002. The last column of Table 4-4 shows that on average, there was $2.93bn 
31 The lower investor returns may be caused by the poorer operating performance and stock performance of 
fisted companies between 2001 and 2002. 
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increase in total assets and $1.55bn increase in market value from 2001 to 2005. 
In addition, ROA increased by 3.09% and ROS increased by 5.15% from 2001 to 
2005 Further, firm total income increased by $0.60bn, whereas E/P ratio 
increased by 2.31%. Table 4-4 shows that these increase in ROA, ROS, E/P ratio 
and total income were significant. 
Due to better stock market performance in 2003, companles reduced the 
amount of debt andreturned to use equity for project financing. Table 4-3 shows 
total debt dropped from $4.28bn in 2002 to $4.15bn in 2003. Table 4-4 also 
shows that total debt continued to drop by $0.07bn from 2003 to 2004. 
Moreover, both Table 4-3 and Table 4-4 suggest that the market leverage ratio 
and the book leverage ratio decreased significantly from 2002 to 2005. This 
implies that companies tended to use equity rather than debt for project financing 
from 2003 onwards. 
4.3 Changes in Audit and Non-audit Fees post-SOX 
Table 4-5 presents the descriptive statistics of audit and non-audit service fees 
from 2001 to 2005. Audit fees are defined as fees charged by the accounting firm 
solely for auditing service. Non-audit fees include audit-related fees, tax fees and 
fees of all other services. Total fees are the sum of audit and non-audit fees. Fee 
ratio is defined as the percentage of audit fees to the total fees. Variables of audit 
fees, non-audit fees and total fees are scaled by the value of total assets to control 
for the client's firm size. Since the scaled values of audit, non-audit and total fees 
were too small; they were further adjusted by multiplying 1000. The Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank Tests are performed to examine the significance of annual changes 
in audit and non-audit fees in Table 4-6. 
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The mean, median and standard deviation of audit and non-audit fees from 
2001 to 2005 were presented in Table 4-5. Consistent with Ciesielski and Weirich 
(2006) and Ghosh and Pawlewicz (2008) (presented in Figure 3-1 of Chapter 3), 
the statistics in Table 4-5 show that non-audit fees decreased substantially after 
the Act prohibited certain types of non-audit services. The average total non- 
audit fees dropped from $5.49m in 2001 to $3.93m in 2002, and continued to 
decrease to $2.14rn in 2005. Table 4-6 shows that the annual decreases in non- 
audit fees frorn 2001 to 2005 were all significant at 1 %. 
Table 4-6 Annual changes of audit fees from 2001 to 2005 
2002-2001 
Pairs=274 
2003-2002 
Pairs=326 
2004-2003 
Pairs=337 
2005-2004 
Pairs=341 
2005-2001 
Pairs=273 
Audit fees ($m) 1.01 0.92 2.22 0.27 4.38 
Non-audit fees ($m) 
-1.65 -0.96 -0.53 -0.39 -3.41 
Total fees ($m) 
-0.74 -0.08 1.75 -0.15 0.91 
Fee ratio 0.15 0.11 0.12 0.04 0.40 
Audit fees* 1 OOO/Assets 0.07 0.12 0.21 -0.01 0.37 
Non-audit fees* 1 OOO/Assets -0.21 -0.12 -0.07 -0.04 -0.40 
Total fees* 1 OOO/Assets -0.15 0.00 0.14 -0.06 -0.04 
The sample consists of up to 346 non-financial S&P 500 companies per year during the period 2001 to 2005. 
Audit and non-audit services fees data are collected from the companies' Proxy Statements (DEF 14A) on 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) website. Audit fees are fees billed by the accounting firms 
solely on auditing services. Non-audit fees are the sum of audit-related fees and all other fees billed by the 
accounting firm including consultant fees. Total fees are the sum of audit and non-audit fees. Ratio is 
defined as the proportion of audit fees to total fees billed by the accounting firm. Audit fees/Assets (Non- 
audit fees/Asscts, Total fees/Assets) is defined as audit fees (non-audit fees, total fees) divided by firms' 
total assets. Audit fees/Assets, Non-audit fees/Assets and Total fees/Assets shown in the table are all scaled 
by multiplying 1000. The Wilcoxon Signed Rank test is performed to test the significance of the changes 
from year to year. ***, ** and * indicate the changes are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
In contrast to non-audit fees, audit fees increased significantly from 2001 to 
2005. Table 4-5 shows the absolute level of audit fees increased from $2.71m in 
2001 to $7.10m in 2005, while the scaled value of audit fees increased from 0.34 
in 2001 to 0.72 in 2005. In addition, the fee ratio increased from 0.4 Mi 2001 to 
0.81 M 2005. Table 4-6 shows that these increases M audit and non-audit fees 
were significant. 
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There are two possible reasons for the increase in audit fees. First, in order 
to comply with requirements in Section 404 of SOX, audit hours may increase 
substantially to ensure audit quality. Further, SOX also required auditors to 
follow the Auditing Standard No. 2 to conduct auditing and attest audit reports to 
the internal control reports. These factors may have increased auditors' workload 
which would be reflected in the audit price. Secondly, accounting firms might 
increase audit fees to compensate for the loss of non-audit fees after SOX was 
introduced. 
If the second explanation holds, the total fees would remain the same from 
pre- to post-SOX. Table 4-5 shows that adjusted for firm size, total fees 
decreased slightly in 2002 and 2003 in response to SOX. However, it increased 
back to the pre-SOX level from 2004 onwards. Table 4-6 shows that, from 2001 
to 2005, the adjusted total fees decreased by only 0.04 and was not significant. 
The statistics therefore imply that companies increased audit fees to supplement 
the loss of non-audit fees. 
4.4 Corporate Governance Data 
4.4.1 Variable Definitions 
Table 4-7 summarises the definitions of corporate governance variables in this 
thesis. Board size is defined as the total number of directors on the board. 
Independent directors are defined as non-executive directors. Fortner executive 
who retired within the last five years, relatives of CEO or main executive 
directors, or those who have significant transactions or business relationships 
with the company are categorized as affiliate directors. 
Retired founders, who 
serve as board chairman emeritus, are defined as affiliate 
directors as well. Board 
independence is defined as the percentage of 
independent directors on the board. 
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Table 4-7 Definitions of corporate governance variables 
Variables / Items Definition 
Independent Director Non-executive directors who have no affiliation with the company beyond for being directors 
Former employees in the last five years, founding directors who have retired from the 
Affiliate Director company, relatives of the CEO or those who have significant transactions and/or business 
relationships with the company 
Insider Current employees of the company 
Founder Directors who found or co-found the company 
Directors who specialize in finance or accounting, or who have worked in the Banking and 
Financial Expert 
Accounting industry for more than 5 years, or who are Chief Financial/ Investment Officer or 
President of Finance of the company, or who are qualified as CPA or CFA, or Professors in 
Finance or Accounting are categorized as a financial expert 
Board Size 
'11le number of directors serving on the company's board at the beginning of the financial 
AudC Size 
The number of directors serving on the company's audit committee at the beginning of the 
financial year 
No. Indep. 
The number of independent directors on the company's board at the beginning of the 
financial year 
'10 Indep. 
The percentage of independent directors on the company's board at the beginning of the 
financial year 
0"0 Founder 
The percentage of founding directors on the company's board at the beginning of the 
financial year 
0 FinExp. 
The percentage of financial experts on the company's board at the beginning of the financial 
NAudC FinExp. 
The percentage of financial experts on the company's board, who are not serving on the audit 
committeee, at the beginning of the financial year 
No. AudC Indep. 
The number of independent directors on the company's audit conimitee at the beginning of 
the financial year 
% AudC Indep. 
The percentage of independent directors on the company's audit commitee at the beginning 
of the financial year 
% AudC FjnExp. 
The percentage of financial experts on the company's audit coMnuttee at the beginning of the 
financial year 
Board Meetings The number of board meetings held at the end of the financial year 
AudC Meetings The number of audit conunitee meetings held at the end of the financial year 
Dual role CEO CEO of the company who also serves as the chairman of the board 
Inside Director 
ý- -1 .- 
Total percentage of shareholdings of inside and affiliate directors serving on the board 
Outside Director Total percentage of shareholdings of independent directors serving on the board Owncrsl-ýp 
I define financial expertise using a narrower definition in accordance with 
the initial definition in the Section 407 proposal. This indicates the financial 
experts on the audit conu-nittee should have: 
'Education and e, %, terience as a Principalfinandal oficer, principal accounting officer, 
controller, 'public 
accountant or auditor or e%, terience in one or more pojifions that 
I. nvolve theperformance of similarfunctions" (SEC 2002)). 
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Therefore directors who specialize in finance or accounting, or who have 
worked in the Banking and Accounting industry for more than 5 years, or who 
are Chief Financial/Investment Officer or President of Finance of the company, 
or who are quahfied as CPA or CFA, or Professors in Finance or Accounting are 
categorized as a financial expert. 
Other variables are defined as follows. Board (AudC) meetings are the 
number of board (audit committee) meetings held in one year. Inside (Outside) 
Director Ownership is defined as. total percentage of shareholdings of inside or 
affiliate (outside) directors. Dual role CEO is defined as CEO who also serves as 
the chairman of the board. 
4.4.2 Cbanges in Governance Variables between 2001 and 2005 
Previous studies suggest that a smaller and more independent board indicates 
superior corporate governance system (Yermack 1996, Hilher and McColgan 
2006, Rosenstein and Wyatt 1990, Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Table 4-8 presents 
the descriptive statistics of corporate governance variables in my sample. The 
statistics suggest that the U. S. corporate governance system changed in the 
direction in accordance with previous studies from 2001 to 2005. Corporate 
boards became slightly smaller after 2002. Board size decreased from 10.57 in 
2001 to 10.47 in 2005. However, Table 4-9 shows that the decrease in board size 
is not significant. Board independence, on the other hand, increased every year 
from 2001 to 2005, and the increases are significant. Further, the percentage of 
firms that have at least one affiliate director decreased from 36% in 2001 to 32% 
in 2005. 
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In fact, from 2001 to 2005, companies M the sample tended to reduce board 
size and increase board independence. For example, Pfizer Inc. (CIK CODE: 
0000078003) had 19 directors on the board in 2001 and 18 directors in 2002. The 
company reduced the board size to 15 in 2003 and 2004 and further to 14 Mi 
2005. Another example is Tyson Foods Inc. (CIK CODE: 0000100493). The 
company had 5 executive directors and 4 affiliate directors on the board in 2001 
and 2002. These directors were former employees of the company and became 
consultants to the company after they retired. However, the company reduced 
the number of affiliate directors to 2 and hence board independence increased to 
50% by 2005. 
The requirements of SOX also increased the workload of company boards. 
Table 4-8 shows the number of board meetings increased slightly from 7.54 times 
per year in 2001 to 8.44 times per year in 2005. In addition, Table 4-9 shows that 
the number of board meetings on average increased by 0.375 times from 2002 to 
2003, and by 0.275 times from 2003 to 2004. In total, board meetings increased 
by 0.904 times per year from 2001 to 2005 and significant at 1%. 
Companies that are listed on the NYSE and NASDAQ have to comply with 
the requirement that all audit conunittee members are independent of the 
companies' management after December 1999 (Klein 2002a). In addition, Section 
301 also requires audit committees to be composed of independent directors 
(SEC 2002g). '111erefore audit committees are supposed to be fuUy independent 
after 1999. 
However, the statistics presented In Table 4-8 show that the mean level of 
audit committee independence for the sample is 99% 
from 2001 to 2005. This is 
because there were a number of directors who were declared as independent 
directors by the company were defined as affiliate directors in this thesis. For 
example, Pall Corporation (CIK CODE: 
0000075829) defined Abraham Appel as 
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an independent director in 2004. As presented in Table 4-7, affiliate directors 
include founding directors and executives from the parent or controlling 
companies. Since Mr. Appel was the founding director of the company who may 
have strong power over the management, I defined him as an affiliate director. 
Therefore although the Act requires audit committees to be fully independent, 
some audit conu-nittee actually may still include non-independent directors. 
Table 4-9 Annual changes of corporate governance variables 
2002-2001 2003-2002 2004-2003 2005-2004 2005-200T- 
Pairs=274 Pairs=326 Pairs=337 Pairs=341 Pairs=273 
Board Size -0.044 -0.077 0.036 -0.038 -0.070 
Independence (No. oo 0.099 0.031 0.148 0.026 0.308 
Independence (0/6) 1.38% 0.91% 1.14% 0.57% 3.70% 
Boards with Affiliate Directors 
-2.92% -1.230/'o -2.08% 0.000//0 -5.49% (% of firms) 
Boards with founding directors 
-0.73% -0.61% -0.30% 0.00% -1.47% (% of firms) 
Boards with dual role CEO 2.92% -0.31% -0.59% -2.64% -2.93% ('/0 of firms) 
Financial Experts (0/6) 1.43'/ o 0.96% 0.68% 0.790,0 3.8506 
AudC Size 0.000 -0.037 0.033 -0.059 -0.077 
AudC Independence (No. oý 0.026 -0.028 0.030 -0.065 -0.055 
AudC Independence (0/6) 0.540//0 0.180//o 0.00% -0.15% 0.46"/o 
AudC. Financial Experts 
0.055 0.104 0.116 0.050 0.344 (No. oo 
AudC. Financial Experts (0/6) 1.74% 2.950/0 2.960//o 2.06% 10.680/o 
Board Meetings -0.055 0.375 0.275 0.149 0.904 
AudC Meetings 1.937 1.047 0.514 0.191 3.607 
'17he sample consists of up to 346 non-financial S&P 500 companies per year during the period 2001 to 2005. The 
sample is constructed by examining all S&P 500 companies With available corporate governance information filed 
in the proxy statements on the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) website from 2001 to April 2006. 
Board/AudC size is the number of directors serving on the company's board/audit committee at the beginning of 
the fiscal year. Independent directors are defined as non-executive directors who have no affiliation with the 
company beyond being directors. Financial experts are defined as directors who are specialized in finance or 
accounting. Directors who specialize in finance or accounting, or who have worked in the Banking and 
Accounting industry for more than 5 years, or who are Chief Financial /Investment Officer or President of 
Finance of the company, or who are qualified as CPA or CFA, or Professors in Finance or Accounting are 
categorized as a financial expert. meetings are defined as the number of board/audit committee meetings held 
over the fiscal year. 'ne Wilcoxon Signed Rank test is performed to test the significance of the changes from year 
to year. ***, ** and * indicate the changes are significant at 1%, 51/o and 10'/10 respectively. 
Table 4-8 shows that companies tended to reduce audit corntmttee size and 
increase the committee's financial expertise and activeness during the sample 
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period. For example, PEPSICO (CIK CODE: 0001076405) had 11 members on 
the audit committee in 2001 and 2002 without any financial experts. However, 
the company reduced the number of audit committee members to 6 and 
appointed one financial expert to the audit committee in 2003. Further, the 
number of meetings of Pepsico's audit committee increased from 2 times per year 
in 2001 to 5 times per year in 2003, and this increased again to 9 times per year in 
2005. 
Since previous studies suggest that an audit committee is more effective if it 
is smaller, with greater financial expertise and more active (DeZoort et al 2002, 
Abbott et al 2004, Anderson, Mansi and Reeb 2004, Carcello et al 2006a, Xie et al 
2003), statistics in Table 4-8 suggest audit committee became more effective post- 
SOX. It shows that the average audit committee siZe decreased slightly from 4.01 
in 2001 to 3.92 in 2005, but not significantly. In addition, Table 4-9 shows that 
financial expertise increased significantly by 10.68% from 2001 to 2005. Further, 
the number of committee meetings increased significantly by 3.607 times per year 
from 2001 to 2005. This is consistent with Unck et al (2008) that they found the 
workload of audit comrmttees increased significantly post-SOX. The statistics 
overall imply that SOX had positive impact on the companies' audit committees, 
and made it more effective in enhancing the companies' financial reporting 
standards. 
Table 4-10 presents the comparisons of key corporate governance variables 
in this thesis with variables in prior research, which enables me to create a picture 
of how the U. S. corporate governance system has developed in the last 15 years. 
The average number of board directors decreased from 12 in the 1990s to 10 
after 2000, whereas the average number of audit committee members decreased 
from 4.5 in the 1990s to about 4 after 2000. Further, since 1990, board 
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independence has increased from 58% to 81% and audit committee , 
independence has increased from 80% to 99%. 
Table 4-10 Comparing key governance variables with prior research 
Klein Anderson el al Xie et al 
Anderson, Deli 
Bafic Injormation 
(2002 a, 2002 b) 
. . 
(2004) 
. 
(2003) & Gillan Tbis Study 
(2003) 
Sample Firms S&P 500 S&P 500 S&P 500 S&P Super 1500 S&P 500 
Sample Size 803(a), 692(b) 1052 282 1241 
Period 1992,1994, 
1991-1993 1993-1998 1996 2001 2001-2005 
Vanables Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Board Size 12.00 12.10 12.48 9.39 10.47 
Independence (No. oo 6.90 6.00 8.47 
Independencr (%) 58', o 57% 67% 63% 81 ý, o 
Financial Experts (%) 24'1'o 20% 
AudC Size 4.50 4.53 3.64 3.97 
AudC Independence (No. oo 3.94 
AudC Independence (0, o) 80% 70% 85% 88% 99% 
AudC. Financial Experts (No. oo 0.90 1.05 
AudC. Financial Experts (%) 29% 28% 
Board Meetings 8.26 6.64 7.94 
AudC Meetings 3.50 3.87 3.97 8.14 
The sample consists of up to 346 non-financial S&P 500 companies per year during the period 2001 to 2005. The sample 
is constructed by examining all S&P 500 companies with available corporate governance information filed in the proxy 
statements on the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) website from 2001 to April 2006. Board/. AudC size is the 
number of directors serving on the mmpany's board/audit cDmmittee at the beginning of the Fiscal year. Independent 
directors are defined as non-executive directors who have no affiliation with the company beyond being directors. 
Financial experts are, defined as directors who are specialized in finance or accounting. Directors who are working in the 
Banking and Accounting industry for more than 5 years, or as Chief Financial/ Investment Officer or President of Finance 
of the company, or qualified as CPA or CFA, or Professors in Finance or Accounting. Board/AudC meetings are defined 
as the number of board/audit cc)mmittee meetings held over the fiscal year. 
However, because the definition of financial expert in this thesis is narrower 
than the definition in Xie et al (2003), the overall board financial expertise is 
lower in this thesis. Audit committee financial expertise is 27% in this thesis, 
whereas in Xie et al (2003), it was 29.2%. 
The number of board meetings did not change too much. It decreased 
slightly from 8.26 times per year to 7.94 times per year. However, the number of 
audit committee meetings has jumped from an average of 3.5 times per year to 
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8.14 times per year. As discussed before, this was largely due to the introduction 
of SOX which increased the workload of the audit conu-nittee. 
In sum the results show that first, during the last 15 years, both boards and 
audit committees have become smaller and more independent. Secondly, more 
financial experts were appointed to company audit committees. Further, both 
boards and audit committees became more active post-SOX. The statistics 
suggest that U. S. corporate governance structure kept developing in the last 15 
years in the direction that is accordance with "good governance" in previous 
literature. 
4.5 Conclusions 
This chapter describes the process of constructing the data sample for the 
analyses in this thesis and presents statistics for firm characteristics, audit fees and 
governance variables. Section 4.1 presents sample distributions, and Section 4.2 
describes changes in sample firm characteristics from 2001 to 2005. The 
descriptive statistics show that companies experienced poor stock market 
performance in 2002, and hence they were more likely to finance projects with 
debt than equity. In addition, companies also had poor operating performance in 
2002 compared to the other years. Firm performance started to recover from 
2003, as firms had higher value and better performance from 2003 onwards. 
Section 4.3 presents statistics on fees for audit and non-audit services from 
pre- to post-SOX. SOX prohibits public accounting firms from providing certain 
types of non-audit services. Therefore the total non-audit fees decreased 
substantiaRy after SOX was introduced. However, audit fees increased 
significantly post-SOX. It is possible that the greater workload and higher quality 
of audit that is required post-SOX drove up the audit price. However, it is also 
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possible that accounting firms tended to increase auditing services fees to 
compensate for the reduction in non-audit services after the Act came into force. 
Section 4.4 shows how SOX affected the sample firm's corporate 
governance structures during the sample period. It illustrates some examples With 
respect to specific companies to highlight how corporate governance changed 
from 2001 to 2005. Companies tended to reduce the board siZe and audit 
committee siZe during the sample period, but increased both the level of board 
and audit committee independence. In addition, after SOX was enacted, audit 
committees increased financial expertise and became more active. 
Section 4.4 also compares key governance variables to prior studies dating 
from 1991 onwards to show a picture of how the U. S. corporate governance 
system has changed over the last 15 years. It is found that during the last 15 years, 
U. S. corporate governance system has developed in the direction that is 
accordance with "good governance" in previous literature. Companies tended to 
reduce the board size, increase board independence and increase audit committee 
financial expertise and activeness to enhance their monitoring over managers. 
The next chapter is the first empirical chapter in this thesis. It analyses 
whether the determinants of audit committee financial expertise have changed 
after SOX. 
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5 
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT, 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
STRUCTURE AND AUDIT 
COMMITTEE FINANCIAL 
EXPERTISE 
Using a unique dataset of governance characteristics, I exarruine the impact of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOXý on the determinants of audit committee financial 
expertise. I find that there were more companies including at least one financial 
expert in the audit conunittee post-SOX. However, companies that appoint 
financial experts to the audit conunittee mainly aimed to comply with the SOX 
requirements rather than to fulfil the companies' requirements. The regression 
analysis also suggests that companies appointed financial experts to complement 
existing governance mechanisms pre-SOX, but to substitute existing governance 
mechanisms post-SOX. A Chow test is performed and proved that the changes 
in the determinants of audit conunittee financial expertise post-SOX were 
significant. 
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5.1 Introduction 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX, or the "Act") introduced regulations 
aimed at the upgrading of financial reporting practice and corporate governance 
in U. S. listed companies. The effective outcome from SOX was to change US 
regulations from a discretionary disclosure regime to mandated corporate 
governance mechanisms, designed to restore investor confidence after several 
accounting scandals. Many of the requirements, however, are controversial and 
the impact of these requirements to issuers lacks empirical evidence. 
Previous research has mainly examined the market wide impact of the whole 
package of SOX provisions, rather than the impact of specific requirements on 
issuers. The most recent SOX studies focus on whether the Act was value adding 
and beneficial to shareholders, but the results are mixed. For example, Zhang 
(2007) finds that SOX has significantly increased firm's costs thus impaired listed 
companies' (or "issuers", or "listed companies" hereafter) firm value. Since listed 
companies perceived that SOX brought a net loss to them, more companies, 
especially small companies, decided to go private after SOX (Leuz et al 2008, 
Engel et al 2007). In contrast, Li et al (2008) and Jain and Rezaee (2006) suggest 
that SOX improved companies' corporate governance system" thus brought in 
total net benefits to listed firms. Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) extend this 
strand of research and find that large firms, that were less compliant with SOX, 
earned higher abnormal returns compared to small firms that were less compliant 
with SOX. 
32 As discussed in Chapter 2, previous studies find that more independent and expert board or audit 
committee, although they may be overly bureaucratic and restrict managers from risk-taking, adds more 
value to the firm and improves financial reporting quality. T'herefore I assume that boards With more 
independent and expert directors are a better governance structure. 
80 
CHAPTER 5 SOX AND AUDIT COMMTFEE FINANCIAL EXPERTISE 
In addition, previous research found that SOX made directors more 
conservative, and accounting anomalies were less likely to occur. For example, 
Cohen et al (2004a) find that executives become more risk-averse and 
conservative post-SOX, and Cohen, Dey and Lys (2005) find that accounting 
earnings management activities dropped significantly post-SOX. Further, Linck et 
al (2008) find that executive and director compensation increased substantially 
post-SOX, possibly because directors face higher litigation costs and became 
more risk-averse. 
There ate however limited studies examining the impact of specific SOX 
requirements on corporate governance practices. One of the SOX provisions that 
receive the most attention is Section 407., which requires public companies to 
disclose to the Securities Exchange Commissions (SEC) whether they have a 
financial expert on the audit committee. This provision significantly increased the 
stock market's focus on audit committee financial expertise and DeFond et al 
(2005) find that the stock market reacts favourably to firms that appoint a 
financial expert to their audit committee. In addition, Carceflo et al (2006b) find 
that companies were reluctant to disclose details of financial literate directors 
because there would be greater litigation costs to specialist directors post-SOX. 
Section 407 of SOX is premised on the assumption that including a financial 
expert in the audit committee will ensure higher quality financial reporting (SEC 
2003). In theory audit conitnittees, in implementing higher quality internal control 
systems and attesting to financial quality, may require the use of greater 
financial 
expertise (DeZoort et al 2002, DeZoort and Steven 2001). In practice, 
issuers had 
two responses to SOX Section 407. First, listed companies did employ more 
financially literate directors post-SOX, but they did not disclose all of the 
financial experts' information to the SEC (Deloitte 2003, Carcello et al 2006b). 
81 
CHAPTER 5 SOX AND AUDIT CONMTl`EE FINANCIAL EXPERTISE 
Secondly, most listed companies employed the widely defined financial experts" 
in accordance with the final rules of Section 407 (Carcello et al 2006b). Since only 
narrowly defined financial experts 34 are capable in improving financial reporting 
quality (Xie et al 2003, Bedard et al 2004, Carcello et al 2006a), it seems listed 
companies appoint financial literature directors to 'Wunal that their e. ýdsfingfinancial 
re porting ystem passes the due diligence tests by an accounfingfinandal e, %pert" (Engel 2005, 
page 199). 
In the SOX requirements, it is within the company's discretion to decide 
upon the degree of financial expertise, thus they ate not supposed to appoint 
financial experts to the audit committee as long as they explain the reason to the 
SEC35. Therefore the response of issuers to SOX raises the following empiric 
questions: first, do listed companies employ financial expert directors based on 
their needs or based on regulation compliance? Secondly, has SOX affected 
companies' decision in the level of financial expertise they include on the audit 
conu-nittee? And thirdly, have the determinants of audit committee financial 
expertise changed post-SOX? These three questions have not been previously 
investigated and therefore motivate research of this chapter. 
This chapter contributes to the audit conitnittee and SOX literature that it 
investigates the determinants of audit committee financial expertise and the 
impact of SOX on these determinants. There are two differences between 
Carcello et al (2006b) and this chapter. First, this chapter provides insights of the 
33 Widely defined financial experts refer to financial literature directors. This will be discussed in detail in 
Section 5.2. 
34 Narrowly defined financial experts refer to directors who are specialized in accounting and finance. This 
will be discussed in detail in Section 5.2. 
p pria p p 35 In particular, Section 407 requires that 'The Commission shall issue rules, as necessag or a rv e in the ub, 6c 
interest and consistent ; vitb the protection of investors, to require each issuer, together udibperiodic reborts requiredpursuant to 
sections 13 (a) and 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, to &sclose whether or not, and if not, the reasons therrfore, 
the au&t committee of that issuer is coilrised of at least 1 member who is afinandal expert, as such term is defined ýv the 
Commission ". 
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actual incentives listed companies have when appointing financial experts to the 
audit comn-iittee. Carcello et al (2006b) examine only the relation between firm 
characteristics and the disclosure of audit committee financial experts which 
indicates that the association only reflects companies' desire to disclose 
information regarding the level of audit committee financial expertise. In contrast, 
this chapter uses the narrowly defined financial expertise and manually collated 
information from proxy statements. Therefore it enables me to investigate 
companies' desire to appoint financial experts instead of disclosing financial 
expert information. 
The second difference is that Carcello et al (2006b) did not compare issuers' 
disclosure practices pre- and post-SOX. Carcello, et al (2006b) only examine the 
response of issuers to SOX in disclosing financial expertise information, but they 
did not provide information on whether and how issuers disclosed financial 
expertise pre-SOX. This chapter however explores possible determinants of audit 
comrnittee financial expertise and compares the differences in the determinants 
from pre- to post-SOX. Therefore it contributes to existing audit connnittee 
studies by examining why companies appoint financial experts, why some issuers 
appoint more financial experts, and what has changed post-SOX. 
In addition, this chapter also contributes to the audit committee and SOX 
research in posing a number of research questions. It investigates whether 
companies appoint financial experts to complement or substitute the existing 
governance system which was discussed theoretically in previous research 
(DeFond and Francis 2005, DeFond et al 2005, Engel 2005). In addition, it also 
provides evidence of how companies, which did not have financial experts, 
fulfilled requirements in SOX Section 404 and 407 without having financial 
experts on the audit committee. Providing empirical evidence to these questions 
gives both investors and regulators a better understanding of the role of 
financial 
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experts in corporate governance and why they are important Mi desiglýg the 
corporate governance system. 
My results show there were more companies that employed at least one 
financial expert post-SOX. I hypothesise that if this change was totally caused by 
SOX, the decision that a company employs at least one financial expert ("the 
decision" hereafter) would not be affected by the firm's economic performance 
and existing corporate governance post-SOX. Consistent with this hypothesis, 
the logistic analysis shows that issuers' economic performance and existing 
corporate governance were statistically significant in determining the decision 
pre-SOX, but lost statistical power post-SOX. This suggests after SOX was 
enacted, companies decided to include at least one financial expert only to 
comply with the Act, whereas pre-SOX issuers made this decision based on 
individual company requirements. 
In addition, I also hypothesise that if the increase in financial expertise is 
totally caused by SOX, the magnitude of the impact of existing governance 
mechanisms and ownership structure on the degree of audit committee financial 
expertise would decrease post-SOX". I employ the Two Stage Least Square 
Regression with Generalized Method of Moments (GMN1) iteration to obtain 
estimates of the audit committee financial expertise determinants model. The 
results show that coefficients of governance variables and ownership structure 
variables decreased significantly post-SOX. Incorporating this result with results 
from the logistic analysis, after SOX was enacted, an issuer was mainly motivated 
to employ financial experts by complying with Section 301 and 407 of the Act, 
but not by the companies' requirements. In addition, results also show that 
36 JjjiS suggests that the use of financial experts is mainly regulatory compliance motivated rather than 
economically motivated post SOX. 
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issuers employ financial experts to complement existing governance pre-SOXý'. 
In contrast, post-SOX issuers employ financial experts to substitute existing 
governance 38 . 
Finally, the results also indicate that audit conu-nittees, which did not employ 
financial experts, tended to increase the usage of other substitute mechanisms 
post-SOX. For example post-SOX, audit committees that did not have a financial 
expert held substantially more meetings than audit conu-nittees with a financial 
expert. These results suggest that in order to fulfil the SOX requirements in 
ensuring the internal control and financial reporting quality, companies that did 
not have financial experts in the audit committee may be more likely to use other 
mechanisms, e. g. their board of directors meets more frequently to evaluate the 
company's internal functions, to substitute for the lack of financial expertise. 
The rest of this chapter is set as follows. In the next section, I discuss the 
regulatory and definitional aspects of the analysis. Section 5.3 develops the 
hypotheses and in Section 5.4, the model and methodologies are presented. 
Section 5.5 presents descriptive statistics and Section 5.6 discusses the empirical 
results. Section 5.7 concludes the chapter. 
5.2 Definition of Financial Expert 
Section 407 of SOX requires that companies disclose the identity of at least one 
financial expert serving on the audit committee. A financial expert is defined 
finally by the Securities Exchange Commissions (SEC) as a person who has: 
37 T define "complement" here as that the combination of existing governance and additional audit com-rruittee 
financial experts makes the governance system more efficient thus adds more value to the 
firm. 
38 T define "substitute" here as companies appoint new financial experts on the audit committee instead of 
using existing governance mechanisms to maintain or improve the efficiency of the 
firm's governance 
system thus add more value to the firm. 
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"(1) An understanding of generally accepted accountiq principles and financial 
statements; 
(2) E, ýcperience in 
(1', 41 the preparation or audifin Z--Lj g offinancial statements ofgenerally, comparable 
issuers; and 
(B) the application of sucb pi,, iples in connection u4tb the accounfing for 
esh . mates, accruals, and reserves; 
(3) E4erience witb internal accounting controls; and 
(4) An understandin ,g of audit committeefundions" 
" (SEC 2002j). 
However, the ori&ially proposed definition is as follows: 
"(1) An understanding of generally, accepted accounfiq ptinciples and finandal 
statements; 
(2) E, %perience applýiq sucb generally, accoted accounting principles in connection 
ixitb the accounfin ,g 
for estimates, acauals, and rrserves that arr generally, 
comparable to the estimates, acenwals and reseives, if an y, used in the registrant's 
finandal statements; 
(3) E4erience preparing or audifin g finandal statements that present accounting 
issues that air generally, comparable to those raised b y the rý: gistrant's finandal 
statements; 
(4) EVenence uith internal controls andpmceduresforfinanaýal trpotting; and 
39 The discussion presented in Italic in this chapter is taken directly from the Sarbanes Oxley Act and the 
SEC, so the section and subsection notations follow the original text. 
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(5) An understanding of audit commiXteefunctions " (SEC 2002a). 
The main difference between the two definitions is that with the originally 
proposed definition of financial expertise, a person can acquire the attributes 
through: 
'Education and e, %perience as a prindpalfinandal officer, pfindpal accounfi, ý ,g officer, 
controller, public accountant or auditor or eNpefience i. n one or more po. 5itions that 
involve the performance of similarfunctions " (SEC 2002a, D eloitte 2003). 
However, with the final definition, a person can acquire the attributes not 
only through the above experience but also through: 
'Experience actively super7ýsiq a princpal finandal oficer, princpal accounfin g 
oficer, controller, public accountant, auditor orperson performing similarjunctions, or 
overseeiq or assessing the performance of companies orpublic accountants MiM respect 
to the preparation, auditing or evaluation of fina&ial statements" (SEC 2002a, 
Deloitte 2003). 
The change in the definition of financial expert raises research questions as 
to how a company can measure financial expertise and the discretion that 
companies can employ in their identification. Wid-iin the final definition, 
companies have a wider scope in designating financial expertise. For example, 
companies may designate directors to be financial experts if they do not have 
education or experience in accounting but have prior experience as an audit 
conu-nittee director. Carcello et al (2006b) reported that in many cases financial 
expertise was misclassified under the current disclosure requirements, thus 
making it difficult for empirical research to determine why firms appoint financial 
experts to the audit conuilittee. 
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In fact, empirical research mainly found that only narrowly defined financial 
expertise, which is in accordance with the original proposed definition, is 
effective in monitoring corporate managers and constraining managers ftom 
earnings management (Xie et al 2003, Bedard et al 2004, Carcello et al 2006a). In 
addition, DeFond et al (2005) find that the stock market reacts positively to the 
presence of narrowly defined financial experts. Therefore the SOX initial 
definition of financial expert better defines financial expertise than the definition 
in the final rules. 
Financial expertise in this thesis is defined usmg the narrower definition In 
accordance with the initial definition in the SOX 407 proposal. This indicates the 
financial experts on the audit conirnittee should have 'Education and experience as a 
principalfinancial oficer, principal accounting oficer, controller, public accountant or auditor or 
e4efience in one or more positions that involve the performance of similar functions" (SEC 
2002a). 
With regard to disclosure, since the identity of only one financial expert 
needs to be disclosed, companies may not disclose all financial experts to the 
SEC. A plausible reason for this is that financial experts bear high reputational 
costs and legal liability. Once financial fraud occurs, audit committee members, 
especially financial experts, will face severe punishment from both capital markets 
and labour markets (Srinivasan 2005). Thereby approximately half of the 
companies which have more than one expert planned to disclose only one expert 
to the SEC Peloitte 2003). In determining the number of financial experts I 
apply the definition of financial expertise in this thesis to the proxy statements to 
arrive at a more precise representation of the degree of audit committee 
financial 
expertise, whether committee members are explicitly 
disclosed as experts or not. 
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5.3 Hypothesis Development 
This section examines the impact of SOX on the determinants of audit 
committee financial expertise. I hypothesise that the influence of SOX is likely to 
be heterogeneous across existing governance mechanisms and thus I begin *in 
Section 5.3.1 with a discussion of a number of determinants of the appointment 
of financial experts to the audit committee. In Section 5.3.2 1 derive further 
testable hypotheses following a discussion of the impact of SOX upon the 
likelihood a company appointing financial experts to the audit committee. Last I 
discuss the impact of SOX upon the determinants of the level of audit committee 
financial expertise. 
5.3.1 Determinants ofAudit Committee Finan(ial E, %peazse 
Board Structure 
Agency and signalling theories provide conflicting explanations as to why 
corporate boards appoint financial experts. Agency theory suggests that 
companies appoint more financial experts to the audit committee when existing 
corporate governance system is more superior (Klein 2002b, Beasley and Salterio 
2001). For example when the board is more independent or has a higher degree 
of business expertise, it is more likely a firm to employ financial experts to further 
reduce agency costs by ensuring that the audit function is effective (Beasley and 
Salterio 2001). Since the efficient functioning of audit committees requires a 
relatively high degree of accounting sophistication (DeFond et al 2005), a 
stronger presence of accounting experts is more likely to constrain creative 
accounting techniques such as earnings management Ne et al 2003, Bedard et al 
2004, Carcello et al 2006a). Under agency theory, the appointment of experts will 
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be undertaken when marginal benefits of employing experts exceed the marginal 
costs in order to reduce the cost of capital and increase finn value. 
On the other hand, signaffing theory suggests that companies with weak 
governance will appoint financial experts to signal to the market that the firms' 
existing finantial re porting ystem passes the due dili gence tests by an accounting financial 
exped" (Engel 2005, page 199). However, poorly governed firms are at risk of 
incurring regulatory discipline (Abbott et al 2000, Carcello and Neal 2003b). For 
example, poorly governed companies are more likely to perform badly (Gompers, 
Ishii and Metrick 2003), manipulate earnings (Klein 2002a, Xie et al 2003), and 
have financial reporting restatements (Abbott et al 2004, Abbott et al 2000, 
Carcello and Neal . 2003a, 2003b). Financial experts may therefore be unwilling 
to work with them due to potential high penalties from the SEC and the labour 
market (Srinivasan 2005). 
Previous studies lend support to agency theory explanations rather than the 
signalling theory explanation. Menon and Williams (1994), Klein (2002b) and 
Beasley and Salterio (2001) suggest that better governed firms are more likely to 
appoint independent and experienced directors to the audit committee. Therefore 
following agency theory more independent boards with stronger financial 
expertise and better governance are more likely to appoint financial experts to the 
audit comniittee. 
Outside Director Equity Holdings 
Agency theory predicts that corporate governance and firm value improves with 
higher level director share ownership. As directors increase the equity holding *in 
their firm, executives' objectives become more aligned with that of outside 
shareholders Uensen 1993, Jensen and Meckling 1976, Anderson et al 2004). 
Research also suggests that the share ownership of independent directors 
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substitutes for some governance mechanisms. For example, Klein (2002b) shows 
that the audit committee requires less independent directors when shares held by 
independent directors increase. In addition, Anderson et al (2004) reports that the 
cost of capital is lower for firms that have higher outside directors share holding, 
and Abbott et al (2004) find that financial restatements are less likely when 
outside directors ownership increases. These studies all show that director share 
ownership serves as a substitute for other governance mechanisms such as the 
inclusion of independent directors or financial experts. Therefore outside director 
ownership is possibly to be negatively related with financial expert appointments. 
Inside Director Equiýy Holdings 
Extant research has found that executive directors can become more entrenched 
for certain director ownership levels (Hermalin and Weisbach 1991, Davies et al 
2005, Short and Keasey 1999, Morck et al 1988). On one hand, at lower levels of 
ownership, risk aversion dominates directors' behaviour because of their 
concerns of external discipline Pavies et al 2005). Iberefore, as their ownership 
grows, their objectives become more aligned with that of other shareholders 
(Hermalin and Weisbach 1991, Short and Keasey 1999, Davies et al 2005). As 
appointing financial experts to the audit committee is perceived to better protect 
shareholders' interest PeFond and Francis 2005), for the lower levels of 
ownership, executives may be more likely to improve audit committee financial 
expertise when their shareholding increases. 
On the other hand, at higher levels of ownership, executive directors have 
stronger voting power, and external governance processes are much weaker 
(Davies et al 2005). Executives have stronger control over corporate decision 
making and financial reporting, and their incentives are less aligned at this stage 
(Hermalin and Weisbach 1991, Davies et al 2005, Short and Keasey 1999, Morck 
et al 1988). In such circumstances, executives may need more protection over 
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their private information. Hence it is less likely that financial experts would be 
appoInted to the audit committee. 
As a result, in line with studies that found an inverted U-shape relation 
between managerial ownership and firm value, I expect that there may be an 
inverted U-shape relationship between ownership of executive directors and 
financial expert appointments. 
5.3.2 The Impact of SOX on the Determinants ofAudit Committee Financial E, %pertise 
Prior to SOX, there was no mandate or disclosure requirement for audit 
committee financial expertise, and hence there was less pressure from investors 
on firms to provide this information. Companies used their discretions in 
deciding upon whether to appoint financial experts and the number of financial 
experts to the audit comnlittee. Therefore before SOX was introduced, 
companies determined the degree of financial expertise solely based on their 
company characteristics. For instance the level of financial expertise would be 
influenced by fi-rm size, firm performance, board compositions and the structure 
of director ownership as discussed in the previous section. 
However, after SOX was introduced, the determinants of the level of audit 
conu-nittee financial expertise might change significantly by the Act. SOX may 
have two main impacts on listed companies. The first order impact of SOX is 
issuers are required to improve financial reporting quality and reduce the 
likelihood of financial fraud. Provisions under Tide VIII, IX and XI of the Act 
impose greater criminal penalties on corporate managers and directors if financial 
fraud occurs. Possibly due to the higher litigation costs and responsibilities, 
independent board directors became more expensive to be appointed (Linck et al 
2008) and behaved more conservatively post-SOX OLinck, Netter and Yang 2007, 
Cohen et al 2004a) . Because corporate executives 
bear greater responsibilities (as 
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required in Section 302 4) and all directors face higher criminal penalties, it would 
be more likely that companies employ financial experts to the audit committee mi 
order to reduce the likelihood of financial fraud. 
The second order effect of SOX is that issuers avoid explaining to the SEC 
and the public as to why the issuer does not appoint a financial expert to their 
audit comn-iittee, as required by Section 407 in SOX41 . As discussed in Chapter 3, 
issuers may be concerned that there may be a negative impact on share prices if 
they disclose their audit committee does not include a financial expert PeFond et 
al 2005). Therefore in order to avoid the negative impact of not employing a 
financial expert and to avoid explaining to the SEC, issuers may employ one 
financially literate director to the audit coMMIttee just to comply with the 
requirements. 
Both impacts would cause issuers to decide the level of audit committee 
financial expertise base on regulations rather than the companies' requirements 
post-SOX. This indicates that company characteristics and corporate governance 
structure have weaker impact in determining the likelihood of appointing 
financial experts and the degree of audit comn-uttee financial expertise post-SOX. 
Iberefore if SOX had no impact on the determinants of audit committee 
financial expertise, I have the following hypotheses: 
HI: Issuers' decision on appointing at least onefina&ial expert to the audit committee was 
stmnUl influenced byfirm cbaraderisficspost-SOX as it waspre-SOX. 
40 Section 302 of SOX requires corporate executives to approve and certify the integrity of the annual or 
quarterly reports. 
41 Rule (a) of SOX Section 407 has the following requirement: "(a) RULES DEFINING 'F7NANCL4L 
EXPERT'- The Commission sball issue rules, as necessag or appmpriale in the public interest and consistent nith the 
praeezion of investors, to require each issuer, togetber jvitbpen`o&, c reports requiredpursuant to sections 13(a) and 15(d) of the 
Securities Excbeinge Act of 1934, to aisclose wbetber or not, and if not, the reasons tbere/orr, the audit committee of that issuer 
is comprised of at least I member xbo is afinancial expert, as sucb term is 
defined by the Commission " 
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H2: Issuers' dedsion on the level of audit commiltee finandal e%peitise was stronvy 
influenced byfirm cbaraclerisficspost-SOX as it waspre-SOX 
5.4 Research Method and Models 
To test hypothesis 1,1 use the Logistic regression analysis with Model 5-1.1 
examine the model on two subsamples respectively. One subsample micludes pre- 
SOX data and the other subsample includes post-SOX data. 
Model 5-1 Determinants of audit conunittee fmancial expertise, logistic analysis 
DummyAudFinex,, t=a+#, BoardSize,,, +#2 BoardIndepjt 
+#3 NonAVDCKnex,, t+, 84 Dual board-, +fl5OutSDirOwnjt 11 
+, 86 InSDirOwnjt+, 87LNMV,, t+fly MKBVIt+, 89ROSit+, 8, OLOSS,, t+e,, t 
The percentage of financial experts on the audit committee (AudFinex) 
represents for the degree of audit committee financial expertise. Board size 
(Board Size) is defined as the natural log of the number of directors on the board. 
Board independence (Board Indep) is defined as percentage of independent 
directors on the board. NonAUDCFinex is defined as the percentage of financial 
experts, who are not audit conuTlittee members, on the board. CEO duality (Dual 
board) is equal to 1 if the CEO chairs the board of directors. Following Klein 
(2002b), I define outside director ownership (OutSDirOwn) as the percentage of 
equity shares owned by all independent directors, whereas inside director 
ownership (InSDirOwn) is defined as the percentage of equity shares owned by 
all inside or affiliate directors42 . Following previous research Klein (2002b), 
Beasley and Salterio (2001), the model controls for firm size, growth 
opportunities and operating performance. If coefficients of these variables are 
42 Definition of these variables are summarised in Chapter 4. 
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si0ficant pre-SOX but become msignificant post-SOX, hypothesis 1 would be 
rejected. 
To examine hypothesis 2,1 employ Model 5-2 to test the relation between 
existing governance mechanisms and financial expert appointments from pre- to 
post-SOX. 
Model 5-2 Determinants of audit committee financial expertise, regression analysis 
AudFinex,, t=a+g, Board5ize,,, +, 82 Board Indep,,, +g3 NonAUDCFinex,, t 
+, 84 Dual board. t+g5Out5DJrOwnj t+, 86 In5DirOwnj,, +g7InsDirOwnSQ,, t 
+, 88LNMV,, t+, 89 MKBV,, t+, 8, OROS,, t+, 811LO55,, t+i8l2SOX 
+91350X*Board5ize,, t*91450X*BoardIndep,,, +g, 550X*NonAUDCFinex,, t 
+, 81650X*Dual board,, t +g, 750X*Ou 6DkO wnj, t +, 8jy5OX*In5DirO wn,, 
+#1950X*InsDirOwnSQ,, t+)62050X*LNMV,, t+, 82150X*MKBV,, t 
+92250X*ROS,, t+, 8235ox L055jt+'61, t 
Following previous studies (Hermalin and Weisbach 1991, Davies et al 2005, 
Short and Keasey 1999, Morck et al 1988), 1 use the square of Mside director 
ownership (InSDirOwnSQ) to allow for a non-linear relation between inside 
director ownership and financial expertise. The dummy SOX is defined as 1 if the 
reported date of proxy statement is after June 30 2003, when was one year after 
SOX was enacted and was also the time that big companies were expected to 
comply With the Act. All variables are winsorized at the 1% level to avoid bias 
caused by outliers. 
The dummy variable SOX is controlling for the incremental value of audit 
committee financial expertise from pre- to post-SOX". In addition, all 
interactive 
43 The use of dummy variables and interaction 
dummy variables may potentially introduce multicollinearity 
problems into the model. However, preliminary tests show that the overall conclusion 
in the study holds 
when multicollineanty problem is controlled. 
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SOX dummies reflect the changes in the impact of independent variables on the 
level of financial expertise from pre- to post-SOX. If all or most interactive SOX 
dummies In Model 5-2 are significant, hypothesis 2 will be rejected. 
Further, since AudFinex and NonAUDCFinex may simultaneously 
determine each other, a Hausman test was performed to test for the endogenous 
relationship between AudFinex and NonAUDCFinex. The results show that the 
endogenous relation between AudFinex and NonAUDCFinex could not be 
rejected. Therefore the Two Stage Least Square Regression with Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) iteration that uses instrumental variables has 
performed to solve the endogeneity problems. I therefore employ Model 5-3 to 
estimate NonAUDCFinex with the following instrumental variables as the first 
stage regression. 
Model 5-3 Determinants of board financial expertise, regression analysis 
-7L-P'YjBoard Size,, t-L12 NonAVDCKnex, 't=a 
Board In dep,, 
.3 
Dual board TP2 11 
+fl4 Ou tSDirO wn, t +#5 InSDirO wnj, t +fl6LNM V,, t +, 87 MKB VI, t +fl8L e verage,, t 
+, 89 CaP dalEXA, t +, 810 QUiCkRa tiOJ, t +#11 Sox+, 61250X*Board Size,, t 
+91350X*Board In dep,, t +, 814SOX*Dual board,, t +, 8j550X*Out5DirO wnj, t 
+#1 6SOX*InSD'ro Wn,, t +, 817SOX*LNM Kt+, 818SOX*MKB Kt 
+#1950X*Leverage,, t+, 82050X*CaPtia'EXPI, t+92150X*QuickRatio,, t+. E,,, t 
5.5 Data and Company Characteristics 
ple Distribution 5.5.1 Sample Construction and Sam 
The analysis draws on a sample of S&P 500 companies comprising 1,636 
firm- 
years between 2001 and 2005. Taking the S&P 500 constituents as a 
base, 2,500 
company proxy statements (every statement 
between 2001 and 2005) were 
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collected from the SEC website. Data on board composition, CEO duality, 
director financial expertise, director ownership, audit committee composition, 
and board and audit committee meetings was manually collated ftom the proxy 
statements for each firm-year. Accounting data are taken from WorldScope 
database provided by Thomson One Banker. A ftffl description of each 
governance variable is presented in Table 4-7 in Chapter 4. 
Table 5-1 Descriptive statistics - sample distributions 
PaneIA: Distribution b yjear 
Missing Available Missing ý'o of ý, o Sample - original Financial Final Year Proxy Proxy AudC Pooled 0110 Original 
Sample Institutions Sample 
Statement Statement Info. Sample Sample 
2001 500 90 117 293 16 277 16.93% -3-07', o 
2002 500 90 67 343 15 328 20.05% 0.05% 
2003 500 90 55 355 15 340 20.78% 0.78% 
2004 500 90 51 359 14 345 21.09% 1.090/0 
2005 500 90 44 366 20 346 21.15% 1.15% 
Total 2500 450 334 1716 80 1636 100-W"o 0.000/0 
Panel B: Distribution ý) industg 
% of Missing Available Missing %of % Sample - Original Filial 
Industry Sector Original Proxy Proxy AudC Pooled % Origin a] Sample 
Sample Statement Statement Info. 
Sample 
Sample Sample 
Oil & Gas 145 7.07% 36 109 10 99 6.05% -1.02% 
Basic Materials 120 5.85//o 25 95 4 91 5.56% -0.29% 
Industrials 355 17.32% 40 315 18 297 18.159ý/o 0.84, /o 
ConsumerGoods 295 14.39ý/(, 37 258 1 257 15.71% 1.32% 
II calth care 255 12.44% 38 217 13 204 12.47% 0.03% 
Con sum er Services 360 17.56% 33 327 15 312 19.07% 1.51% 
Telecrimmunication 50 2.44% 16 34 8 26 1.59% -0.85% 
Utilities 150 7.320/'o 39 ill 7 104 6.36% -0.96% 
Technology 320 15.61% 70 250 4 246 15.04% -0,57% 
Total 2050 100.000/0 334 1716 80 1636 100.009/0 0.000/0 
The sample consists of up to 346 non-financial S&P 500 companies per year during the period 2001 to 2005. The 
sample is constructed by examining all S&P 500 cc)mpanies with available corporate governance information filed in 
the proxy statements on the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) website from 2001 to April 2006. Firm- 
years are omitted from the sample if information regarding audit committee mmposition, board and audit 
committee meetings at the year end is unavailable. The initial sample consists of 500 companies Including 90 
financial companies each year. Missing Proxy Statement refers to the aggregate number of proxy statements missing 
from the SEC website. Missing AudC. Info refers to observations missed due to unavailable governance 
information in the proxy statements at the year end. The final sample oc)nsists of 1636 observations. 
The last 
column refers to the percentage of firms eadi year or each sector of the total number of 
firms in the final sample 
(1636). 
97 
CHAPTER 5 SOX AND AUDIT CONMETTEE FINANCIAL EXPERTISE 
Table 5-1, panel A presents a fiffl breakdown of the sample. After deducting 
a total of 450 firm-years by removing financial firms and 334 firm-years for firms 
that did not provide proxy statements, there were 1,716 available proxy 
statements. I further removed 80 proxy statements because of incomplete or no 
governance data. The final sample comprises 1,636 firm-years from 346 
companies across five years (2001-2005). 
Unlike previous studies (Krishnan and Visvanathan 2005, DeFond et al 
2005), 1 choose the period covering pre-SOX, SOX and post-SOX to capture any 
impact of the Act on audit committee composition and expertise. Panel B of 
Table 5-1 shows the industry distribution of the overall sample. The sample firms 
are focused mainly in the industrial, consumer goods, consumer services and 
technology industries. Differences between the sample distribution and original 
sample distribution do not exceed 5%, indicating that the distribution of the 
sample of this chapter is fully representative of the distribution of the population 
of firms in the S&P 500. 
5.5.2 Compayy Cbaracterisfics 
Table 5-2 reports the descriptive statistics of the key variables of this study. 1 
include audit committee size, independence and number of audit committee 
meetings in the table for comparison with prior research. The statistics generally 
suggest that companies in this sample have a stronger governance environment 
than previous studies. For example, Klein (2002b, 2002a), Xie et al (2003), and 
Anderson et al (2004) all found that the average board size is above 12. However, 
from 2001 onwards, Anderson et al (2003) find that boards are smaller, a finding 
I support, with the sample companies in this thesis employing an average of 10.5 
board members. Further, audit committees exhibits a similar trend that the 
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average committee size decreased from approximately 4.5 in the 1990s to 3.96 
(Anderson et al 2003) across my sample from 2001 to 
200544. 
Table 5-2 Descriptive statistics of firm characteristics and governance variables 
Mean Median Std. Max 'Min 
PanelA -Board Informalion Variables 
Board Size 10.47 10.00 2.32 16.00 6.00 
% Independent Directors 80.7% 83.3% 10.3% 93.3% 50.0% 
Financial Experts (No. 00 2.03 2.00 1.41 6.00 0.00 
% Financial Experts 19.7% 18.2% 13.6% 60.0% 0010 
Non AudC. Financial Experts (No. 00 0.98 1.00 1.01 4.00 0.00 
% Non AudC. Financial Experts 9.1% 8.3', o 9.3% 37.5% 0.0% 
Board Meetings 7.94 7.00 3.09 20.00 4.00 
Dual Board 0.74 1.00 0.44 1.00 0.00 
Panel B -Director Ommersbo Variables 
Insider Ownership 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.29 0.00 
Outsider Ownership 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.29 0.00 
Panel C- Au&t Committee Variables 
AudC Size 3.97 4.00 1.07 7.00 2.00 
016 AudC Independent Directors 99.3% 100.0% 3.9% 100.0% 75.0% 
0.0% o AudC Financial Experts 28.0% 25.0% 24.7% 100.0% 
AudC Financial Experts (No. 00 1.05 1.00 0.88 3.00 0.00 
AudC Meetings 8.14 8.00 3.23 17.00 3.00 
Panel D- Control Variables 
Market Value ($billion) 20.04 8.47 36.75 242.77 1.05 
Return on Sales (ROS) 0.05 0.06 0.16 0.35 -1.00 
Loss 0.06 0.00 0.24 1.00 0.00 
Market / Book 3.04 2.31 2.56 14.86 0.25 
The sample consists of up to 346 non-finanaal S&P 500 companies per year during the period 2001 to 2005. 
The sample 
is constructed by examining all S&P 500 companies with available corporate governance information 
filed in the proxy 
statements on the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) website from 2001 to April 2006. 
Board/AudC size is the 
number of directors serving on the company's board/audit committee at the beginning of the 
fiscal year. Independent 
directors are defined as non-executive directors who have no affiliation with the company 
beyond being directors. 
Financial experts are defined as directors who are specialized in finance or accounting. Directors who are working 
in the 
Banking and Accounting industry for more than 5 years, or as Chief Financial/Investment Officer or 
President of Finance 
of the company, or qualified as CPA or CFA, or Professors in Finance or Acmunting. 
Board/AudC meetings are defined 
as the number of board/audit committee meetings held over the 
fiscal year. Accounting data is collected from the 
Worldscope database. NIV is the year-end market value of the firm. MKBV is defined as the market value of the equity 
plus book value of debt and then divided by the book value of firm's total assets. 
ROA is Income divided by total assets. 
ROS is Income divided by total sales. 
Compared with previous studies, the board and audit commi'ttee have 
become more independent as the sample period progresses. Average board 
independence increases from 58% (Klein 2002b, Klein 2002a) in 1991-1993 to 
81% in 2001-2005, whereas audit committee independence increases from 80% 
44 Table 4-10 in Chapter 4 provides detailed comparison of governance variables between previous studies 
and this thesis. 
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to 99% respectively. Not all audit committees in this sample are completely 
independent. The Exchange Act 10A and Section 301 of SOX require that an 
audit committee member should not be someone who 'ý) accipts any consulting, 
adtisog, or other compensatog fie from the issuer; or b) be an afiliatedperson of the issuer or 
any subsidiag thereof' (SEC 2002g). During the data collection from the proxy 
statements, it was found that some companies define those who worked for the 
company in the previous five years as independent directors. However, according 
to previous studies (Klein 1998, Hillier and McColgan 2006, Anderson et al 
2003), these directors should be categorized as affiliate directors. I follow this 
approach to define audit committee independence and therefore less than 1% of 
the sample firms are not totally independent. 
Audit committee financial expertise has grown through time. The average 
number of audit committee financial experts grows from 0.9 in the 1990s 
(Anderson et al 2004) to 1.05 in this thesis. Meanwhile, the number of audit 
committee meetings increases from average 3.5 times per year over the same 
period (Anderson et al 2004, Xie et al 2003) to 8.14 times per year M this sample 
period. However, the number of board meetings does not change as much. The 
statistics suggest that corporate boards delegated more responsibilities to sub- 
committees such as the audit comniittee to ensure the quality of the respective 
function-, especially post-SOX, audit committee have to bear more responsibilities. 
Panel B reports director ownership characteristics. Generally, inside directors 
hold more shares than outside directors. The average inside director ownership is 
3%,, whereas the average outside director ownership is only 1%. 
All in all, the statistics of this sample shows that companies have a stronger 
governance environment than in previous research. Boards and audit committees 
in this sample are more independent, have more financial expertise and are more 
active. 
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5.6 Results 
5.6.1 Descri 
'ptive 
Statistics 
Table 5-3 compares firm and governance characteristics of companies with and 
without financial expertise on the audit committee pre- and post-SOX 
respectively. The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Test is performed to compare 
whether the differences in governance variables between different groups are 
significant. The statistics show that post-SOX, there are more firms that included 
a financial expert on the audit conunittee compared to the pre-SOX. The 
percentage of firms without financial experts dropped from 33.52% pre-SOX to 
24-52% post-SOX, a 9% decrease. However, there remained 178 firm-years that 
did not Include financial expert post-SOX. 
In addition, the results also show that prior to SOX, companies that 
appointed financial experts had more superior governance characteristics 
compared to companies that did not include financial experts. The boards of 
these firms were significantly more independent and with a higher degree of 
financial expertise. In addition, inside director ownership is significantly higher, 
whereas outside director ownership is significantly lower. However, differences in 
most corporate governance variables and firm characteristics between firms with 
financial experts and without financial experts were not significant post-SOX. 
This implies that determinants of audit committee financial expertise might be 
dominated by regulation compliance other than self-selection. 
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Comparing the number of board and audit committee meetings from pre- to 
post-SOX between firms with financial experts and firms without financial 
experts, the results show that firms without financial experts tended to meet more 
frequently after the Act was implemented. The number of audit committee 
meetings of firms without financial experts is statistically lower than their 
counterpart (firms with financial experts) pre-SOX (6.96 < 7.73, significant at 
10%). However, their boards met more frequently (8.65 times) post-SOX than 
their counterparts (8.21 times). In addition, increase in board and audit committee 
meetings was greater for firms without financial experts than firms with financial 
experts from pre- to post-SOX (1.11 > 0.39 for board meetings, 2.16 > 1.99 for 
audit committee meetings). 
The above statistics imply that companies decided whether to appoint 
financial expert to the audit committee based on the companies' requirements 
pre-SOX. However, after SOX was introduced, companies appointed financial 
experts only to comply with the Act. In addition, the results also show that firms 
that did not employ financial experts may hold more audit or board meetings 
post-SOX to ensure the internal control function. To investigate the relation 
between financial expert appointments and firm characteristics, I utihse both the 
logistic analysis and regression analysis in the next section. 
5.6.2 4! gisficAnalý, Sis 
Table 5-4 shows the results of the logistic analysis. The logistic regression shows 
the relationship between governance variables and the probabilities of having at 
least one financial expert on the audit committee, where the positive sign reflects 
higher probability. 
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Table 5-4 Logistic regression - the impact of SOX on the probabilities of appoMting financial experts to 
the audit committee 
DummyA udFinex,,, =a+, 8, BoardSize,,, +, 8, BoardIndep,,, + P, NonA UDCFinex, 
+, 84Dualboard,,, +, 8, OutSDirOwn,,, +, 861nSDir0wn,,, +, 87LNAfV,,, +, 88MKB V, 
+, 8, ROS,,, +, 8,. Loss,,, + cj', 
Pre-SOX Post-SOX 
Variables Estimate Wald Chi- Estimate Wald Chi- 
square square 
Intercept 0.795 0.85 2.017 3.47 
Board Size 0.053 2.30 0.029 0.42 
Board Tndep. 2.701 11.29 0.989 0.94 
Non AUDC FinExp. (Fit) 2.519 9.64 1.937 3.64 
Dual Board -0.060 0.11 -0.142 0.47 
OutS. Dir. Own. -2.192 1.68 -1.950 1.15 
InS. Dir. Own. 5.112 8.80 0.415 0.57 
LNNW -0.351 20.13 -0.246 6.96 
MKBV 0.024 0.59 0.096 5.07 
Loss 0.440 1.42 0.079 0.04 
ROS -0.134 0.09 -0.462 0.26 
Observations 910 726 
The sample consists of up to 346 non-financial S&P 500 companies per year during the period 2001 to 2005. 
sample is constructed by examining all S&P 500 companies with available corporate governance information 
filed in the proxy statements on the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) website from 2001 to April 
2006. Dependent variable takes 1 if the audit committee has at least one financail expert, 0 otherwise. Board 
size is defined as the natural log of number of directors on the board. Board independence is defined as the 
percentage of independent directors on the board. Non-AudC. FinExp. is defined as the percentage of 
financial experts who are not audit committee members on the board. Dual Board is defined as 1 if the 
companies' CEO also serves as chairman of the board. OutSDirOwn. is defined as the sum of ownership 
hold by independent directors on the board. InSDirOwn. is defined as the sum of ownership hold by inside 
or affiliate directors on the board. Accounting data is collected from the Worldscope database. LNNfV is the 
natural log of the year-end market value of the firm. NIKBV is defined as the market value of the equity plus 
book value of debt and then divided by the book value of firm's total assets. ROS is Income divided by total 
sales. Loss is 1 if the company have negative net income in the previous two years. Pre-SOX/Post-SOX is 
firm years before/after the date June 30th 2003. and * indicate the changes are significant at 1%, 5% 
and 10% respectively. 
The results show that existing governance mechanisms were the main 
factors that influenced the decision of financial expert appointment pre-SOX. 
However, the determinants of audit committee appointments tended to be 
dominated by regulatory compliance rather than firm and governance 
characteristics post-SOX. Board independence, board financial expertise, inside 
director ownership and firm. size are the main factors that affect the appointment 
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of financial expert pre-SOX. These variables were significant at 1% in the model 
in the pre-SOX subsample. 
However, board independence and inside director ownership did not affect 
the decision process post-SOX. Both board independence and inside director 
ownership lose power in the logistic model in the post-SOX subsample. In 
addition, the significance level of board financial expertise has changed from 1% 
to 5%. The intercept becomes significant in the post-SOX subsample, which 
indicates that a majority of companies appointed at least one financial expert to 
the audit committee post-SOX. Tbis is another indication that regulatory 
compliance dominated the determinants of financial expert appointments. This 
result implies that regulatory compliance strongly dominates the determinant 
process post-SOX. Since most governance variables were not as significant post- 
SOX as they were pre-SOX, therefore hypothesis 1 is rejected. 
5.6.3 Rqgression Analysis 
Table 5-5 reports the results of the regression analysis with the Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) estimation for Model 5-2. The left-hand side of the 
table shows estimates for the determinants of audit conunittee financial expertise 
pre-SOX, whereas the right-hand side shows estimates for the variables post- 
SOX. The dummy variable (SOX) controls for the changes M audit cornmittee 
financial expertise from pre- to post-SOX, while the interactive dummy variable 
(SOX*Vatiables) controls for the impact of SOX on the determinants of audit 
cominittee financial expertise. As discussed in Section 5.3.2, if the interactive 
dummies are significant, it indicates that SOX has impacted on the determinants 
of audit committee financial expertise and hence hypothesis 2 would be rejected. 
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Table 5-5 Regression analysis with GMM estimation - the impact of SOX on the determinants of audit 
committee financial expertise 
AudFinex =a+ fi, Board Size,,, + Moard Indep,,, + fi, NonA UDCRn exij + fl, Dual board,,, 
+, 8,0utSDir0wn,,, +#, 1nSDir0wn,, t+ fi71nsDirOwnSQ, + fl8LNMV,,, +fl, AKBV,,, 
+#j0R0Sj,, +, 81, LOSSj,, + fi12 SOX + fiHSOX * Board Size,, 
t + fil, SOX * Board Indepi,, 
" P1, SOX NonA UDCRn ex1j + fl,, SOX * Dual board,,, + fl, 7SOX * 0utSDir0wnj, 1 
" fl,, SOX InMrOwn, 
', 
+ fil, SOX * MsDirOwnSQ, +fl20SoX*LNMVi, t 
" fi2l SOX M10VU + fl22SOX* ROS,,, + P23 SOX * LOSSj', + E, 
', 
GMM estimates 
Post SOX 
Estimate 
Variables Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat 
Intercept -5.056 -2.89 SOX 5.935 3.39 0.879 
Board Size -0.017 -0.40 SOX*Board Size 0.002 0.04 -0.015 
Board Indep. 3.077 2.66 SOX*Board Indep. -3.216 -2.78 -0.139 
Non ALTDC FinExp 1.639 1.61 SOX*Non AUDC FinExp -1-280 -1.26 0.359 
Dual Board 0.427 1.82 SOX*DuaI Board -0.506 -2.14 -0.079 
OutS. Dir. Own. 2.489 0.88 SOX*OutS. Dir. Own. -2.497 -0.88 -0.008 
InS. Dir. Own. 65.663 3.60 SOX*InS. Dir. Own. -64.679 -3.54 0.984 
InS. Dir. Own. SQ -215.868 -3.74 *** SOX*InS. Dir. Own. SQ 212.688 3.68 *** -3.180 
INW 0.204 2.78 SOX*INNfv -0.223 -3.02 -0.019 
MKBV -0.079 -2.47 SOX*MKBV 0.076 2.36 -0.003 
Loss -0.008 -0.04 SOX*Loss -0.028 -0.12 -0.036 
ROS 0.608 1.25 SOX*ROS -0.617 -1.27 -0.009 
Observations 1127 
Adjusted R2 -34.218 
Degree of freedoms 24 
Chow Test Observations (Pre-SOX: Post-SOX) F value p-value 
605: 548 3.67 <. 000 1 
The sample consists of up to 346 non-financlal S&P 500 cDmpaiiies per year during the period 2001 to 2005. The 
sample is cDnstructed by examining all S&P 500 companies with available corporate governance information filed 
in the proxy statements on the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) website from 2001 to April 2006. 
Dependent variable is the percentage of financial experts on the audit committee. Board size is defined as the 
natural log of number of directors on the board. Board independence is defined as the percentage of independent 
directors on the board. Non-AudC. FinExp. is defined as the percentage of financial experts who are not audit 
committee members on the board. Dual Board is defined as 1 if the oc)mpanies' CEO also serves as chairman of 
the board. OutSDirOwn. is defined as the sum of ownership hold by independent directors on the board. 
InSDirOwn. is defined as the sum of ownership hold by inside or affiliate directors on the board. Acmunting data 
is collected from the Worldscope database. LNMV is the natural log of the year-end market value of the firm. 
MKBV is defined as the market value of the equity plus book value of debt and then divided by the book value of 
firm's total assets. ROS is Incc)m e divided by total sales. Loss is 1 if the company have negative net iiioc)m e in the 
previous two years. Pre-SOX/Post-SOX is firm-years before/after the date June 30th 2003. and * indicate 
the changes are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Consistent with the agency theory discussions in Section 5.3.1, a more 
independent board appoints more financial experts to the audit committee. In 
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addition, consistent with previous studies (Hermalin and Weisbach 1991, Davies 
et al 2005, Short and Keasey 1999, Morck et al 1988), there is an inverted U- 
shape relation between inside director ownership and the degree of financial 
expertise. However, CEO duality is positively related to financial expertise. 
Possibly this is because shareholders need more protection to their wealth 
45 through appointing more financial experts . However, board size and outside 
director ownership are not significantly related to the degree of financial 
expertise. 
The right-hand side of the table shows coefficients for the determinants of 
audit conunittee financial expertise post-SOX. Interaction dummy variables for 
board independence, CEO duality and inside director ownership are significant, 
suggesting that SOX has a significant impact on a company's decision over the 
level of audit committee financial expertise. The last column shows coefficients 
of the governance variables and firm characteristics variables post-SOX. The 
coefficients are calculated as pre-SOX estimates plus the corresponding 
interaction dummies. Compared to the pre-SOX estimates, all post-SOX 
estimates are significantly smaller. This indicates that firm and governance 
characteristics have much smaller impact on the level of financial expertise after 
the introduction of SOX. This in turn implies that companies that employed 
financial experts mainly did it to comply with regulations rather than to fulfil their 
companies' requirements. 
45 Possible explanations are as follows. Pre-SOX, there were no regulations monitoring corporate managers, 
therefore shareholders may require more financial experts to conduct the monitoring function in order to 
ensure financial reporting quality. However, since SOX required issuers to have financial experts on their 
audit committee, shareholders rely more on regulations instead of self-governance-improvements. 
Therefore corporate remote shareholders no longer took actions to require the company to appoint 
financial experts post SOX because they relied on the Act and believed that the Act had enough power to 
monitor executives. 
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Moreover, the signs of governance and firm variables changed post-SOX. 
'I'he pre-SOX estimates show that firms with better governance system appoint 
more financial experts, indicating that they appoint financial experts to 
complement existing governance gClein 2002b, Beasley and Salterio 2001). 
However, signs for the board independence variable have changed post-SOX. 
This indicates that companies tended to appoint financial experts to substitute 
some of the existing governance post-SOX. 
Finally, A Chow Test is performed to examine whether changes of the 
coefficients from pre- to post-SOX in Table 5-5 are statistically significant. The 
F-value for the Chow Test is 3.67 and significant at the 0.001 level. This provides 
further evidence that, the changes of coefficients of governance and firm 
characteristics variables were significantly affected by SOX. 
3.6.4 AddifionalAnal5yýs - the Impact of Governance and Firm Variables 
on the Additional E, %, perfise 
I perform one additional analysis to investigate the impact of governance and 
firm characteristics on the firms' decision on appointing additional financial 
experts. I analyse the relation between the changes in audit comnlittee financial 
expertise on the changes in governance and firm variables from pre- to post-SOX. 
Pre-SOX period is defined as the period from July 1" 2002 to June 30 th 2003) 
whereas post-SOX period is defined as the period from July 1" 2003 to June 30 
th 
2004. There are totally 315 observations with available data both pre- and post- 
SOX. 
Consistent with analyses in Section 5.6.2 and Section 5.6.3,1 perform one 
logistic analysis and one regression analysis. For the logistic analysis, the 
dependent variable is 1 when companies add more financial experts to the audit 
committee and 0 otherwise. All independent variables 
in Model 5-1 are replaced 
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by the corresponding variable from pre- to post-SOX. The results show that 
increase in board size and independence increase the likelihood a firm appointing 
additional financial experts to the audit conunittee. However, a decrease in board 
financial expertise increased the likelihood a firin appointing additional financial 
experts from pre- to post-SOX. 
For the regression analysis, the dependent variable is the changes in audit 
committee financial expertise and the independent variables are the changes in 
governance and firm variables. The results show that only the intercept and board 
financial expertise variable are significant, where board financial expertise is 
significantly negative. This suggests that first, the changes in audit committee 
financial expertise is determined by board financial expertise changes. Secondly, 
because the intercept is significant, it indicates that the changes were caused 
mainly by regulations rather than firm characteristics. 
In sum, the results show that although some governance variables still 
impact on the firm's decision to appoint financial experts, their decision was 
strongly affected by the Act. 
5.7 Conclusions 
This chapter examines the impact of SOX on the determinants of audit 
committee financial expertise. I first utilise agency theory to analyse factors that 
are associated with the audit committee financial expertise pre-SOX. 
Consistent 
with the agency theory explanation, I find that existing governance mechanisms 
such as board independence, board financial expertise, CEO control and 
director 
ownership, are the main determinants of the 
firms' decision to include financial 
experts on the audit committee. 
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I then examine the impact of SOX on the likelihood a firm will appoint 
financial experts to the audit conu-nittee. I employ a logistic analysis model to 
explore the relation between the likelihood of a firm appoint financial experts and 
firm and governance characteristics. Ilie results show issuers' economic 
performance and existing corporate governance were statistically significant in 
determining whether to appoint a financial expert pre-SOX, but lost statistical 
power post-SOX. This suggests after SOX was enacted, companies that decided 
to include at least one financial expert mainly wanted to comply with the Act, 
whereas pre-SOX, issuers made this decision based on the companies' 
requirements. 
In addition, I employ a regression model to estimate the impact of 
governance and firm characteristics variables on the degree of audit comnuittee 
financial expertise. The results show that companies' decision in relation to the 
level of financial expertise was based on the companies' governance and firm 
characteristics pre-SOX. However, coefficients of governance variables and 
ownership structure variables decreased significantly post-SOX. This implies that 
companies decide upon the degree of audit committee financial expertise based 
more on regulatory compliance rather than the companies' need. 
Moreover, the signs of some governance variables changed significantly 
post-SOX, indicating that companies tended to appoint financial experts to 
complement existing governance mechanisms pre-SOX, but post-SOX they 
tended to appoint financial experts to substitute existing governance. Last, a 
Chow test is performed and the results suggest that the Act has a significant 
impact on the determinants of audit committee financial expertise from pre- to 
post-SOX. 
An additional analysis is performed to examine what factors impacted on the 
changes in a company's decision of appointing additional financial experts to the 
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audit conu-nittee post-SOX. The results show that only board financial expertise 
impacted on the changes in firm's decision, and the intercept is statistically 
significant. This suggests that firm's decision was strongly affected by the Act 
rather by the firm's requirements. 
In sum, the results suggest that after SOX was enacted, an issuer was mainly 
motivated to employ financial experts to comply with the Act, but not by the 
companies' needs. In addition, results also suggest that issuers employ financial 
experts to complement existing governance pre-SOX, but post-SOX issuers 
employ financial experts to substitute existing governance. 
The next chapter, chapter 6, will further investigates the financial impact of 
the issuers' decision to appoint or dismiss financial experts post-SOX. 
ill 
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6 
WAS THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT 
BENEFICIAL TO SHAREHOLDERS? 
AN ANALYSIS OF AUDIT 
COMMITTEE FINANCIAL 
EXPERTISE 
In response to the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, corporate board 
of directors increased the level of audit committee financial expertise substantially 
post-SOX. Using a unique dataset of audit committee financial expertise, I 
examine whether the company's response to SOX Section 407 has improved a 
firm's financial reporting quality and firm value. In contrast to the SEC 
expectation, the results show that firms that did not appoint financial experts 
either pre- or post-SOX had greater improvements in financial reporting quality 
than firms that appointed financial experts both pre- and post-SOX. However, 
firms which appointed financial experts pre-SOX but did not appoint financial 
experts post-SOX had experienced a reduction in financial reporting quality. In 
relation to firm value, firms that maintained appointing audit committee financial 
experts pre- and post-SOX had a greater increase in firm value over the sample 
period. Therefore the results imply that SOX did not achieve its objectives of 
improving financial reporting quality. However, it has, albeit unintentionally, 
enhanced corporate value for some firms. 
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6.1 Introduction 
The arrival of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 (SOXý imposed significantly higher 
legal liabilities and greater responsibilities on the directors of listed companies 
((companies", or "issuers", or "firms" hereafter). Post-SOX, executives are under 
considerably more pressure to ensure that their audit function is efficient and able 
to competently assess the financial health of the firm. As a result, companies 
appoint more accounting and financial experts to their audit committees in order 
to enhance financial reporting quality. The financial impact of appointing 
financial experts to the audit committee, however, has not been empirically 
examined. 
There have been a number of studies examining the impact of SOX on U. S. 
listed companies. On one hand, the Act, especially Section 404, has imposed 
higher compliance costs to issuers. It brought additional net costs to listed firms 
and led to a deterioration in overall firm value (Zhang 2007). Due to the 
perceived higher compliance costs, most companies either chose to go dark 46 or 
to go private (Engel et al 2007, Leuz et al 2008). On the other hand, shareholders 
regarded the Act as beneficial to their interests because it imposed greater 
liabilities and legal costs on executives and directors, which in turn improved 
corporate governance and provided better protection on shareholder wealth 
(Hohnstrom and 1,, '-aplan 2003, Linck et al 2008; Chhaochharia and Grinstein 
2007) Li et al 2008, Jain and Rezaee 2006). VA-iile Id et al (2008) and Jain and 
Rezaee (2006) find that SOX brought total net benefits to listed firms. 
46 Leuz et aZ (2008) defiries "go dark" as "&ted coiVanies cease 
filiq witb the Securities and Excbange Commission 
g da k (SEC) ýy deregisteriq their securities, but continue to trade in the Over-the-counter (OTC) market", where 
'ýoin r 
and going private both remove the obfigation to provide 
information to pubic investors. However, there are important 
ggga distinctions between these actions, the most notable bein that oin -d rk firms continue tra&ng after the 
date of 
, gistration 
" Jeuz et aZ , page 
184). dere 
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Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) find that large firms that were less compliant 
to SOX earned higher abnormal returns. 
Leuz (2007) suggests that previous SOX studies had the following 
weaknesses. First, Leuz (2007) argues that there was a lack of a control group that 
was "not aftled by the SOX and comparable to U. S. firms inpretious studies" (Leuz 2007, 
page 149). Therefore the results in prior research might be contaminated by other 
news, thus not entirely attributable to SOX. Secondly, since SOX was ".. passed as 
a package of complementag proi4sions" (Leuz 2007, page 149), the overall market 
reaction may reflect only the net benefits or costs of the whole package but not 
of a specific SOX provision. In addition, listed-companies' response such as 
going-dark or going-private (Engel et al 2007, Leuz et al 2008) may reflect the 
perception of potential costs of SOX rather than the actual costs incurred. These 
weaknesses raise several questions regarding first, are an provisions costly to 
issuers? Secondly, are some specific provisions beneficial to issuers, and thirdly, in 
what aspect is a specific provision beneficial or costly to issuers? These questions 
motivate research in this chapter. 
In this chapter, I investigate the effect of SOX Section 407 on listed 
companies. To examine the incremental benefits or costs of a specific SOX 
provision to issuers, Leuz's (2007) advice is to ".. soarate the effects ofbarficular 
SOXprotisions by using cross-sectional analý, sis of stock returns" (Leuz 2007, page 149). 1 
therefore separate a sample of data into four portfolios according to their 
responses to SOX Section 407, and compare the differences in financial reporting 
quality and fi-nn value across the four portfolios. This chapter has the followmg 
contributions to the audit comnlittee and SOX research. 
First, this study investigates the impact of Section 407 specifically, rather 
than the Act as a whole. Previous SOX studies focused on examining the net 
effects of the Act by comparing stock market performance from pre- to post- 
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SOX (Zhang 2007, Li et al 2008, Jain and Rezaee 2006). Since the Act was passed 
as ... apackage of complementagprobisions" (Leuz 2007, page 149), previous studies 
did not assess the impact of a specific provision. In contrast to prior studies, this 
chapter separates the sample according to the firms' response to Section 407 and 
compares the differences among different portfolios 47 . In doing so, this study is 
able to distinguish the impact of Section 407 from other provisions in the Act. 
Secondly, this study provides evidence of the consequences of appointing 
financial experts rather than the reasons to appoint financial experts in response 
to Section 407. Previous SOX research only examined why companies designated 
or appointed financial experts in response to SOX. For example, Carcello et al. 
(2006b) examines how company characteristics influence firms' designations of 
audit committee financial experts in response to Section 407. Further, Chapter 5 
in this thesis examines the determinants of audit committee financial expert 
appointments after the Act was announced. This chapter however explores the 
financial impact of appointing financial experts to their audit committee post- 
SOX, e. g. what have changed in the issuers' financial reporting quahty and firm 
value. This is especially important to regulators because it provides an evaluation 
to the effectiveness of Section 407 in SOX. 
Thirdly, this chapter explores whether the decreased earnings management 
post-SOX attributed to the increased level of audit committee financial expertise. 
Cohen et al (2005) find that earnings management decreased substantially after 
SOX was enacted. Meanwhile, both Carcello et al (2006b) and Chapter 5 in this 
thesis document that the level of audit committee financial expertise increased 
substantially post-SOX. However, there is no research exploring the link between 
the decreased earnings management and the increased level of financial expertise 
post-SOX. This chapter therefore explores this link and documents evidence of 
47 The way I construct the portfolios is surnmarised in the proceeding sections. 
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whether the decrease in accounting earnings management was caused by the 
changes in audit committee financial expertise. 
I select a sample that consists of 630 firm-years from the S&P 500 index, 
with 315 observations pre-SOX and 315 observations post-SOX. The sample is 
then divided into four portfolios: the NN portfolio, the FF portfolio, the NF 
portfolio and the FN portfolio. The NN portfolio consists of companies that did 
not include any financial expert either pre- or post-SOX. The FF portfolio 
consists of companies that included at least one financial expert both pre- and 
post-SOX. The NF portfolio consists of companies that did not include a 
financial expert pre-SOX but they included a financial expert post-SOX; and the 
FN portfolio consists of companies that included a financial expert pre-SOX but 
they did not include any financial expert post-SOX. 
The sample distributions show that the majority of issuers chose to follow 
the spirit" of the Act both pre- and post-SOX, i. e. to include at least one financial 
expert in both periods. I further examine which portfolio had greater 
improvements in financial reporting quality. The results show that companies that 
maintained or switched to include at least one financial expert post-SOX had 
lower improvements In financial reporting quality than companies that 
maintained not to appoint financial experts. Inconsistent with the hypothesis, 
both the FF and the NF portfolios had a lower increase in financial reporting 
quality relative to the NN portfolio from pre- to post-SOX. In addition, financial 
reporting quality improved when the audit conuTiittee became more active, but 
the marginal improvements of financial reporting quality by an audit committee 
are lower for firms that appoint financial experts post SOX. 
48 Section 407 does not mandate issuers to appoint financial experts. Instead, it requires issuers to 
disclose 
whether they have financial experts on the audit committee and explain the reason 
if they do not have one. 
This indicates issuers have discretions to appoint financial experts. Therefore if issuers appoint a financial 
expert to the audit committee, I define them as 
following the spirit of the Act. 
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In the context of firm value, the descriptive statistics show that comparnies mi 
the NF portfolio had the highest firin value both pre- and post-SOX. In contrast, 
companies in the FN portfolio had the lowest firm value pre- and post-SOX. 
Firm value of the FF and the NN portfolios are between the firm value of the 
NF and the FN portfolios. Further, the regression analysis shows that finns that 
chose to follow Section 407 post-SOX, e. g. the FF portfolio and the NF 
portfolio, had a greater increase in firm value than the finns that did not follow 
the rules post-SOX. 
Overall, the results generally indicate that SOX is beneficial to investors in 
that, overall, both firm value and financial reporting quality has been improved 
post-SOX. For firm value, the improvements were more substantial for firms 
which include financial experts post-SOX. However, for Section 407, it has not 
achieved its intended improvements in financial reporting quality through 
appointing financial experts. 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2, develops the 
hypotheses. Section 6.3 presents the data and methodologies. Section 6.4 
discusses the empirical results. Section 6.5 performs additional testing and Section 
6.6 concludes the chapter. 
6.2 Hypothesis Development 
6.2.1 FinmialReporfiq. Qualýty 
Section 407 requires issuers to disclose whether they have at 
least one financial 
expert in the audit committees and if not explain why not. 
Since it is at the 
companies' discretion to appoint 
financial experts, a company can either simply 
follow the rules or the spirit of Section 407 by appointing 
financial experts to 
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their audit connnittees, or do not follow the rules but employ other governance 
mechanisms to substitute the lack of expertise. Therefore according to a 
company's choice of appointing financial experts, I create four portfolios, which 
are the NN portfolio, the FF portfolio, the NF portfolio and the FN portfolio. 
The NN portfolio consists of companies that did not include any financial expert 
either pre- or post-SOX. The FF portfolio consists of companies that included at 
least one financial expert both pre- and post-SOX. The NF portfoho consists of 
companies that did not include a financial expert pre-SOX but they included a 
financial expert post-SOX; and the FN portfolio consists of companies that 
included a financial expert pre-SOX but they did not include any financial expert 
post-SOX. 
Agency theory suggests that the main function of an audit committee is to 
reduce agency costs by monitoring managers over financial reporting thus 
ensuring financial reporting integrity (Watts 2003, Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
The audit conunittee is therefore vital to ensure internal control, improving 
financial reporting quality and enhancing communication with external auditors 
(DeZoort et al 2002, Krishnan 2005). Previous research has documented 
evidence that appointing financial experts to the audit committee improves 
financial reporting quality. For example, Carcello et al (2006a) and Bedard et al 
(2004) find that financial reporting standards are higher for firms that have more 
financial experts in the audit cornnUttee. Abbott et al (2004) reports that firms are 
less likely to restate financial reports if their audit committees have at least one 
financial expert. In addition, Krishnan (2005) documents that audit committees 
with financial experts are less likely to have internal control problems within the 
firm. Therefore appointing more financial experts into the audit conunittee can 
reduce earnings management and improve financial reporting quality. 
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Since financial reporting quality is associated with the level of audit 
committee financial expertise and the firm's corporate governance (Klein 2002a, 
Carcello et al 2006a, Bedard et al 2004, Me et al 2003), companies that maintain a 
higher level of audit committee financial expertise are likely to have more reliable 
accounting information compared to companies that have a lower level of audit 
committee financial expertise. This suggests that if companies switch from having 
a higher to having a lower level of financial expertise, they may experience a 
decrease in financial reporting quality, and vice versa. 
As a result, the changes in financial reporting quality for the four portfolios 
may follow the following order. The FN portfolio has the greatest decrease in 
financial reporting quality from pre- to post-SOX, whereas the NF portfolio has 
the greatest increase in financial reporting quality within the four portfolios. 
Compared to the NN portfolio, the FF portfolio may have greater improvement 
in financial reporting quality. This is because for the FF portfolios, there are 
financial experts on the audit committee who are first, more capable in enhancing 
financial reporting quality; and second they have higher reputation costs 
motivating them to ensure higher financial reporting quality. Therefore the 
hypotheses are as follows. 
potting qualiýy, wbereas the H 1: The FNportfolio bas the greatest reduction infinandal re 
'potting 
qualitfrompre- to post-SOX NFponfolio bad the greatest improvement infinandal re 
H2., The I-Tponfolio badgreater reduction in finandal reporfig qualio than the NN 
por6(oliofmmpre- topost-SOX. 
6.22 Firm Value 
Agency theory predicts that firms with better governance structure have higher 
firm value as they are associated with lower agency costs 
Gensen 1986, Jensen and 
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Meckling 1976). Previous research has documented evidence that superior 
governance structure is associated with higher firm value (Gompers et al 2003). 
In addition, Yermack (1996) presents evidence that shareholder wealth is higher 
when the boards are smaller. Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) also find that 
boards with more independent directors have less agency costs and perform 
better, and Cremers and Nair (2005) report that better governance mechanisms 
are associated with higher firm performance. Since superior governance structure 
is associated with higher firm value, appointing (dismissing) financial experts to 
(from) the audit committee is expected to add (damage) firm value. 
In addition, firms with better governance system may incur a lower cost of 
capital, which in turn enhances fi-rm value. Anderson et al (2004) find that firms 
with more qualified audit committees pay less on their borrowings. They argue 
that creditors determine the cost of debt based on the firms' financial reporting 
reliability49 (Anderson et al 2004). Companies that employ financial experts to the 
audit conu-nittee therefore may have lower cost of capital, which in turn enhances 
firm value. DeFond et al (2005) present evidence consistent with this argument, 
and they find that firms who appointed financial experts to the audit committee 
have higher stock returns. Although Weir, Laing and McKnight (2002) do not 
find any significant relationship between audit committee independence and firm 
value, they suggest better firm performance is associated with a higher profile 
audit committee. Therefore, it is expected that boards which employ financial 
experts are likely to have better firm performance and firm value. 
As a contrasting argument, recent research on SOX suggests that the Act has 
imposed excessively high compliance costs to listed companies (Zhang 2007, 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein 2007). Firms that employ more financial experts M 
49 Anderson et A (2004) find that creditors consider financial accounts more credible if the issuer's audit 
committee is of higher profile, and they charge lower interests to issuers with higher profile audit 
conunittees, e. g. more independent, expertise and active audit cornmittees. 
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response to SOX Section 404 would also bear significant compliance costs. 
Concerned with reputation risk, financial experts are more likely to require their 
company to expend more resources, both monetary and human, to comply with 
the Act. This may result in a situation where companies focus more on complying 
with regulations rather than focusing on business objectives (Solomon and Bryan- 
Low 2004 cited in Zhang 2007). Consequently, the employment of financial 
experts will not maximise firm value if the concomitant costs of employment are 
too high post-SOX 01, inck et al 2008). Therefore, firms with more financial 
experts. may actually have a lower firm value compared with their peer companies. 
I formulate the hypothesis under the former arguments that appointing 
(dismissing) financial experts to (from) the audit committee enhances (impairs) 
firm value. In addition, firms that changed from appointing financial experts to 
dismissing financial experts would have the greatest change in firm value, and 
vice versa. Therefore the NF portfolio has the greatest increase in firm value 
while the FN portfolio has the largest decrease in firm value. Further, the FF 
portfolio would have higher increase in firm value than the NN portfolio because 
first, savings from the lower cost of capital which is brought by lower agency 
cost, could be invested in projects that add value to the firm for the next fiscal 
year. As a result, better governed companies would have a greater increase in firm 
value. However, ultimately, these questions are empirical ones. 
-H3: 
TbeNFponfolio bad tbegreatest inarase infirm value, whereas the FNponfolio 
had the greatest decmase infirm valuefrom pre- to post-SOX. 
"Id II -T: The 
-FF_ponfolio 
bad agreater increase infirm value than the -NNponfolio. 
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6.3 Data and Methodologies 
6.3.1 Data 
Table 6-1 Descriptive statistics - sample distributions 
RanelA: Disiribuliwi ýy. year 
Missing Available % Sample - Original Financial Missing Final 
Year 
Sample Institutions 
Proxy Proxy 
AudC Info. Sample 
% Sample % Original 
Statement Statement Sample 
2002 500 90 67 343 15 328 32.38% -0.95% 
2003 500 90 55 355 15 340 33.56% 0.23% 
2004 500 90 51 359 14 345 34.06% 0.72% 
Total 1500 270 173 1057 44 1013 100.00% 0.00% 
Panel B: Derivation qj the sample 
Observations available from pre-SOX to Missing data for the calculation of Tobin's Q and Final Sample 
post-SOX Discretionary Accruals 
No. of 
Observations 328 13 315 
The sample consists of up to 345 non-financial S&P 500 companies during the period 2002 to 2004. 'Me sample is constructed 
by examining all S&P 500 companies with available corporate governance information filed in the proxy statements on the 
Securities and Exchange CoMrrUssion (SEC) website from 2002 to 2004. Firm-years are on-iitted from the sample if 
information regarding audit committee composition, board and audit committee meetings at the year end is unavailable. The 
initial sample consists of 500 companies including 90 financial companies each year. Missing Proxy Statement refers to the 
aggregate number of proxy statements missing from the SEC website. Missing AudC. Info refers to observations missed due to 
unavailable governance information in the proxy statements at the year end. The final sample consists of 1013 observations. 
The last column refers to the percentage of firms each year or each sector of the total number of firms in the final sample 
(1013). 
Panel B presents the derivation of the final sample for the analyses in this study. There are 328 firms with available corporate 
governance information from 2002 to 2004. After deleting firms with unavailable accounting information to calculate Tobin's 
Q and the Discretionary Accruals, there are 315 firms with all information for the analyses in this study. Pre/Post-SOX is 
defined as the date before /after June 30 2003. 
Panel A of Table 6-1 shows the descriptive statistics of the sample. The analysis 
draws on a sample of S&P 500 companies comprising of 1,013 firm-years 
between 2002 and 2004'0. Taking the S&P 500 constituents as a base, 1,500 
company proxy statements (every proxy statement between 2002 and 2004) were 
collected from the SEC website. Data on audit conu-nittee financial expertise was 
50 1 restrict the sample period to 2002-2004 because I want to capture the effects on issuers' 
financial 
reporting quality and firm value of the immediate changes 
in audit coMnUttee characteristics after SOX was 
enacted. 
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manuaRy coUated from the proxy statements for each firm-year and accounting 
data is taken from WorldScope. 
After deducting 270 firm-years through omitting financial firms and 173 
firm-years for firms that do not have proxy statements and corporate governance 
information, I was left with 1,013 available observations. The final sample 
comprises 1,013 firm-years from 343 companies across three years, 2002-2004. 
Table 6-1, panel A presents a full breakdown of the sample. The sample 
distributions do not deviate from the original sample distributions since the 
difference in distributions between this sample and the original sample is less than 
i %. 
I next chose the period covering pre-SOX and post-SOX to capture the 
impact of the Act on audit committee financial expertise. As Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 5 show, June 30th 2003 is one year after the Act was enacted and thus 
expected to be the date large companies comply with rules, and there was a 
structural change in the determinants of audit committee financial expertise from 
this date on. Therefore consistent with Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, the pre-SOX 
period is defined as the period from July Vt 2002 to June 30" 2003, whereas the 
post-SOX period is defined as the period from July 1st 2003 to June 30 
th 2004. 
Deleting observations that lack accounting data for calculating the discretionary 
accruals and the Tobin's Q, the final sample consists of 315 observations 
in both 
pre- and post-SOX period. 
6.3.2 Metbodolqgies 
Pro, %yfor Finamial Reportiq Qualiýy 
I employ the modified Jones model derived 
from the Jones model Gones 1991) 
based on the method in Teoh et al (1998a, 1998b) and 
Dechow et al (1995). 
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Given that operating performance may affect the power of discretionary accruals 
as a proxy for financial reporting quality, Kothari et al (2005) suggests to control 
normal accruals for the firm's operating performance. In addition, my sample 
period covers the time when the U. S. economy was experiencing poor 
performance because of the terrorist attacks and accounting scandals. These 
factors significantly affected the operating performance of listed companies5l and 
hence the normal discretionary accruals. I therefore follow Teoh et al (1998a, 
1998b) and Kothari et al (2005) to derive the performance matched modified 
Jones model using the following methods. 
Nondiscretionary accruals (NDCAi, ) are expected accruals from a cross- 
sectional modification of Jones (1991) regression in that year of total accruals on 
a set of independent variables using an estimation sample of all two-digit SIC 
code peers, and discretionary accruals (or DCAi, ) are the residuals (reoh et az 
1998a, Teoh et al 1998b). 
Equation 6-1 
DCA 
ACI, j NDCA 
TAi't-I i't 
ACj,, is defined as: 
Equation 6-2 
ACj, j = 
NetIncome,,, (172) - CashRowFrom0peratim,,, (308) 
52 
The Performance-Matched Modified Jones (PMj) model is defined as 
follows: 
51 See Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 for details 
52 The Compustat item numbers are in parentheses. I use the matching 
item in the WorldScope database. 
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'Me PMJ model: 
Equation 6-3 
ACj, t bo I+b, 
ASalesj,, 
+ b2 
PPEj, t + b3 
ROSj, t + Ej, t TAj,, 
-, 
TAj, t-l TAj,, j TAj,, -, 
TAj,, 
-, 
E=- estimation sample 
Nondiscretionary total PMJ accruals or PMJNDCA are calculated as: 
Equation 6-4 
AIA ASales,,, - ATRi,, +^ 
PPEi'l ROSj', 
PMJNDCA,,, = bo TAi't-I 
+ b, 
TAi't-I 
b2 
TAi'l-I + 
b3 
TAj', j 
where ASalesi,, is the changes of Sales (12) from previous year (t-1), ATRj,, 
is the change of Trade Receivables (151) from previous year, PPE, 
', 
is the Gross 
Property, Plant and Equipment (7), ROS, 
', 
is the Net Income (172) divided by 
AA 
Sales (12), b, is the estimated intercept from the Equation 6-3, b, , 
b2 
and 
b3 
are 
estimated slope coefficients for firm i in year t. 
I proxy the changes of financial reporting quality as the absolute value of 
changes of the discretionary accruals from t-1 to t, which is: 
Equation 6-5 
APMJDCA j, , =PMJDCA j, t-PMJDCA i, t- i 
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ro, %y fo r Fi rm Va lu e 
Following Davies et al (2005), Gompers et al. (2003) and Yermack (1996), 1 
employ Tobin's Q as the proxy for firm value. Following Gompers et al. (2003), 1 
define Tobin's Q as the market value of assets divided by book value of assets, 
where the market value of assets is computed as book value of assets plus the 
market value of common stock less the surn of book value of common stock 
(WorldScope Item: TotalCommonEquity) and balance sheet deferred taxes 
(WorldScope Item: DeferredTaxesBalSht). I proxy the changes in firm value as 
the changes in Q from t-1 to t. 
Equation 6-6 
AQi, t=Qi, t-Qi, t-l 
6.4 Results 
6.4.1 Desetipfive Statistics 
Table 6-2 presents the descriptive statistics for the changes in firm characteristics 
from pre- to post-SOX. Firm size (total sales) growth is defined as the changes M 
market value of equity (total sales) from t-1 to t divided by market value of equity 
(total sales) at t-1. The changes in other firm characteristics variables are defined 
as the value at t minus the value at t-1. Details of the definition of governance 
variables are summarised in Table 4-7 in Chapter 4. All variables are winsorized at 
i %. 
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Table 6-2 Descriptive statistics of changes in firm characteristics variables 
Mean Niedian Std. N 
PanelA (Fbe NWporffiolio) 
Firm Size Growth 18-04"o 10.850'o 33.48% 70 
Return on Assets (ROA) Changes 0.146 0.052 2.066 70 
Growth Opportunities Changes 0.056 -0.001 1.250 70 
Total Sales Growth 14.04% 11.11% 15.42% 70 
Leverage Changes 
-0.010 -0.018 0.048 70 
Capital Expenditure to Total Assets Changes -0.003 -0,001 0.014 70 
Cash Flow to Total Assets Changes 0.235 0.065 1.059 70 
Audit Committee Mectings Changes (Number oo 0.971 0.000 3.064 70 
Panel B (Fhe FFporyb1io) 
Firm Size Growth 21.200'o 15.63% 31.69% 220 
Return on Assets (ROA) Changes 0.451 0.068 3.227 220 
Growth Opportunities Changes 0.145 0.090 1.206 220 
Total Sales Growth 15.66% 11.26% 17.50% 220 
Leverage Changes -0.027 -0.020 0.044 220 
Capital Expenditure to Total Assets Changes -0.002 0.000 0.021 220 
Cash Flow to Total Assets Changes 0.218 0.117 1.113 220 
Audit Conunittee Meetings Changes (Number oo 0.558 0.000 2.149 220 
Panel C (77je I\Tpor6(olio) 
Firm Size Growth 16.76% 22.971,16 20.26"/o 19 
Return on Assets (ROA) Changes -0.028 0.009 1.262 19 
Growth Opportunities Changes 0.146 0.070 0.551 19 
Total Sales Growth 9.91% 9.51% 8.38% 19 
Leverage Changes -0.031 -0.029 0.036 19 
Capital Expenditure to Total Assets Changes 0.000 0.002 0.011 19 
Cash Flow to Total Assets Changes 0.186 0.094 0.368 19 
Audit Conurýittee Meetings Changes (Number oo 0.500 1.000 1.917 19 
Panel D (The FNporffoho) 
Firm Size Growth 19.09010 17.20% 39.62% 6 
Return on Assets (ROA) Changes 0.105 0.055 0.212 6 
Growth Opportunities Changes 0.631 0.086 2.625 6 
Total Sales Growth 9.87% 6.50% 8.73% 6 
Leverage Changes -0.016 -0.010 0.052 6 
Capital Expenditure to Total Assets Changes 0.003 0.001 0.012 6 
Cash Flow to Total Assets Changes 0.059 0.046 0.181 6 
Audit Conuýnittee Meetings Changes (Number oO 1.833 2.000 1.602 6 
The sample consists of up to 315 non-financial S&P 500 companies during the period 2002 to 2004. 
All accounting data is 
collected from the WorldScope database. Firm size is the year-end market value of the 
Firm. Growth opportunity is defined 
as the market value of the equity plus book value of debt and then 
divided by the book value of firm's total assets. 
Leverage is defined as year-end total debt divided by year-end total assets of the 
firm. Units of assets, sales, income, market 
value and debt are billion U. S. dollars. All growth ratios are calculated as the value of 
item I at t divided by the value of 
item I at t-1 minus 1. Adl changes values are calculated as the value of 
item i at t minus the value of item j at t-1. The 
sample is divided into four portfolios, a) The FF portfolio 
(firms that stick to following the rules in Section 407 pre- and 
post-SOY, b) the NN portfolio (firms that stick to not-follo,, ving the rules pre- and post-SOXý, c) the 
FN portfolio (firms 
that switch from following to not-following the rules post-SOI', 
ý, and d) the NF portfolio (firms that switch from not- 
following to following the rules post-SOXý. 
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Ilie majority of the sample (220 firms) followed the rules/spirit of Section 
407 (or "follow the rules" hereafter) both pre- and post-SOX. About 22% of the 
sample (70 firms) did not follow the spirit of SOX either pre- or post-SOX. 
Compared to the FF portfolio, the NN portfolio had relatively smaller increase 1n 
firm size, profitability (ROA), growth opportunities (Market to Book) and sales, 
but greater increase in free cash flow. This implies that the FF portfolio might 
have relatively more growth opportunities and greater improvements in 
performance from pre- to post-SOX than the NN portfolio. 
Since companies that appoint financial experts to their audit committees 
perform better in the stock market (DeFond et al 2005), firms that have financial 
experts on the audit committee are more likely to increase the proportion of 
equities to finance projects. Consistent with DeFond et al (2005), Table 6-2 
shows that the FF and NF portfolios have a greater Mcrease in equity financing. 
Changes in the leverage ratio is -0.031, -0.027, -0.01 and -0.016 for NF, FF, NN 
and FN portfolios respectively. This suggests that issuers who have financial 
experts on the audit committee are more likely to use equity financing post-SOX. 
Table 6-2 also shows that the increase in audit conu-nittee meetings was 
significant for both the NN and FF portfolios. In addition, the increase in audit 
committee meetings for the NN portfolio was substantially greater for the FF 
portfolio. In addition to the large increase of audit committee meetings for the 
FN portfolio, the statistics suggest that companies that did not appoint financial 
experts tended to be more diligent in order to substitute the lack of expertise in 
the audit conitnittee. 
Only a small amount of companies (6 firms) chose not to follow the rules 
post-SOX. These companies have substantially greater increase in growth 
opportunities compared to the other three portfolios. This is consistent with the 
notion that, opportunistic managers tend to select a less qualified audit committee 
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(Klein 2002b). However, since most of the changes for the FN portfolio were not 
significant, I can only draw a conclusion that firms in this portfolio did not have 
large changes M firm characteristics from pre- to post-SOX. 
6.4.2 Univariate Analý, Sis 
Table 6-3 Changes in audit committee financial expertise, firm performance and financial reporting quality 
Pre-SOX Post-SOX N Post - Pre % Changes 
PanelA A. 1. - 42. A. 1. - A. 2. 
A. 1. The NWpoq(olio 
Financial Reporting Quality 0.079 -0.004 0.044 -0.026 70 -0.035 -44.71% 
Firm Value 2.310 0.0092 2.288 -0.065 70 -0.022 -0.95% 
A. 2. The FFporffiolio 
Financial Reporting Quality 0.082 0.069 220 -0.013 -15.76% 
Firm Value 2.301 2.353 220 0.052 2.28% 
Panel B B. 1. - B. 2. B. 1. - B. 2. 
B. 1. Tbe I\Tporffiolio 
Financial Reporting Quality 0.060 0.0193 0.062 0.0151 19 0.003 4.77% 
Firm Value 2.416 0.4345 2.439 0.5901 19 0.023 0.93% 
B. 2. The FNporffiolio 
Financial Reporting Quality 0.040 0.047 6 0.007 17.40% 
Firm Value 1.982 1.849 6 -0.133 -6.71% 
'Me sample consists of up to 315 non-financial S&P 500 companies during the period 2002 to 2004. All accounting 
data is 
collected from the WorldScope database. Firm size is the year-end market value of the firm. Growth opportunity 
is defined as 
the market value of the equity plus book value of debt and then divided by the book value of firm's total assets. 
Leverage is 
defined as year-end total debt divided by year-end total assets of the firm. Units of assets, sales, income, market value and 
debt 
are bdhon U. S. dollars. All growth ratios are calculated as the value of item j at t divided 
by the value of item i at t-l minus 1. 
All changes values are calculated as the value of item ) at t minus the value of item ), at t-l. 
Tobin's Q is defined as the market 
value of assets divided by book value of assets, where the market value of assets 
is computed as (book value of assets plus the 
market value of common stock) less the sum of (book value of common stock (WS 
Item: TotalCommonEquity) and balance 
sheet deferred taxes (WS Item: DeferredTaxesBalSht)). The sample is divided 
into four portfolios, a) 'Me FF portfolio (firms 
that stick to following the rules in Section 407 Pre- and post-SOY, b) the NN portfolio 
(firms that stick to not-following the 
rules pre- and post-SOXý, c) the FN portfolio (firms that switch from following to not-following the rules post-SOXý, and 
d) 
the NF portfolio (firms that switch from not-following to following the rules post-SOXý. 
'Me Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test was performed to test the differences in financial reporting quality and 
firm value between 
different portfolios, whereas the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test was performed to test the changes 
in financial reporting quality and 
firm value from Pre- to post-SOX for the portfolio. and * 
indicate the changes are significant at 1%, 501'. and 10% 
respectively. 
I further investigate the changes in financial reporting quality and firm value 
based on companies' choices in appointing financial experts. Table 
6-3 presents 
the Univariate analysis of the changes in financial reporting quality and firm value 
for the four portfolios. Panel A reports the comparisons between the FF 
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portfolio and the NN portfolio, whereas Panel B reports the comparisons of the 
FN portfolio and the NF portfolio. The Wilcoxon-Mann-VA-iitney test was 
performed to test the differences in financial reporting quality and firm value 
between different portfolios, whereas the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test was 
performed to test the changes in financial reporting quality and firm value from 
pre- to post-SOX for the portfolio. 
Financial reporting quality, which is measured as the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals (DCA), was about 8% for both the NN and the FF 
portfolio pre-SOX. The difference in DCA between the two portfolios was not 
significant either pre- or post-SOX. However, financial reporting quality 
increased substantially post-SOX for both portfolios. While DCA decreased by 
0.035 for the NN portfolio, it decreased by 0.013 for the FF portfolio. This result 
is contrast to hypothesis 2.1 interpret it as that the greater decrease M financial 
reporting quality for the NN portfolio was caused by other factors but not the 
firm's choice in appointing financial experts. For example, it may be caused by 
the increased diligence of audit committees. As shown in Table 6-2, the increase 
in the number of audit committee meetings was 0.971 for the NN portfolio, 
which was greater than 0.558 times for the FF portfolio. Since audit committee 
diligence could substitute financial expertise in terms of enhancing financial 
reporting quality (DeZoort et al 2002, Abbott et al 2004), the greater 
improvements in financial reporting quality for the NN portfolio might be 
attributable to their more diligent audit committees caused by SOX Section 404.. 
A further investigation is provided in the following sections. 
Comparing firm value between the two portfolios, although the differences 
in firm value for the FF and the NN portfolio were not statistically significant 
either pre- or post-SOX, the FF portfolio exhibits a greater increase in firm value 
(0.052), where the NN portfolio decreased slightly by 0.022. Change in firm value 
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for the NF portfolio in Panel B was 0.023 and not significant. However, both the 
FF and the NF portfolios had positive increase in firm value, whereas both the 
NN and FN portfolios had decrease in firm value. These results suggest that 
firms that follow the SOX spirit tended to have a greater increase in firm value 
than firms that did not follow the spirit. 
The FN portfolio had the lowest level of DCA and Q, and it exhibited 
negative changes in firm value. This result tends to imply that smaller firms find it 
more difficult to follow the rules to include a financial expert to the audit 
conu-nittee. In addition, if including at least one financial expert to the audit 
committee improves firm value and vice versa, the companies' decision of not 
following the rules may be one of the reasons that the FN portfolio had lower 
firm value post-SOX. 
The next section further investigates the relation among financial reporting 
quality, firm value and companies' choices in appointing financial experts with the 
regression analysis. 
6.4.3 Multivariate Analý, Sis 
Finmial RePorting Qualio 
Model 6-1 Changes in financial reporting quality 
ADCAj, t=a+fljADCAj, t-j+fl2AW- +#3AROAit+fl4AMKBVit+fl5ACapExpi't I't 
+186 ACashi'l +fl7 DumNNj, t +fl8 DumFFi, t+PgDumNFit+, 8, OAAudMeetit 
+, 8, DumNNit *AAudMeetit +fl12 DumFFj, t*AAudMeetjt 
+, 8,3DumNFi, t *AA udMeeti, t +Ej, t 
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Model 6-2 Financial reporting quality post-SOX 
DCAj, t=a+fl, DCAj't_j +fl2MVit+, 83R0Aj, t+, 84MKB Vjt+#5CapExp, 
't 
+186Cashi, t+fi7DumNNi, t+fl8DumFFi, t+, 89DumNFi, t+, 81OAudMeeti, t 
+#, DumNNi, t *AudMeetjt+J812DumFFjt 
I employ Model 6-1 and Model 6-2 to examine whether a firm's choice of 
appointing financial experts have impact on its financial reporting quality53. MV is 
the year-end market value of the firm. MKBV is defined as the market value of 
the equity plus book value of debt and then divided by the book value of firm's 
total assets. ROA is net income divided by total assets. CapExp is defined as 
capital expenditure divided by total assets, and Cash is operating cash flow. I 
assume that the changes in DCA follow a random walk procedure hence I add 
the lag value of DCA to and the lag value of the changes in DCA to Model 6-2. 
In addition, because both Table 6-2 and Table 6-3 have implications that audit 
committee diligence can substitute the lack of financial expertise in ensuring 
financial reporting quality, I add the variable "AudMeet" (audit committee 
meeting) to the model to control for this effect. 
Table 6-4 reports results for the relation between financial reporting quality 
and companies' choice of appointing financial experts. First, consistent with 
previous studies, the left-hand side of the table shows that the lag value of ADCA 
is negatively related to the value of ADCA, which indicates the reversing nature 
of discretionary accruals (DeFond and Park 2001). Secondly, the tight-hand side 
of the table shows that the lag value of DCA is positively related to DCA. 
Consistent with Jensen (2005), t1lis suggests that once corporate managers start 
manipulating earnings they could not stop it in a short period: 
53 The results of the model that controls for industry are similar to the results in these two models, except that 
the dummies of NN, FF, NF become inso-ýificant in Model 6-2 when industry is control. 
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'Once we as mana n gs mana le gers start yliq i the eamin gement game, it is near, tj ýy i ossib 
to stop because the game cascadesjonvard. P', we are baviýT trouble meefiq the earniqs targets 
for thisyear, we push e. %pensesjonward, and we pull revenuesfrom next pen . od into thisperiod 
Revenues bormwedfrom the future and today's eVenses pushed to tomo o qui even more rr w re re 
manoulazion in tbefuture tojorestall the day ofreckoning "0 ensen 2005, page 8). 
In contrast to hypothesis 1 and 2, results of Model 6-1 in Table 6-4 shows 
that companies that did not appoint financial experts post-SOX had greater 
improvements in financial reporting quality than firms that appointed financial 
experts. Controlling for the changes in meeting frequency, results show that the 
NN portfolio had the greatest increase in financial reporting quality post-SOX 
compared to the other portfolios, while the NF portfolio had greater 
improvements in financial reporting quality than the FF portfolio. 
Similarly, results of Model 6-2 in Table 6-4 show that the NN portfolio had 
higher financial reporting quality post-SOX, while the NF portfolio had better 
financial reporting quality than the FF portfolio. Further, both audit committee 
meeting frequencies and the changes in audit committee meeting frequencies are 
negative and significant, suggesting that audit committees with a higher level of 
diligence are more capable in improving financial reporting quality (Abbott et al 
2000, DeZoort et al 2002). However, the interactive dummies show that for the 
FF portfolio, audit committees became less efficient than other portfolios when 
the committee increased the meeting frequencies. This suggests that the marginal 
efficiency of audit committee meetings for the NN portfolio was higher than 
other portfolios. 
In general, the results are contrast to my hypothesis and different from the 
SEC expectations. Incorporated with results in Chapter 5, the analysis shows that 
SOX intends to enhance corporate financial reporting quality through mandating 
issuers to disclose the level of financial experts on the audit conlinlIttee. However, 
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issuers tended to include more experts to the audit conu-nittee mainly to comply 
with the Act but not to fulfil the companies' requirements. Therefore including 
more financial experts to the audit committee may not necessarily improve 
financial reporting quality post-SOX. Results in Table 6-4 support this argument. 
Table 6-4 Regression analysis - audit committee financial expertise and financial reporting quality 
Changes in financial reporting quality (DC. A) Financial reporting quality (DCA) post-SOX 
Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat 
Intercept 0.238 3.430 Intercept 0.300 2.190 
Lag Delta DCA -0.287 -9.280 Lag DCA 0.082 1.960 
Delta MV (scaled by 100) -0.078 -3.360 Nfv 0.001 0.140 
Delta ROA (scaled by 100) 0.839 7.480 ROA 0.826 10.150 
Delta MKBV (scaled by 100) 0.006 0.970 NlKBV -0.002 -1.140 
Delta CapExp (scaled by 100) 0.080 0.260 CapExp 0.024 0.210 
Del Cash (scaled by 100) -0.027 -4.510 Cash -0.970 -10.280 
DummyNN -0.221 -3.130 DummyNN -0.250 -1.880 
DummyFF -0.210 -3.000 DummyFF -0.240 -1.820 
DununyNF -0.218 -2.940 DummyNF -0.286 -2.040 
DelAudMeet -0.075 -2.510 AudMeet -0.026 -1.720 
DunimyNN*DeLAudMeet 0.066 2.190 DununyNN*AudMeet 0.025 1.590 
DummyFF*DelAudNIect 0.076 2.520 DummyFF*AudMeet 0.024 1.540 
DurritnyNF*DeLAudMeet 0.071 2.160 DununyNF*AudMeet 0.028 1.720 
Observations 315 Observations 315 
Adjusted R2 38.97% Adjusted R2 37.9716 
F Statistic 14.59 F Statistic 13.98 
(p-value) <. 0001 (p-value) <0001 
The sample consists of up to 315 non-financial S&P 500 companies during the period 2002 to 2004. All accounting data is 
collected from the WorldScope database. MV is the year-end market value of the firm. MKBV is defined as the market value of 
the equity plus book value of debt and then divided by the book value of firm's total assets. Leverage is defined as year-end 
total debt divided by year-end total assets of the firm. Units of assets, sales, income, market value and debt are billion U. S. 
dollars. All growth ratios are calculated as the value of item j at t divided by the value of item j at t-1 nuinus 1. All changes 
values are calculated as the value of item ) at t minus the value of item j at t-1. Tobin's Q is defined as the market value of 
assets divided by book value of assets, where the market value of assets is computed as (book value of assets plus the market 
value of common stock) less the sum of (book value of common stock (WS Item: TotalCominonEquity) and balance sheet 
deferred taxes (WS Item: DeferredTaxesBalSht)). Discretionary accruals are calculated using the Modified Jones model. 'Me 
sample is divided into four portfolios, a) The FF portfolio (firms that stick to following the rules in Section 407 pre- and post- 
SOX, b) the NN portfoho (firrns that stick to not-following the rules pre- and post-SOXý, c) the FN portfolio (firms that 
switch from following to not-following the rules post-SOXý, and d) the NF portfolio (firrns that switch from not-following to 
following the rules post-SOXý. ***, ** and * indicate the estimates are significant at 1 O'o, 5% and 10% respectively. 
In sum, the results imply that the improvements in financial reporting quality 
post-SOX were attributed to the changes in whether financial experts were 
appolnted to the audit conu-nittee and the changes in audit conu-nittee activeness. 
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However, the results are in contrast to the SOX expectation and previous studies 
since I found firins that appoint financial experts to the audit conunittee post- 
SOX had lower unprovements in financial reporting quality. 
Firm Value 
I use Model 6-3 and Model 6-4 to exarrune the relation between companies' 
choice in appointing financial experts and firm value. I assurne firin value and its 
changes follow a random walk procedure hence I add the lag value of changes in 
Q to Model 6-3 and the lag value of Q to Model 6-4. 
Model 6-3 Changes in firm value 
AQ,, t=a+, 8, AQi, t_l +fl2AWi, t 
+P3 AROSi, t+184 A MKB Vi, t +, 85ASalesi, t 
+186 ALeverage it+187 ACqpExp,, t+&ACashjt+&DumNNjt 
+, 81ODumFFi, t+fl,, DumNFi, t+ei, t 
Model 6-4 Firm value post-SOX 
Qi, 
t=a+, 
8, Q,, 
t_, +, 
82AIYi, t+, 83ROSi, t+, 84MKB Vj' t +fl5Salesit +P6 Leverage,,, 
+, 8 7 CapExp,, t +, 
88Cashit+, 89DumNNit+, 81ODumFFit+, 81, DumNFit+Eit 
Table 6-5 shows the results of the regression analysis for Model 6-3 and 
Model 6-4. Consistent with Core et al (1999), Cremers and Nair (2005) and 
Gompers et al (2003), companies that chose better governance structure perform 
better than firms that chose poorer governance structure. All the three dummy 
variables are significant and positive in Model 6-3. Both FF and NF portfolios 
have a greater increase in firm value than the NN and FN portfolio. However, 
only the FF dummy variable is significant and positive in Model 6-4. Ibis also 
supports that only firms that employed financial experts had higher finn value 
post-SOX. 
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Table 6-5 Regression analysis - audit conm-ýittee financial expertise and financial value 
Changes in firm value (Tobin's Q) Firm value (Tobin's Q) post-SOX 
Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat 
Intercept -0.359 -2-300 Intercept 0.051 0.150 
Lag Delta Q -0.131 -3-520 Lag Tobin's Q 0.606 17.580 
Delta MV 0.814 9.020 MV 0.239 5.380 
Delta ROA -0.164 -0.360 ROA 0.118 0.190 
Delta MKBV 0.212 9.470 MKBV 0.101 6.540 
Delta Sales -0.368 -2.430 Sales -0.230 -5.700 
Delta Leverage 1.308 2.650 Leverage -0.644 -2.820 
Delta CapExp -0.924 -0.810 CapExp -0.365 -0.430 
Delta Cash 0.024 1.060 Cash 1.168 1.590 
DununyNN 0.266 1.640 DummyNN 0.368 1.760 
DummyFF 0.324 2.050 DunimyFF 0.403 1.990 
DununyNF 0.309 1.740 DunirnyNF 0.369 1.610 
Observations 315 Observations 315 
Adjusted R2 62.37% Adjusted R2 87.371, 'o 
F Statistic 45.65 F Statistic 190.62 
(p-value) <. 0001 (p-value) <. 0001 
The sample consists of up 315 non-financial S&P 500 companies during the period 2002 to 2004. All accounting data is collected 
from the WorldScope database. MV is the year-end market value of the firm. TvfKBV is defined as the market value of the equity 
plus book value of debt and then divided by the book value of firm's total assets. Leverage is defined as year-end total debt divided 
by year-end total assets of the firm. Units of assets, sales, income, market value and debt are billion U. S. dollars. All growth ratios 
are calculated as the value of item j at t divided by the value of item j at t-l minus 1. All changes values are calculated as the value 
of item j at t rninus the value of item j at t-1. Tobin's Q is defined as the market value of assets divided by book value of assets, 
where the market value of assets is computed as (book value of assets plus the market value of common stock) less the sum of 
(book value of common stock (WS Item: TotalCommonEquity) and balance sheet deferred taxes (WS Item: 
DeferredTaxesBalSht)). Discretionary accruals are calculated using the Modified Jones model. 'Me sample is divided into four 
portfolios, a) The FF portfolio (firms that stick to following the rules in Section 407 pre- and post-SOX, b) the NN portfolio 
(firms that stick to not-following the rules pre- and post-SOXý, c) the FN portfolio (firms that switch from following to not- 
following the rules post-SOXý, and d) the NF portfolio (fim-is that switch ftom not-following to following the rules post-SOXý. 
***, ** and * indicate the estimates are significant at 1 ý46,5% and 10% respectively. 
One of the results is in contrast to iny third hypothesis. Hypothesis 3 
predicts that the dummy for the NF portfolio had a greater increase in firm value 
than all other portfolios. However, Table 6-5 shows that the FF portfolio had the 
greatest increase in firm value, whereas the NF portfolio had the second largest 
increase in firm value. This result indicates that first-, companies that appoint 
financial experts to their audit committees have a greater increase in firm value 
than others; and secondly, compared to the FF portfolio, firms in the NF 
portfolio need to exert more resources, for instance, the initial costs incurred in 
relation to hiring a financial expert. 
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Consistent with previous research, the changes in firm size and growth 
opportunities are positively related to the changes M firm value (Davies et al 
2005). However, the lag of the change in firm value is negatively related to the 
change in firm value. There are two possible reasons for this negative relation. 
The first reason is that the change in firm value is mean reverting thus any 
positive change in firm value in the last period will cause negative change in the 
current year. The second reason is that the U. S. economy experienced poor 
performance from 2002 but started to recover M 2003. As discussed in Chapter 4, 
firm value of listed companies dropped significantly from 2001 to 2002, but 
increased significantly from 2002 to 2003. Since my sample covers period from 
2002 to 2004, the poor performance of U. S. economy may be the cause for this 
negative relation. 
In sum, the results are not consistent with hypothesis 3 but consistent with 
hypothesis 4. The results show that the FF portfolio had the greatest increase in 
film value as well as having highest firm value post-SOX. In addition, firms that 
appointed financial experts post-SOX had a greater Mcrease in firm value 
compared to firms that did not appoint financial experts. The results generally 
support the assertion that choosing superior governance structure enhances 
shareholders' wealth. 
6.5 Additional Tests 
6.5.1 Otber Metbod to Ditide the Sample 
I further test whether companies' responses of increasing, maintaining, or 
decreasing the level of financial expertise improved financial reporting quality and 
firm value. I divide the sample into three portfolios, a) an increasing portfolio, 
defined as firms increased the number of financial experts from pre- to post- 
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SOX; b) a maintaining portfolio, defined as firms did not change the number of 
financial experts from pre- to post-SOX; and c) a decreasing portfolio, defined as 
firms reduced the number of financial experts from pre- to post-SOX. The 
results are consistent with the results in Table 6-4 that firms that did not change 
in financial expertise had greater improvements than other portfolio. However, 
for the analysis of firm value, the results show that the companies' decision in 
changing the degree of audit committee financial expertise did not affect the 
subsequent firm value. 
6.5.2 Otber Measures of Earnings Manqgement 
I perform additional tests with other measures of earnings management. I use the 
original modified Jones model which is used in Teoh et al (1 998a, 1998b), and the 
Lag and the Growth model in Dechow et al (2003) to test the robustness of the 
results in Table 6-4. The results show that the modified Jones model and the Lag 
model provide similar results with analyses in Table 6-4. However, when the 
Growth model in Dechow et al (2003) was utilised, the portfolio dumniies and 
the interactive variables became insignificant. 
portiqQualiopre-SOX 
, gfor the 
Level of Finandal Re 6.3.3 ContmIlin 
I also control for the level of DCA pre-SOX in Model 6-1 by replacing the lag 
value of the changes in DCA with the pre-SOX DCA. The results show that the 
pre-SOX DCA is negatively related with the changes in DCA which suggests the 
marginal changes in DCA are decreasing. In addition, after controlling for the 
pre-SOX DCA, the results remain robust that the NN portfolio had greater 
improvements in financial reporting quality. 
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6.5.4 Contmllin: gfor the Si , gn of 
DCA 
I control for the sign of DCA by replacing the value of DCA with the absolute 
value of DCA. The analyses show sfimilar results with Table 6-4. 
6.5.5 Using annual Stock Returns as a Measure of Firm Value 
I use the changes in annual stock returns as the measure of changes in firm value 
to test therelation between stock returns and the choice of appointing financial 
experts. Stock returns are measured as the change in annual return post-SOX 
minus stock returns pre-SOX. Ilie results show that none of the dummy 
variables is significant. Therefore there is no difference in the changes In stock 
returns among different portfolios. 
6.6 Conclusions 
This chapter extends Chapter 5 to investigate the financial impact of a firm's 
choice of whether to follow the rules in SOX Section 407. Using audit conu-nittee 
financial expertise information, with 630 observations covering pre- and post- 
SOX) I investigate the changes in financial reporting quality and firm value based 
on the firm's choice in appointing financial experts post-SOX. I divide the sample 
into four portfolios and draw out the following conclusions. 
First, earnings management has been constrained after SOX was enacted and 
this is attributed to the level of audit comniittee financial expertise and diligence. 
However, the results are inconsistent with SEC expectations and show that 
companies that maintained or switched to include at least one financial expert 
post-SOX had smaller improvements in financial reporting quality. Inconsistent 
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with hypothesis 1, the NN portfolio had the greatest increase in financial 
reporting quality relative to all other portfolios from pre- to post-SOX. 
In addition, the results are also inconsistent with hypothesis 2, where my 
results find that the NN portfolio had greater improvements in financial 
reporting quality than the FF portfolio. This suggests issuers who appointed 
financial experts were not as effective as issuers who did not appoint financial 
experts in improving financial reporting quality. Further, the results also suggest 
that issuers that did not appoint financial experts either pre- or post-SOX had 
more efficient audit committees. 
Next, in terms of firm value, the results show that firms that maintained the 
appointment of financial experts both pre- and post-SOX, e. g. the FF portfolio, 
had a significantly greater increase in firm value than all other portfolios. Further, 
firms that chose to follow the rules of Section 407 post-SOX had higher firm 
value than firms that did not follow the rules. 
The results in this chapter remain robust after using different methods and 
controlling for different factors. Overall, the results suggest that although SOX 
intended to increase audit committee financial expertise to enhance financial 
reporting quality, companies that maintained not appointing financial experts 
from pre- to post-SOX had greater improvements in financial reporting quality 
than companies that appointed financial experts post-SOX. Since the main 
purpose of Section 407 is to improve financial reporting quality, all results in this 
study imply that SOX did not achieve its intended goal in improving financial 
reporting quality, whereas it has had unintended results in enhancing firm value. 
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7 
OVERALL AUDIT COMMITTEE 
EFFECTIVENESS, THE SEC 
REQUIREMENTS AND 
THE IMPACTS OF THE SARBANES- 
OXLEY 
Utihzing three comprehensive discretionary accruals models and a unique sample 
of audit conu-nittee data, I provide a practical method to construct an audit 
committee effectiveness index (A-Index). The analysis shows that highly effective 
audit committees are larger, have a higher level of financial expertise and are 
more active in holding committee meetings. In addition, when comparing two 
audit conunittees, ceteris patibus, a larger, or more independent, or an audit 
comniittee with greater financial expertise, or more active is more effective. 
Further, after comparing a score constructed in previous studies (the SEC score) 
with the A-Index, it is found that the SEC score is weakly correlated with the A- 
Index. While the A-Index shows that overall audit committee effectiveness 
decreased during the SOX period, the SEC score reports contrasting results. This 
implies that the SEC score and the A-Index could not substitute each other in 
reflecting the overall audit committee effectiveness. 
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7.1 Introduction 
Since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 (SOX) was enacted, financial reporting quality 
of U. S. listed companies has been improved substantially" (Cohen et al 2005). 
The audit committee, as the ultimate monitor of companies' financial reporting, 
has attracted a number of requirements in the Act, e. g. Section 301 and Section 
407. Both the structure and workloads of audit committees had changed 
significantly after SOX was enacted OLinck et al 2008). The changes attributed to 
different aspects of the effectiveness of audit conu-nittees in improving financial 
reporting quality. As discussed in chapter 6, using only one aspect of the audit 
committee to proxy for the audit conunittee effectiveness may sometimes 
produce inconsistent conclusions. Therefore an overall measurement of the 
effectiveness of the audit committee that captures both the structural 
characteristics and activity is necessary. 
Previous studies have attempted to score different aspects of the audit 
committee and integrate them into a composite score as the measure of overall 
audit comn-uttee effectiveness. They then examine the relationship between the 
composite score, which proxies for audit committee effectiveness, and financial 
reporting quality. Abbott et al (2000) combines the audit committee 
independence and meeting frequencies into one score and find that financial 
fraud is negatively related to audit committee quality. In addition, DeFond et al 
(2005) and Carcello et al (2006a) integrate the audit committee independence and 
size into a composite measurement of overall corporate governance quality 55 and 
find that stronger governance is negatively related with earnings management. 
54 Chapter 6 also reported evidence that financial reporting quality has improved substantially post-SOX. 
55 The composite measurement of overall corporate governance quality in DeFond et al (2005) and Carcello et 
al (2006a) consists of six factors. These factors are board size, board independence, audit committee size, 
audit committee independence, shareholders' rights and institutional ownership. They take a value of 1 if 
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There are, however, a number of weaknesses in previous studies. First, they 
lack a theoretical framework that explains why audit committee exists, what 
causes different audit committee structural characteristics, and how to optimise 
the effectiveness of the audit committee (DeFond and Francis 2005). Secondly, 
the validity of the composite measure in previous studies has not been examined 
empirically. Therefore both theoretically and empirically, it is yet unknown 
whether the composite measure of audit committee quality that is used in 
previous studies truly reflects the overall audit conu-nittee effectiveness. 
In addition, chapter 5 shows that the introduction of SOX has led to 
structural changes in the composition and activities of audit committees. Further, 
chapter 6 shows that companies, who did not appoint financial experts to the 
audit committee either pre- or post-SOX, had greater improvements in financial 
reporting quality than those appointed financial experts both pre- and post-SOX. 
Since SOX was enacted, the relation between audit committee composition and 
financial reporting quality may have changed subsequently. This implies that first, 
the composite score created based on the SEC requirements pre-SOX may not 
truly reflect the effectiveness of audit conitnittees; and secondly, a method based 
on the real effectiveness of audit conu-nittees is necessary. 
This study contributes to several strands of the audit committee and SOX 
research. First, unlike DeFond et al (2005), Carcello et al (2006a) and Abbott et al 
16 
(2000), this study scores four aspects of audit comniittee characteristics and 
aMegates them into one composite score. VA-iile DeFond et al (2005) and 
these governance characteristics satisfy the criteria of strong governance and 0 otherwise. Ile overall 
governance quality is the sum of scores from these six characteristics. 
56 The four aspects include audit committee independence, size, financial expertise and activeness, where 
activeness is measured as the number of meetings the audit committee 
holds each year. Using these four 
characteristics provide more precise information regarding the effectiveness of each aspect, 
but using an 
aggregate index provide a measure to compare the overall effectiveness of two or more audit committees 
with different characteristics. 
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Carcello et al (2006a) used audit committee independence and size to construct 
their composite score, Abbott et al (2000) used audit committee independence 
and meeting frequencies. However, first, the Act requires the committee to be 
composed of fully independent directors and thus the marginal effectiveness of 
audit committee independence became zero post-SOX. Secondly, previous 
studies show that audit committee financial expertise and activeness both 
contribute to enhancing financial reporting quality (Carcello, et al 2006a, Bedard et 
al 2004). Therefore, aggregating these four aspects of the audit committee 
provides a more updated measure that fully reflects the effectiveness of the audit 
committee. 
Secondly, I construct a more reliable proxy for the audit committee 
effectiveness compared to previous studies. Previous studies score different 
aspects of audit conu-nittee characteristics and simply aggregate the scores 
together. The weakness of this method is it lacks control over interactions 
between various audit committee characteristics. For example, committee A has 4 
members and meets 3 times per year, while committee B has 5 members and 
meets 3 times per year. Previous studies would give different scores to the two 
conu-nittees based on their size, but add the same score to both committees based 
on their meeting frequencies. The problem of this method is that the marginal 
effects of the audit committee meetings in an audit committee with 4 members 
may be different from an audit conurnittee with 5 members. As a result, if 
previous studies use the above method to consider more aspects of the audit 
committee, the more interactions they will miss and the less likely the composite 
score can truly reflect the overall audit committee effectiveness. In this chapter 
I 
control for the interactions between different aspects of audit committee 
characteristics; therefore it is more reliable in reflecting the overall audit 
committee effectiveness. 
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11-lirdly, this chapter is the first to provide evidence of how the overall audit 
committee effectiveness changed from pre- to post-SOX. Previous studies found 
that there were more financial experts appointed to the audit committee, and the 
workload of audit committees had increased substantially post-SOX (Linck el al 
2008) However, they did not examine how audit committee effectiveness as a 
whole changes from pre- to post-SOX. Using the audit corrunittee effectiveness 
index created here, this chapter presents a picture to investors, academics and 
regulators of the changes in overall audit committee effectiveness from pre- to 
post-SOX. 
Finally, the chapter extends Abbott et al (2004) and documents evidence of 
audit committee effectiveness from pre- to post-SOX. Abbott et al (2004) 
examines whether the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Blue 
Ribbon Committee (BRC) recommendations are in the right direction In 
improving audit committee effectiveness. The BRC and SEC recommended that 
reasonably large, independent, expert and active audit committees were more 
active in reducing financial fraud (Abbott et al 2004), and Abbott et al (2004) 
provided empirical support for this conjecture. Since the composition of audit 
committees changed significantly from pre- to post-SOX, the evidence provided 
by Abbott et al (2004) may not hold. Therefore this chapter extends Abbott et al 
(2004) and documents updated empirical evidence for this matter. 
Among the various measurements of financial reporting quality, I chose the 
discretionary accruals as a benchmark to evaluate the audit committee 
effectiveness". Utilizing three comprehensive discretionary accruals models" and 
a unique sample of audit committee data, the audit committee characteristics are 
57 Detailed discussions of why I chose discretionary accruals as a benchmark are discussed in Section 7.2. 
58 The three models include the performance-matched modified Jones Model gones 1991, Kothari et aZ 
2005), the performance-matched Lag model and the performance-matched Growth model derived from 
Dechow et aZ (2003) 
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ranked according to the magnitude that discretionary accruals deviate from zero". 
The overall audit committee effectiveness index (A-Index hereafter) is then 
calculated as the sum scores from the rankings. 
After constructing the A-Index, a probit analysis is conducted to examine the 
relationship between overall audit committee quality and various audit conitnittee 
characteristics. The analysis shows that more effective audit committees are 
larger, have a higher level of financial expertise and independence, and work 
more efficiently in the committee meetings. In addition, when comparing two 
audit committees, ceterisparibus, a larger, more independent, with greater financial 
expertise, or more active audit committee is more effective. 
In addition, I construct a score (the "SEC score" hereafter), based on the 
SEC requirements and the methods in previous studies (DeFond et al 2005, 
Carcello, et al 2006, Abbott et al 2004), and examine whether it is capable of 
reflecting overall audit conu-nittee effectiveness. I compare the SEC score with 
the A-Index and find that the SEC score is weakly correlated with the A-Index, 
and it does not reflect the changes in A-Index over time. While the A-Index 
shows that overall audit committee effectiveness decreased during the SOX 
period, the SEC score reports contrasting results. This implies that, the SEC 
score and the A-Index could not substitute with each other in reflecting the 
overall audit committee effectiveness. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.2 develops 
the method of deriving the three discretionary accruals (DCA) and describes the 
data sources. Section 7.3 develops the method of constructing the A-Index. 
59 Because discretionary accrual is the residuals from normal accruals, theoretically if financial reporting 
quality is a hundred percent credible and there is no earnings management, 
discretionary accruals should be 
equal to zero. 'I'lierefore the less discretionary accrual deviates 
from zero, the higher financial reporting 
quality. 
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Section 7.4 investigates the impact of SOX on companies' audit committees and 
their overall effectiveness. Section 7.5 concludes. 
7.2 Data and Methodologies 
'An effective audit committee bas qualified members ndth the autborio and resources to protect 
stakebolder interests ýy ensuring reliable finandal reportin& internal controls, and risk 
manaTement throýgh its difi: gent oversiTht efforts" (DeZoort et al 2002, page 41). 
Both structural characteristics and activities of the audit conunittee should be 
able to affect its overall effectiveness (DeZoort et al 2002), but most previous 
studies only focus on the impact of a single structural characteristic on audit 
committee effectiveness (Klein 2002a, Anderson et al 2004, Anderson et al 2003, 
Carcello et al 2006a, Carcello and Neal 2000, Carcello and Neal 2003a, Abbott 
and Parker 2000, Abbott et al 2004, Abbott, Parker, Peters and Raghunandan 
2003, Krishnan 2005). However, results in chapter 6 suggest that both audit 
conuTiittee financial expertise and activities are important in determining the 
overall committee effectiveness. Therefore, the overall audit committee 
effectiveness should be the collective effect of audit committee composition, 
expertise and activeness. 
Due to the absence of a theoretical framework of the audit committee 
composition and activity (DeFond and Francis 2005), the overall audit committee 
effectiveness index therefore should be created based on a benchmark that 
reflects the effectiveness of the audit committee. For example, among the 
literature there are mainly three measures that infer the auditor or audit 
committee effectiveness. 'Mey are the discretionary accruals PCA), financial 
restatements, and the propensity of the auditor to issue a qualified opinion 
PeFond and Francis 2005). Among the three measures, the most commonly 
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used measure to reflect the auditor or audit conu-nittee effectiveness is the DCA 
(see Carcello et aZ 2006a, Kothari et al 2005, Cohen et al 2005, Klein 2002a, 
DeFond and Subramanyarn 1998, DeAngelo 1981b). Although the other two 
measures provide more direct evidence, they are limited because restatements and 
qualified opinions are relatively less common compared to the DCA. Therefore 
the DCA is more generally appropriate as the benchmark to evaluate audit 
committee effectiveness. 
7.21 DiscretionagAcemals 
Assumptions 
Previous studies have developed comprehensive models to derive discretionary 
accruals (Teoh et aZ 1998a, Teoh et aZ 1998b, Dechow et al 2003, Dechow, Sloan 
and Sweeney 1995). Dechow et al (2003) documents that Dechow's lagged model 
(LAG), Dechow's forward-looking model (FWD) and the modified Jones model 
provide less biased discretionary accruals. Further, Kothati et al (2005) suggest to 
control normal accruals for the firms operating performance, I therefore follow 
Kothari et al (2005) to add the operating performance variable to Dechow's LAG 
and FWD model when estimating normal accruals. Kothari et al (2005) also 
highlight that the performance-matched discretionary accruals is interpreted as 
Yzims identified as bating managed earnings are injact manqgiq earninWs at a rate biýher than 
the compan'son sample" (Kothari et al 2005, page 165). Therefore, consistent with 
Kothari et al (2005), 1 draw the following assumption. 
, ge ea 
in Mp ption 1: It IS assumed that all covanies mana rn : gs, but co anies witb Assum 
more effective audit committees would bave less material earnings manqgement than its 
comparison sanple. 
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In addition, because the DCA measure may be noisy and potentially 
performance biased PeFond and Francis 2005, Kothari et al 2005), it may not be 
the best proxy for financial reporting quality (Dechow et al 1995, Dechow and 
Dichev 2002). However, since most previous studies utdise the DCA as a 
measure of financial reporting quality (see Dechow et al 2003, Dechow and 
Dichev 2002 for a review), and as discussed above, the DCA is more generally 
appropriate as the benchmark to evaluate audit committee effectiveness. I 
therefore further assume that DCA is the best proxy for financial reporting 
quality. 
Assumption 2. It is assumed that the dismfionag accrual IS the best PM. )g for the 
fznanaýal reportin ,g quaho. 
DCA Models 
I utilise the modified Jones model in Teoh et al (1 998a, 1998b) and Dechow et al 
(1995) to derive the modified Jones DCA (MJDCA), and utilise the lagged and 
forwarded modified Jones model in Dechow et al (2003) to derive the Lagged 
DCA (LAGDCA) and Forward-looking DCA (FWDDCA)'O. Given that there is 
'inechanical relationship " between operating performance and normal accruals, I 
follow Kothari et al (2005) to control normal accruals with the companies' 
operating performance, i. e. the return on sales (ROS). 
Non-discretionary accruals or NDCA,, are expected accruals from a cross- 
sectional modification of Jones (1991) regression of total accruals Mi that year on 
a set of independent variables using an estimation sample of an two-digit SIC 
code peers, and discretionary accruals or DCAj, t are the residuals 
(Teoh et al 
1998a, Teoh et al 1998b). 
60 The original estimation of Modified Jones and Dechow's LNG and FWD discretionary accruals are 
discussed in Appendix A. 
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Equation 7-1 
DCA 
ACj,, 
NDCA 
TAi'l-I 
Total accruals (AQ are defined as: 
Equation 7-2 
AC,, l = NetIncome,,, (172) - CashFZowFrom0perati(n,,, (308) 61 
The difference in the three DCA comes from the different modifications of 
the Jones (199 1) models. The performance-matched modified Jones (PMJ) model 
is defined as follows: 
The PMJ model: 
Equation 7-3 
ACj, 
l bo 
I+b, ASalesj,, 
+ b2 
PPEj, t + b3 
ROSj, t + Ej, j TAj,, 
-, 
TAj, t-l 
) 
TAj, t-l 
TAj, 
t-l 
TAj, t-l 
E=- estimation sample 
Nondiscretionary total PMJ accruals or PMJNDCA are calculated as: 
Equation 7-4 
Iý ASalesi,, - ATRi,, PMJNDCA,,, = bo -+bI +b, +b, TAj', TAo-l TAo-l TAi, t-I 
where ASales,,, is the changes of sales (12) from previous year (t-1), A7Rj,, 
is the change in trade receivables (151) from previous year, PPE,,, is the gross 
property, plant and equipment (7), ROS,,, is the net income (172) divided by 
61 The Compustat item numbers are in parentheses. I use the matching item in the WorldScope database. 
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total sales (12), bo is the estimated intercept, b, , 
b2 
and 
b3 
are estimated slope 
coefficients for firm i in year t from Equation 7-3. The performance-matched 
Dechow's LAG (PLAG) and FWD (PFW) model is defined as follows: 
The PLAG model: 
Equation 7-5 
ROSj,, 
bo 
)+bl 
+b2 
)+b3 
+b4 - TAJ, I-l 
): 
TAj,, 
-, 
TAj,, 
-, 
TAj,, 
-, 
TAJ,, j TAj,, -, 
E=- estimation sample 
Nondiscretionary total PLAG accruals or PLAGNDCA are calculated as: 
Equadon 7-6 
I- ASales,,, - ATRj', PLAGNDCA,,, =b0 TAi'l-I 
+bI 
TA,, 
t-l 
+b2 
TAj', j 
LagAC,,, 
+b3 
TA,,, 
-, 
+b4 
TA,, 
t-l 
The PFW model: 
Equation 7-7 
ACj,, 
=b "I+b, 
ASalesj,, 
+ 
b2 + 
b3 LagACj'I 
TAj,, 
-, 
TAj,, 
-, 
TAj,, 
-, 
TAj,, 
-, 
TAj,, 
-, 
b4 GR - 
Salesj', 
+ b, + Ej', jc estimation sample 
TAj,, 
-, 
TAj,, 
-, 
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Nondiscretionary total PFW accruals or PFWNDCA are calculated as: 
Equation 7-8 
PFWNDCA,,, =bI+b, 
ASales,,, - ATRI', +b2+ 
ý3 LagAC,,, 
TA,,, 
-, 
TA,,, 
-, 
TAi'l-I TAj', 
-j 
+A 
GR 
- 
Sales,,, b4 
TA,,, 
-, 
+b5 
TAi'l-I 
LagAC,,, is the lag value of total accruals, and GR _Sales,, 
is the sales 
growth frorn the previous year. 
7.22 Data 
Table 7-1 summarises the derivation of the sample, the sample distribution year 
on year, and the year on year control sample distributions respectively. My main 
data sources are hand-collected information of audit committee characteristics 
from proxy statements of S&P 500 firms in the period between 2001 and 2005, 
and discretionary accruals data derived from the PMJ model, the PLAG model 
and the PFW model. All governance data was manually collected from S&P 500 
firms' proxy statements from 2001 to 2005 filed with the SEC, while all 
accounting data were collected from WorldScope database provided by Thomson 
One Banker. 
Panel A of Table 7-1 reports the sample distributions for the data in this 
chapter. It shows that the sample has a total number of 1636 finn-years with 29 
observations that do not have the necessary data for calculating the DCA. I 
further delete 148 observations that missing information in constructing audit 
committee quality index (A-Index). The final sample consists of 
1459 
observations. Panel B and Panel C of Table 7-1 present the 
distributions of the 
152 
CHAPTER 7 SOX AND THE OVERALL AUDIT COMNUTFEE EFFECTIVENESS 
governance sample and the DCA estimation sample on a yearly basis. According 
to previous earnings management studies Gones 199 1, Teoh et al 1998a) Teoh et 
al 1998b, Dechow et al 2003, Dechow et al 1995), coefficients of normal accruals 
are estimated from a cross-sectional modification of the Jones (1991) regression 
in that year of total accruals on a set of independent variables using an estimation 
sample of all two-digit SIC code peers. The estimation sample shown in Panel C 
is therefore used to estimate the coefficients of the DCA model. 
Table 7-1 Descriptive statistics of sample distributions 
PanelA: Sat*le &slribulion 
Initial sample 
Missing acoDunting data for DCA calculation 
Missing data for A-Index construction 
Final A-Index sample 
1636 
29 
1607 
148 
1459 
Panel B: Year ýyyear sam , 
ple dsiribulion 
No. of firms 
Year 2001 244 
Year 2002 298 
Year 2003 306 
Year 2004 311 
Year 2005 300 
Total 1459 
, 
ple dstribution Panel C Year b yyearconfrolsam 
No. of firms with not enough Original sample Final sample SICinformation 
Year 2001 3739 ill 3628 
Year 2002 3739 75 3664 
Year 2003 3739 59 3680 
Year 2004 3739 45 3694 
Year 2005 3739 42 3697 
Total 18695 332 18363 
The sample consists of up to 297 non-finanoal S&P 500 companies per year in the US during the period 2001 to 2005. 
Sample is mnstructed by examining all S&P 500 companies with available cc)rporate governance information 
filed in 
the proxy statements on the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) website from 2001 to 
April 2006. All data 
are manuaBy cDEected by using the corporate govemance data coflection system 
from Survey Partner. Companies may 
be dropped out from the sample if they do not have information regarding to the audit committee mrnposition, 
board and audit committee meetings at the year end. The initial sample consists of 
500 cc)mpanies where there are 90 
financial companies each year. Observations missed due to not available proxy statements or governance information 
in proxy statements at the fiscal year are deleted from the sample. In addition to the missing information of 
211 firm 
years to construct the audit committee quabty index, the final sample consists of 
1396 observations. The control 
sample for estimating discretionary accruals is denved from the S&P 
Total Market Index with available accounting data 
in Wor1dScDpe database. 
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The estimation sample is derived from the S&P Total Market Index with 
sufficient accounting data to estimate DCA. Following Klein (2002a), Xie et al 
(2003), Teoh et al (1 998a, 1998b) and Dechow et al (2003), each firm-year in the 
governance sample is required to have at least eight observations with the same 
two-digit SIC code in that year in the estimation sample. The third column of 
Panel C shows the number of observations that do not have sufficient 
observations with the same two-digit SIC code in the estimation sample. After 
deleting observations that do not have enough information, there are maximum 
311 observations in 2004 for the governance sample and 3697 observations in 
2005 for the control sample. 
7.23 Desctiptive Statistics of the SaVle 
Table 7-2 shows the descriptive statistics for the audit committee variables and 
accrual variables. The results show that, on average audit conu-nittees in this 
sample are highly independent. Although the NYSE and the NASDAQ have 
required audit conu-nittees to be fully composed of independent directors since 
1999 (Klein 2002a), the mean audit committee independence is 99%. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, the reason audit comnlittees in this sample are not fully 
independent is that I define director independence more strictly Mi this thesis. 
Following previous studies, directors who were formerly an employee of the 
company in the previous 5 years are defined as affiliate directors (Klein 1998, 
Hillier and McColgan 2006). However, the company may still define them as 
independent directors. Therefore there are still some directors who are not fully 
independent in my sample. 
Table 7-2 also shows that audit committee characteristics in my sample tend 
to satisfy both the BRC recommendations and SOX reqvdrements. 
'Me BRC 
recommends that the audit committee should be composed of at 
least three 
totally independent members (Abbott et al 2004). It also recommends that the 
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committee ".. sbould meet at least four times per 
_year 
in order to prolide the type of 
interaction and deliberation necessag to fulj'il their duties" (DeFond and Francis 2005, 
page 22). The descriptive statistics show that on average an audit committee is 
composed of 3.94 members, nearly 100% independent, and hold on average 8.11 
meetings per year. In addition, there are on average 1.03 financial experts on the 
committee. Detailed information of the changes in audit conanuttee 
characteristics from pre- to post-SOX will be discussed in the next section. 
Table 7-2 Descriptive statistics of firm characteristics variables 
Mean Std Median Max min 
PanelA - Au&I committee characlerislics 
Audit committee size 3.94 4.00 1.00 7.00 2.00 
Audit mmmittee independence 0.99 1.00 0.04 1.00 0.75 
Audit mmmittee financial expertise (no. oo 1.03 1.00 0.85 3.00 0.00 
Audit cc)mmittee mectings (no. oo 8.11 8.00 3.21 17.00 3.00 
Panel B -Accruals tariables 
Total accruals -0.07 -0.05 0.07 0.14 -0.40 PMJDCA -0.04 -0.03 0.13 0.41 -0.57 
PMJNDCA -0.03 -0.02 0.11 0.39 -0.48 
PLAGDCA -0.02 -0.02 0.12 0.40 -0.50 
PLAGNDCA -0.04 -0.03 0.11 0.30 -0.51 
PFWDCA -0.03 -0.03 0.12 0.39 -0.48 
PFWNDCA -0.04 -0.02 0.11 0.29 -0.51 
Panel C'- Cýnlrol wriables 
Market value ($ billion) (MV) 19.75 8.26 37.24 250.14 1.04 
Sales ($ billion) 13.38 5.94 24.66 177.26 0.43 
Assets ($ billion) 15.95 6.94 28.86 206.80 0.79 
Market to book (MKBV) 3.06 2.33 2.50 14.04 0.17 
Return on assets (ROA) 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.20 -0.38 
'ne sample consists of up to 311 non-finanoal S&P 500 cr)mpanies per year in the US during the period 2001 to 2005. 
AN accounting data is w1lected from the WorldScDpe database. Data on board characteristics and audit committee 
(AudC) d-iaractenstics are manually collected from the oDmpanies' proxy statements (DEF 14A) on the Secuntics and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) website. Audit committee size is the number of directors serVing on the company's 
audit committee at the beginning of the fiscal year. Audit cDmmittee independence and financial expertise are defined as 
the percentage of independent and finanaal expert directors serving on the audit committee. Audit CDMmittee 
activeness is defined as the number of meetings of audit committee of the fiscal year. PMjDCA, PLAGDCA and 
PFWDCA are defined as discretionary accruals derived from the performance matched modified Jones model, 
Dechow's lagged model and Dechow's Fowarded model respectively. PIVIJNDCA, PLAGNDCA and PFWNDCý are 
defined as non-discretionary accruals derived from the performance matched modified Jones Model, Dechow's I-Wed 
model and Dechow's Fowarded model respectively. Market value is defined as the year-end common stod, price 
multiplied by the year-end total number of mmmon stock. Market to book ratio is defined as market value of equity 
(book value of equity + deferred taxes). ROA is defined as the net income divided by total assets. 
Mean and median of DCA and NDCA are similar across all models but the 
standard deviation of DCA in the PMJ model is higher than the other two. This 
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is consistent with Dechow et al (2003) that the LAG and the FWD model are 
twice as powerful in estimating DCA. All DCA are between -0.02 to -0-04, which 
are close to the value of performance-matched DCA in Kothati et al (2005). 
Total accruals are comparative to previous studies that it is -0.067 in Klein 
(2002a) and -0.07 in my sample. 
7.3 Construction of the Audit Committee Quality Index (A-Index) 
7.3.1 Assumptions 
Previous studies have documented evidence of the *impact of audit committee on 
financial reporting quality. Mein (2002b) finds that more independent audit 
committee is more effective in improving financial reporting quality. Xie et al 
(2003) and Carcello et al (2006a) find that firms with higher financial expertise 
audit committees have higher financial reporting standards. In addition, Abbott et 
al (2000) find that fully independent audit committees that meet at least twice a 
year have lower rate of financial fraud. 
Therefore it is assumed that-, financial reporting quality is positively related 
with audit comn-iittee effectiveness. In this study, DCA is utilised as the proxy for 
financial reporting quality. Because DCA is the residuals from normal accruals, 
theoretically if financial reporting quality is a hundred percent credible and there 
is no earnings management, discretionary accruals should be equal to zero. 
Therefore it is assumed that the less the DCA deviates from zero, the higher 
financial reporting quality and hence the more effective the audit committee is. 
Assumption 3: It is assumed that the less the DCA deviatesfmm ýZem, the more effective 
the audit committee is. 
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7.3.2 The Construction of the Audit Committee Qualýly Index 
The audit committee quality index (A-Index) is constructed via a number of 
sequential steps. First, each characteristic is scored based on the level of 
PMJDCA and the scores are summed. Next, the same procedure is repeated 
based on the level of LAGDCA and FWDDCA respectively. The final A-Index 
is the average of the three surn scores. 
I first divide the sample into two sub-samples, positive DCA and negative 
DCA, and group audit conumittees by their size and score each group according 
to the level of DCA for the two sub-samples respectively. Because there are a 
limited number of observations that have more than 6 members on the audit 
-, 
cor committee nmittees With more than 6 members are allocated into the siZe-6 
group. Thereby there are five groups with the sizes of 2,3,4,5 and 6+. 
I then calculate the median positive (negative) DCA of each size group, rank 
the positive DCA (negative DCA) from the smallest *gest) to the largest 
(smallest). There are 5 groups hence the scores range from 2-6. The size-group 
with the smallest positive (largest negative) DCA scores 6 whereas the largest 
positive (smallest negative) DCA scores 2. Scores obtained from the ranking of 
positive DCA is Scorel whereas scores obtained from the ranking of negative 
DCA is Score2 in Equation 7-9. 
Equation 7-9 
TotalScorej,, = 
[(Scoreli,, + Score2,,, )(Size) + (Score3,,, + ScorA,, t) (Finex*Meei 2 
+ Score5i, t(Ind) 
The next step is to obtain scores for audit committee expertise and activity, 
which are Score3 and Score4 in Equation 7-9.1 group audit committees 
by the 
number of financial experts and the number of meetings respectively. 
For 
157 
CHAPTER 7 SOX AND THE OVERALL AUDIT COMNffT'I'EE EFFF-MVENESS 
expertise, there are 4 groups with a total number of 0,1) 2 and 3+ financial 
experts respectively. For meetings, there are 12 groups with from a total number 
of 3- to 14+ meetings per year respectively. Tberefore there are 48 combinations 
with different expertise and different activities level (4 expertise group times 12 
meetings group). 
I then calculate the mean positive (negative) DCA of each combination and 
minus the median positive (negative) DCA of each size group in order to adjust 
for different audit committee sizes. The adjusted DCA is calculated as follows: 
Equation 7-10 
-4djDCA,,, = MeanDCA(Combin),,, - MedianDCA(Size),,, 
The adjusted positive (negative) DCA of each combination is ranked from 
the smallest (largest) to the largest (smallest). The scores will be based on the 
percentile of the ranking and the lowest percentile ranks the highest scores. For 
example, the 10"' percentile will score 10 whereas the 90ffi percentile will score 1. 
This score ranges from 1 to 10. Scores obtained from the ranking of positive 
DCA is Score3 whereas scores obtained from the ranking of negative DCA is 
Score4 in Equation 7-9. 
In addition, if the audit conirrdttee is fiffly independent, Score5 equals 1 and 
0 otherwise. The next step is to sum up the Score 1 to 4 and average it by 2 since 
these scores are obtained from the positive DCA and the negative DCA 
respectively. The final step is to sum the scores according to Equation 7-9. The 
three different DCA which are the PMJDCA, the PLAGDCA, and the 
PFWDCA, would generate three different surnmed-scores and each of them 
could be one of the A-Index. In order to mitigate potential errors 
from model 
selection, the final A-Index takes the mean of the three total scores. 
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Equation 7-11 
A -Index,,, = (Score(pAv), ', 
+ Score(PLAG)ij + Score(pFw),, 1)13 
7.4 The Impact of SOX on Audit Committee Characteristics and 
Effectiveness 
7.4.1 The Impact of SOX on Audit Committee Characteristics 
Panel A of Table 7-3 shows the characteristics and activity of the audit 
committees in this sample throughout the SOX period. The pre-SOX period is 
defined as the time from the beginning of 2001 to 30th June 2002. The SOX 
period is defined as the time from 1" July 2002 to 30'hjune 2003, whereas the 
post-SOX is defined as the time period from 1" July 2003 to the end of year 
2005. 
Audit committee siZe did not change substantially from pre- to post-SOX, 
but the standard deviation of audit committee size decreased from 1.10 pre-SOX 
to 0.96 post-SOX. This implies that it became more common for companies to 
choose an audit committee with around 4 members post-SOX. In addition, both 
the number of financial experts and the number of meetings have increased from 
pre- to post-SOX, where the number of financial experts increased from 0.87 to 
1.17 and the number of meetings increased from 6.55 to 9.22. These results are 
consistent with Linck et al (2008) and show that SOX impacted on the structure 
and activity of the audit committee. 
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The SEC recommends that the audit committee should have at least 3 
members, be fully independent, should include financial experts and meet a 
minimum of 4 times per year (Abbott et al 2004). Panel B shows statistics of the 
percentage of companies that follow the SEC and the BRC recommendations for 
audit conu-nittee composition and activity. 
The results show that nearly all companies have at least 3 members on the 
audit conu-nittee. In addition, there were more issuers with less than 3 members 
pre-SOX than post-SOX, where there were 95.9% of firms with at least 3 
members pre-SOX, and 98% of firms with at least 3 members post-SOX. Some 
companies had less than 3 members in this sample because their directors were 
resigning from the audit committee and a replacement was being sought M that 
year. 
There are slightly more firms with affiliate directors pre-SOX than the SOX 
and post-SOX periods. In addition, consistent with chapter 5 and chapter 6, an 
increasing number of companies follow Section 407 in the SOX period to Include 
at least one financial expert. The statistics show that there were 72.5% of 
companies having at least one financial expert since SOX and this figure 
continued to increase to 75.9%. Moreover, consistent with Linck et al (2008), 
audit convilittee work load has increased substantially from pre- to post-SOX, 
and more and more companies held more than 3 meetings per year. Nearly all 
companies, 98.7% of the sample, held at least 4 meetings annually mi the 
SOX 
and post-SOX period. 
In sum, results in Table 7-3 show that SOX has changed the composition 
and activity of d-le audit committees since SOX was 
introduced. 
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7.4.2 The Impact of SOX on the OverallAudit Committee Effectiveness 
Table 7-4 presents descriptive statistics of the A-Index and audit com=ttee 
characteristics. Panel A shows the mean, median and the distributions of A-Index 
in different index groups. Due to the reliance on DCA in constructing A-Index 
and its limited data availability, the final sample consists of 1459 observations. 
The mean and median of the A-Index are 12.29 and 12.17 respectively. In 
addition, the median value of the A-Index ranges from 7.83 to 17.67. The last 
column of Table 7-4 shows the distribution of A-Index and the statistics show 
that most audit conu-nittees had effectiveness scores ranging from 9 and 14. 
Table 7-4 Descriptive statistics of the audit committee effectiveness index 
PanelA - Descriptive statistics of audt committee qualio inde. v 
A-Index Me-an Median Std. N 
A< 9 7.36 7.83 1.43 67 
A< 10 and >=9 9.51 9.50 0.26 167 
A< 11 and >=10 10.36 10.50 0.28 230 
A< 12 and >=ll 11.42 11.50 0.27 234 
A< 13 and >=12 12.39 12.50 0.23 188 
A< 14 and >=13 13.46 13.50 0.30 228 
A< 15 and >=14 14.36 14.33 0.26 139 
A< 16 and >=15 15.51 15.67 0.32 
57 
A< 17 and >=16 16.46 16.50 0.24 
91 
A>=17 17.61 17.67 0.37 58 
Total Sample 12.29 12.17 2.47 1459 
Panel B- Au&t committee qualio changes dun*ng the SOX 
, VIndex 
SEC ý\-Inclex 
Year Mean Median Mean Median 
Pre-SOX 12.22 12.17 3.45 4.00 
SOX 12.07 11.83 3.67 4.00 
Post-SOX 12.46 12.33 3.71 4.00 
Audit Committee Quality Index (A-Index) is constructed by summing scDres 
from four aspects of audit 
cc)mmittee. Audit committee size is the number of 
directors serving on the company's audit committee at the 
beginning of the fiscal year. Audit committee Independencr and 
financial expertise are dcfined as the percentage of 
independent and financial expert directors serving on the audit committee. 
Audit committee activeness is defined as 
the number of meetings of audit committee of the 
fiscal year. The pre-SOX period is defined as the time from the 
beginning of year 2001 to 30th June 2002. Tbc 
SOX period is defined as the time from lstjuly 2002 to 30th June 
2003, whereas the post-SOX is defined as the time period 
from 1stJuly 2003 to the end of year 2005. 
Panel B of Table 7-4 shows the summary of the changes In the 
A-Index and 
the SEC score from pre- to post-SOX and the comparisons 
between the two 
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scores. I calculate the SEC scores in accordance with the BRC recommendations 
and the SOX reqwrements as follows. It scores one if the audit committee is 
100% independent. It adds one extra score if the audit conu-nittee has at least one 
financial expert, another extra score if the audit committee has at least 3 
members, and one extra point if the committee meets a minimum of 4 times per 
year. This method is consistent with the method used in DeFond et al (2005), 
Carcello et al (2006), Abbott et al (2004) and the BRC and SEC 
recon-unendations. 
By comparing the A-Index with the SEC scores,, the results show that the 
two scores provide inconsistent results. While the SEC score shows that audit 
conu-nittees have become more effective after SOX was introduced, the A-Index 
shows that the audit committee is less effective. The A-Index decreased in the 
SOX period because it may be a learning period for the board and audit 
committee to learn how to comply with regulations and how to work more 
effectively. The Pearson correlation tests show that the correlation between the 
A-Index and the SEC score is only 0.04 and not significant. This indicates that 
the SEC score and the A-1ndex could not substitute with each other In reflecting 
the overall audit committee effectiveness. If A-Index is assumed as the best proxy 
for audit conunittee effectiveness, the SEC score should not be used, and vice 
versa. 
I further investigate the relationship between audit committee characteristics 
and overall audit committee effectiveness. I assume the A-Index to be the best 
proxy for overall audit committee effectiveness because it captures more on audit 
committee's effectiveness in monitoring financial reporting quality. A probit 
analysis is employed and the following model is utilised in the analysis. 
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Model 7-1 Audit committee characteristics and overall audit committee effectiveness 
AudIndexi, t=a+P, Sizei, t+fl2Indi, t, 
FinExp,, 
t+fl3Meetjt+, 
84SZei, t *FinExp,, t 
+fl5Sizei, t *Meetjt+fl6FinExp,, t 
*Meetj, I+fl7Sizejt *FinExp,, t 
*Meetit+Ei, t 
The interactive terms, Size * FinExp, Size * Meet and FinExp * Meet, 
ate used to control for the different levels of audit comi-nittee size, meetings and 
financial expertise. The variables of interest in this model include the SiZe, Ind, 
FinExp, Meet and the interactive term Size*FinExp*Meet. The variable Size, Ind, 
FinExp and Meet shows the relation between audit committee characteristics and 
the A-Index. The interactive variable, Size*FinExp*Meet, shows how to compare 
effectiveness of two audit committees. If the sign of this variable is negative 
(positive), this variable shows that if two of these three characteristics (size, 
expertise or activeness) are equal between two audit committees, the greater the 
value of the last characteristic the more (less) effective the audit committee is. 
Table 7-5 shows the results of Model 7-1 which tests the relationship 
between the A-Index and the four audit committee characteristics. The 
coefficients of independent variables show the probabilities of the audit 
committee having lower A-Index. Therefore a negative sign on the coefficient 
suggests a greater probability of having higher A-Index. 
The results show that audit committee quality increases when the audit 
committee size, independence, expertise and activities increase", which means 
that audit committee becomes more effective when the committee is larger, more 
independent, with a higher level of expertise and more active. This is consistent 
with the BRC recommendations and the SOX requirements. 
62 The estimated parameters in the Probit Analysis suggest the probability of being lower quality. 
Hence the 
positive sign suggests a greater probability of having lower A-Index whereas the negative sign suggests a 
lower probability of having lower quality. 
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Table 7-5 Probit analysis of A-Index and audit committee characteristics 
Dependent variable: A-Index 
Estimate Std. Err. X2 p-value 
Size -0.95 0.11 81.46 <. 0001 
Independence -0.89 0.17 28.82 <0001 
Financial Expertise (RnExp. ) -4.53 1.32 11.84 0.001 
Meetings (Meet. ) -0.22 0.05 16.47 <0001 
Size*FinExp. 1.07 0.35 9.34 0.002 
Size*Meet. 0.05 0.01 15.61 <. 0001 
FinExp*Meet, 0.52 0.15 11.98 0.001 
Size*FinExp*Meet. -0.12 0.04 8.46 0.004 
Post-SOX -0.17 0.06 8.67 0.003 
Log Likelihood -5367.51 
Number of observations 1459 
The sample consists of up to 311 non-financial S&P 500 companies per year in the US during the period 2001 
to 2005. All accounting data is collected from the WorldSoope database. Data on board cbaractenstics and audit 
committee (AudC) cliaracteristics are manually collected from the companies'proxy statements (DEF 14A) on 
the Securities and Excliange Commission (SEC) website. Audit committee size is the number of directors 
serving on the company's audit committee at the beginning of the fiscal year. Audit committee independence 
and firiancial expertise are defined as the percentage of independent and financial expert directors serving on 
the audit committee. Audit committee activeness is defined as the number of meetings of audit committee of 
the fiscal year. Audit Committee Quality Index (A-Index) is constructed by summing scores from four aspects 
of audit committee. The pre-SOX period is defined as the time from the beginning of year 2001 to 30th j une 
2002. T'he SOX period is defined as the tim e from 1 st j uly 2002 to 30th j une 2003, whereas the post-SOX is 
defined as the time period from lstjuly 2003 to the end of year 2005. 
In addition, the interactive term "Size*FlnExp*Meet" is negative and 
significant. Consistent with Abbott et al (2004), it indicates that, if two of the 
three characteris tics (size, expertise or activeness) are equal between two audit 
conu-nittees, if one audit committee is larger, or with a higher level of financial 
expertise, or more active, it has greater possibilities to be more effective. 
Moreover, the dummy variable "post-SOY' shows that, audit committees were 
more effective post-SOX", which is consistent with the aims of Section 301,202, 
204 and 407 in SOX. In addition, the -results also 
imply that the SEC and BRC 
recommendations are in the right direction in improving audit committee 
effectiveness. 
63 Another model that adds a slope dummy of post-SOX on the 1ndependent variables has been examined, 
and the results show that the post-SOX slope-dummy does not have impact on the slopes. 
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Overall, the statistics show that a simple SEC score is not sufficient to reflect 
the overall audit committee effectiveness. Meanwhile, audit committees were less 
effective during the SOX period, but it became more effective after SOX was 
implemented. In addition, effective audit committees are usually larger, more 
expert and more active. Finally, in comparing two audit committees, if two of the 
audit conunittee characteristics are the same, the one that is greater, or more 
financially expert, or more active has greater capability in monitoring managers. 
7.5 Summary and Conclusions 
By utilizing the discretionary accruals derived from the performance-matched 
modified Jones model, the performance-matched Dechow's lagged model, 
performance-matched Dechow's forward-looking model, and a sample of audit 
committee characteristics data, I construct the A-lndex as a proxy for overall 
audit committee effectiveness based on the assumption that lower DCA reflects 
higher audit committee effectiveness. 
Descriptive statistics show that there are more companies choosing to 
appoint 4 members to the audit committees. Issuers also increased the number of 
financial experts and meetings on the audit con-umttee post-SOX. Further, the 
results also show that there were more issuers following the BRC and SEC 
recommendations to employ fully independent directors, include at least one 
financial expert and meet at least 4 times per year post-SOX. 
In addition, I create the SEC score, based on the SEC requirements and 
previous studies, and compare it with the A-Index. The results show that the SEC 
score is weakly correlated with the A-Index, and it provides inconsistent results 
with respect to changes M audit committee effectiveness relative to the A-Index. 
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lberefore it suggests that the SEC score and the A-Index could not substitute 
each other in reflecting the overall audit conunittee effectiveness. 
Further, I perform the probit analysis on the relationship between the A- 
Index and the four audit committee characteristics. I find that, all other three 
characteristics being constant, when comparing two audit committees, the larger, 
or the more independent, or committees with a higher level of expertise, or the 
more active audit committees are more effective in monitoring corporate 
managers. 
The construction of the A-Index as proxy for overall audit committee 
effectiveness will potentially attract further research on the impact of the audit 
committee on corporate activities, for example, the mipact of audit committee 
effectiveness on other financial reporting quality proxies, insider trading 
performance, and information asymmetries between specific traders and the 
stock market. In addition, higher quality audit committees are more likely to 
increase directors' or managers' financial reporting conservatism. Since the A- 
Index provides a proxy for the overall audit conurlittee effectiveness, future audit 
committee research would be fruitful. 
The next chapter investigates how the overall audit committee effectiveness 
and SOX affected the information content of earnings and their relevance to 
investors. 
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8 
AUDIT COMMITTEE 
EFFECTIVENESS, EARNINGS 
INFORMATIVENESS, AND THE 
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT 2002 
This chapter investigates the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) on the 
earnings informativeness (measured as the earnings response coefficients or 
"ERC") conditional on audit committee effectiveness. Results show that firstly, 
the ERC model that controls for the S-Shape return-earnings relation better 
estimates the ERC. Secondly, earnings informativeness has improved after SOX 
was enacted. Thirdly, before SOX was introduced, earnings Mformativeness is 
greater for firms with more effective audit committees. Finally, however, there is 
no difference in the ERC between more effective audit comtTiittee and less 
effective audit committee post-SOX. These results imply that SOX was beneficial 
to investors by enhancing earnings usefulness to investors, but this improvement 
may not be attributable to the improvements in audit conunittee effectiveness. 
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8.1 Introduction 
One of the main goals of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 (SOX or the "Act") is to 
increase corporate executives' and directors' responsibilities in providing more 
credible information to the public after a series of accounting scandals in the 
United States. Corporate boards and audit committees as the ultimate monitors 
of financial reporting play an important role in determining the transparency and 
informativeness of accounting earnings (Ahmed et al 2006, Vafeas 2000, 
Anderson et al 2003). Since results in previous chapters show that audit 
committee composition and effectiveness have changed significantly post-SOX, 
informativeness of accounting earnings was supposed to change correspondingly 
to the changes in audit committee effectiveness. However, this has not yet been 
tested empirically. 
The introduction of the Act was controversial for a number of different 
areas. First, debate has continued about whether the Act added value to listed 
companies. Results of empiric studies in this area are mixed. While Li et al (2008), 
Jain and Rezaee (2006) and Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) find that the Act 
added value to listed companies, Zhang (2007), Leuz et al (2008) and Engel et al 
(2007) find that the Act only increased the firms' costs to U. S. issuers. 
The second debatable area is whether the mandated requirements on 
corporate governance improved financial reporting quality and the usefulness of 
accounting information. The Act has increased the independence and financial 
expertise of the board and audit committees (Carcello et al 2006b, Linck et al 
2008), but it is arguable whether this is beneficial to the firm. On one hand, it is 
argued that including more independent and expert directors helps the board to 
make more informed decisions that are independent from corporate managers 
(Carcello et al 2006a, DeFond et al 2005, Bedard et al 2004). Therefore the 
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accounting information of a fim-1 with a superior governance structure will be 
more useful and informative to investors (Ahmed et al 2006, Vafeas 2000, 
Anderson et aZ 2003). 
However, on the other hand, corporate directors will be concerned about 
potential litigation risks and may become more conservative in a stricter legal 
environment,, e. g. post-SOX (Cohen et al 2004a, Linck et al 2008). Tberefore they 
may be more conservative in releasing relevant financial information to the public 
thus reducing investors' ability to analyse and evaluate the firm (Begley et al 
2007). Since accounting earnings usefulness is determined by the quality of 
earnings as well as prior relevant financial information (Cai, Faff, Hilher and 
Mohamed 2007, Teoh and Wong 1993, Kim and Verrecchia 1991), earnings 
informativeness may decrease for firms that are conservative in releasing useful 
information for assets valuation. This statement has not been examined and 
motivates the subsequent research in this chapter. 
The contributions of this chapter are as follows. First, this chapter 
documents evidence of the impact of SOX on earnings informativeness. Previous 
studies mainly examine the relation between corporate governance and earnings 
usefulness before SOX was enacted (Anderson et al 2003, Vafeas 2000). 
However, since U. S. corporate governance structures have changed significantly 
post-SOX, this affected issuers' financial reporting quality and thus the 
information content in accounting earnings. This chapter investigates the changes 
in earnings informativeness from pre- to post-SOX and thereby is the first to 
document evidence of the impact of SOX on earnings information quality. 
Secondly, this chapter documents evidence of the impact of audit committee 
effectiveness mistead of board effectiveness on earnings 
informativeness. Both 
Vafeas (2000) and Ahmed et al (2006) examine the impact of board size and 
independence on earnings usefulness to investors. Since previous studies suggest 
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that the board of directors delegates responsibilities to the audit cornmiittee in 
order to improve the conu-nittee's efficiency (Menon and Williams 1994), it is 
suggested that audit committees serve as the ultimate monitors of financial 
reporting (DeZoort et al 2002). Therefore examining the impact of the audit 
comn-. tittee on earnings informativeness provides a more direct test of whether 
and how corporate governance has changed earnings information quality. 
Thirdly, this chapter extends Ahmed et al (2006) and documents U. S. 
evidence of the impact of regulations on corporate governance thus earnings 
informativeness. Ahmed et al (2006) use a dataset of New Zealand listed 
companies to examine the impact of the New Zealand Company Act of 1993 and 
the New Zealand Financial Reporting Act of 1993 on the relation between 
earnings usefulness and board structure. As discussed in Ahmed el al (2006), 
agency costs may be different between U. S. and New Zealand companies. The 
enactment of SOX provides an environment to investigate and compare the 
impact of regulation changes on earnings informativeness between U. S. and New 
Zealand. 
Finally, this chapter investigates the impact of overall audit con-irmittee 
effectiveness, but not a single audit committee characteristic, on earnings 
information quality. Anderson et al (2003) investigate the impact of audit 
committee independence and size on earnings informativeness. As discussed in 
Chapter 7, different audit committees choose different structures, expertise and 
activity levels to optimise their effectiveness in controlling financial reporting 
quality. Therefore results in this chapter show whether and how the overall audit 
committee effectiveness affects earnings usefulness to investors. 
By incorporating the audit committee effectiveness with the revised earnings 
responses model that captures the S-shape earnings-return relation, the analysis 
has the following key findings. 
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First, in contrast to Begley et al (2007), SOX has unproved listed companies' 
financial reporting quality and thus increased the usefulness of accounting 
earnings to investors. The results show that the earnings response coefficients (or 
"ERC") increased significantly from pre- to post-SOX. This implies that SOX is 
beneficial to shareholders because it increased the earnings usefulness to 
investors. 
Secondly, consistent with the hypothesis that firms with superior governance 
structures have higher earnings information quality, I found that before SOX was 
introduced, the ERC is significantly greater for firms with more effective audit 
committees. This is consistent with previous studies that in a less strict legal 
environment, a more effective audit committee is better at reducing the noise 
embedded in accounting earnings (Ahmed et al 2006, Anderson et al 2003, 
Vafeas 2000). 
Tbirdly, the results also show that, however, after SOX was introduced, 
there is no difference in the ERC between more effective audit committees and 
less effective audit committees. This implies that first, other sections of the Act 
e. g. Section 404, Section 302 and Section 201 rather than Section 407 enhanced 
earnings quality and thus the earnings informativeness. Other sections of the Act 
may have improved earnings informativeness to the minimum required level, so 
that the improved audit committee effectiveness post-SOX did not add marginal 
credibility to the earnings. Secondly, the result also implies that the Act may 
increase the conservatism of corporate managers. Post-SOX, corporate 
executives are concerned about higher reputation costs and legal liabilities, they 
may not release irrelevant information to the public until they fully verify the 
financial accounts, which in turn increased the earnings usefulness to investors. 
Finally, the results also imply that the relation of corporate governance and the 
ERC may no longer hold post-SOX. 
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The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 8.2 develops the 
hypotheses with respect to the theoretical model in Teoh and Wong (1993). 
Section 8.3 describes the research design and sample data selection, and presents 
descriptive statistics of the sample data. Section 8.4 presents and discusses the 
results. Section 8.5 performs additional tests and Section 8.6 concludes. 
8.2 Hypothesis Development 
I Tbeorefical Framework of the Earnings Response Coeiiients 
Kim and Verrecchia (1991) provide a theoretic model to examine the *information 
quality of accounting earnings, where earnings information quality is denoted as 
the earnings response coefficients. Teoh and Wong (1993) modify the Kim and 
Verrecchia (1991) model and examine the relationship between auditor quality 
and the ERC. Teoh and Wong (1993) denote that the stock price response is an 
increasing function of the earnings surprise: 
Equation 8-1 
P2 - Pl =-v (Y2 - pl) v+p 
captures the earnings surprise and the surrounding noise in the 
announcement period, the (P2 - Pl) denotes the stock market's reaction. 
Denoting the earnings' surprise (UE) as the actual earnings (AE) minus the 
financial analysts' consensus forecast (AF), dividing P, in both sides, Equation 
8-1 yields: 
Equation 8-2 
P2 - P1 V (Y2 - pl) v 
--> Return =-(Deflated UE) P, v+pP, v+ /I 
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Denoting stock returns as the cumulative abnormal returns 'in the 
announcement window (CAR), the earnings response coefficient (ERC) thereby 
is the ratio of v. where v denotes the prior amount of uncertainty of the V+y 
earnings, and p denotes the noise in the earnings signal (Teoh and Wong 1993) 
Following Teoh and Wong (1993), the first differential of ERC to v and p are: 
Equation 8-3 
dERC cl y 0 
av (v + P), , 
Equation 8-4 
aERC av 
<0 alt (v + P), 
Therefore ERC is an increasing function of v (prior uncertainty about the 
underlining value of stock i), and a decreasing function of p (noise embedded in 
the earning information) (reoh and Wong 1993). 
8.2.2 Relation between Audit Committee Effectiveness and ERC 
Previous studies suggest that firms with superior governance structure have 
higher earnings information quality. Vafeas (2000) uses a U. S. sample to examine 
the relation between board structure and earnings response coefficients, and finds 
that firms with smallest boards have more informative earnings than other firms. 
Ahmed et al (2006) use a sample of New Zealand companies and find results 
consistent with Vafeas (2000). Further, Anderson et al (2003) examine the 
relation between the audit committee structure and earnings informativeness and 
find that smaller audit committees provide more informative earnings to 
shareholders, but they do not find a relation between audit committee 
independence and earnings informativeness (Vafeas 2005). 
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Other audit comn-dttee research also documents indirect evidence that audit 
committee effectiveness may affect earnings usefulness. On one hand, Teoh and 
Wong (1993) find that investors' response to earnings surprise is greater for firms 
that employ the big eight accounting firms. Their results suggest higher quality 
external auditors provide less noisy earnings information to the stock market. On 
the other hand, Abbott and Parker (2000) find that the appointment of external 
auditors is determined by the audit committee. The two studies imply that audit 
conu-nittee characteristics may impact the earnings usefulness to investors. 
Secondly, prior research also finds that accounting manipulations and 
financial fraud are less likely when the firm's audit committee is more 
independent, with more financial experts and is more active (Carcello et al 2006a, 
1<Jein 2002a, Xie et al 2003, Abbott et al 2000). In addition, incidences of internal 
control problems are less likely when audit committees are more independent and 
have a higher level of financial expertise g<rishnan 2005). 
Thirdly, since financial experts concentrate on the underlying quality of 
financial reports (McDaniel et al 2002), an audit committee with greater financial 
expertise may provide information that is more relevant to the valuation of firms' 
assets thus creating less uncertainty to investors. Therefore a firm with higher 
quality audit committee is less likely to disclose irrelevant information to the 
public prior to earnings announcement until they fully verify the financial 
account. As a result, earnings information released by higher quality audit 
committee may contain less noise. 
However, as an alternative explanation, firms with more qualified directors 
may also have the possibility to increase prior market uncertainty of the firms' 
value. Corporate directors will be concerned with potential litigation risks and 
become conservative prior to earnings announcement, e. g. post-SOX (Cohen et 
al 2004a, Linck et al 2008). Therefore they may be more conservative in releasing 
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relevant financial information to the public thus reducing investors' ability to 
valuate firms' assets (Begley et al 2007). Since accounting earnings usefulness is 
determined by the quality of earnings as well as prior relevant financial 
information (Cai et al 2007, Teoh and Wong 1993, Kim and Verrecchia 1991), 
earnings informativeness may decrease for firms that are conservative in releasing 
useful information for asset valuation. 
In conjunction with the argument that companies with higher quality audit 
committees are expected to provide more accurate and less noisy information 
during earnings announcements, according to Teoh & Wong (1993), 1 
hypothesise that ERC for firms with a more effective audit committee would be 
higher than firms with a less effective audit committee. 
HI: ERC is bigberforfirms ; vitb more effective audit committees. 
8.2.3 The Impact ofSOX on ERC 
SOX imposed several mandated requirements on issuers' auditing functions and 
improved their financial reporting quality. For example, Section 301 requires the 
audit committee to be composed solely of independent directors (SEC 2002g). 
Section 407, although it is not mandated, suggests that issuers include at least one 
financial expert on the audit committee (SEC 2002j). Since non-audit services are 
perceived to reduce external auditor's independence, the Act prohibits nine 
categories of non-audit services within Section 201 (SEC 2002c). 
In addition, 
Section 202 requires that all audit and non-audit services have to be pre-approved 
by the audit conunittee (SEC 2002d). 
Further, other sections of the Act also aim to enhance the credibility of 
financial accounts. Section 404 requires issuers to invest more resources to 
enhance internal control over financial reporting 
(SEC 2002i), while Section 302 
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requires corporate executives to certify financial accounts and thus take 
responsibility for ensuring the accuracy and credibility of the financial accounts 
(SEC 2002h). 
Cohen et al (2005) find that financial reporting quality increased substantially 
post-SOX. Chapter 6 also presents evidence that post-SOX, financial reporting 
quality improved significantly. These results suggest that post-SOX, the noise 
embedded in earnings information (or It) decreased substantially thus the ERC 
may improve significantly. Therefore I have the following hypothesis: 
Iz- IH-a- ERC inmased si, ýnýzicantlypost-sox. 
In addition, after a series of accounting scandals and the introduction of 
SOX, the stock market may be more aware of the importance of audit committee 
effectiveness in guaranteeing the financial reporting quality of corporate accounts. 
For example, investors react more favourably to companies with financial experts 
on the audit cominittee (DeFond et al 2005). Therefore the market is more likely 
to be aware of the difference in the quality of financial accounts provided by 
different audit committees. This in tam may increase the difference in the ERC 
between firms with more effective and less effective audit committees. 
However, it is also possible that companies' compliance with the Act 
increased the overall earnings informativeness and so the difference in audit 
committee effectiveness did not have an incremental impact on the ERC. Since 
Section 404 of the Act requires external auditors to follow Auditing Standard 
No. 2 to attest the audit to the internal control report, all issuers' financial 
accounts should have increased to the niinimum level of quality that the Act 
requires. The changes in the ERC post-SOX may attribute mainly to Section 404 
and 302 so that the changes in audit conu-nittee effectiveness may only add 
marginal credibility to the financial accounts post-SOX. This is in contrast to pre- 
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SOX where the difference in the ERC attributed mainly to the firtn's oversight 
body (Ahmed et al 2006, Vafeas 2000, Anderson et al 2003). The difference 'in 
the ERC therefore may be greater pre-SOX than post-SOX. There are two 
alternative hypotheses. 
Tj 2 
113: The difference in ERC betweenfirms udtb more effective audit commiltees andfirms 
wtb less effective audit commiltee become greaterpost-SOX. 
H3a. The difference in ERC betweenfirms u4tb more eedive audit commiltees andfitms 
=M less eective audit committee become smallerpost-SOX. 
8.3 Data and Methodologies 
8.3.1 Research Desi 
, Tn 
Following prior studies (Kim and Verrecchia 1991, Teoh and Wong 1993, 
Kinney, Burgstabler and Martin 2002), 1 udhse the coefficient of the short 
window market reaction (t-2day: t+2day 64 ) regression on the earnings surprise 
(deflated UE) to proxy for the ERC. Since previous studies find that there is an S- 
Shape 65 relation between stock returns and earnings (Ryan and Zarowin 2003, 
Kinney et al 2002, Skinner and Sloan 2002, Doyle, Lundhohn and Soliman 2006), 
1 add the UE 2 in the following model to control for the S-shape effects. 
64 Results of the t-l: t+ 1 are similar with the results of t-2: t+2. 
65 The S-shape relation can be explained as follows. According to Freeman and Tse (1992), the extremely 
large UE contains more transitory earnings information, which is less informative to investors. Therefore 
its information quahty is lower and shows flatter coefficients. Extreme large negative earnings provide even 
less information to the public than extremely large positive earnings because there may incur more earnings 
management. Therefore response to extremely large negative earnings will be flatter than extremely 
large 
positive earnings. 
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Model 8-1 Earnings response coefficients controlling for the S-shape earnings-return relationsl-ýp 
22 CARit=u. +PIUEit-4--p UEit+, fl3UEitUEDUMt+#4MKBVit+fl5LNAIfVit+ IJ2 i 
13 16 
Y, 8 IndustryDummyo) + 
1, &QuarterDummy(k). +E 
,j it It j=6 k=14 
CAR,, is cumulative abnormal returns from day t-2 to t+2 using the market 
model with 120 day estimation period from 141 trading days prior to earnings 
announcement. UEDUM, -t is 1 when the unexpected earning is negative, and 0 
otherwise. This is to control for the asymmetric stock price responses to good 
news and bad news. Higher P, signals higher earnings usefulness to investors. P2 
is expected to be negative and ý3 is expected to be positive. This is because the 
earnings-return relationship is more steeply sloped for a small absolute surprise, 
but much flatter for a extremely large absolute surprise (Ryan and ZaroWin 2003, 
K, _inney et al 2002, Skinner and Sloan 2002, Doyle et al 2006). The model reflects 
the S-Shape relationship between CAR and UE. Following Teoh and Wong 
(1993), 1 add the firm's growth opportunities (market to book ratio or MKBV), 
firm size (natural log of market value of equity, or LNMV), industry dummies 
and earnings announcement quarter dummies in the model to control for 
different cross-sectional and time series effeCtS66. 
To examine the impact of the audit committee effectiveness, two interactive 
dummy variables, the "AudM" and the "AudH", are added into the model as 
follows: 
66 The ERC may vary across different quarters in earnings announcement, therefore 
I control for the 
quarterly effects on the ERC by adding dummies of quarters to the model. 
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Model 8-2 Audit committee effectiveness and earnings informativeness 
CARit=a UE UE 2 UE 2 UEDUM +fll 't+fl2 it+fl3 't it+fl4 ControlVarit +fl5 AudM*UEit 
+fl6AudM*UEi2t+fl7AudM*UE2it UED UMit +, 88AudM*ControlVarit+flgAudH*UEit 
+flloAudH*UEi2t+fl,, AudH*UEi2l UED UMit +fll2AudH*ControlVari, +Eit 
AudM is medium effective audit conunittee and AudH is higWy effective 
audit committee. I employ the A-Index that is derived from chapter 7 and define 
AudM as the A-Index that is in the middle four portfolios, the 11 <= A-Index < 
15, where AudH is defined as A-Index in the highest three portfolios, e. g. A- 
Index >= 15. The bottom three portfolios, e. g. A-Index < 11, are defined as the 
least effective audit committees. ControlVar in the model includes MKBV, 
LNW, industry dummies and the quarter dummies. If P, or P9 is significant and 
positive, hypothesis 1 cannot be rejected. 
61 
S To examine hypothesis 2,1 repeat Model 8-1 in three subsample which 
are the pre-SOX, the SOX and the post-SOX subsamples. Earnings 
announcements during the time period before 30thJune 2002 are in the pre-SOX 
subsample. Earnings announcements during the time period from 1't July 2002 to 
30thJune 2003 are in the SOX subsample. Earnings announcements during the 
time period from V July 2003 to the end of year 2005 are in the post-SOX 
subsample. It is expected that P, increased from pre- to post-SOX. A Chow test 
is Performed to examine the equality of coefficients across the three subsamples. 
To examine hypothesis 3 and 3a, Model 8-2 is then examined in the pre- 
SOX, SOX and the post-SOX period respectively. It is expected that the 
difference between P, and Pq would become greater in the SOX and post-SOX 
67 The Chow-tests are performed and suggest dividing the sample 
into three subsamples. However, using 
interactive slope dummies have similar results. 
180 
CHAPTER 8 SOX, EARNINGS INFORMATIVENESS AND AUDIT CO', \L%IITfEES 
sample if hypothesis 3 is not rejected. In contrast, the difference may become 
smaller in the SOX and post-SOX sample if hypothesis 3a is not rejected. 
8.3.2 Data 
Table 8-1 Descriptive statistics of sample distributions, earnings surprise and cumulative abnormal returns 
PanelA: Samble &stibution 
Initial sample 1636 
Missing accounting data for DCA calculation 29 
1607 
Nfissing data for A-Index cc)nstruction 148 
Final A-Index sample 1459 
PanelB: Descripthe stalistics of UEIP, -, 
(*100) 
Mean Median Std. N 
Pre-SOX 0.033 0.024 0.297 1426 
SOX 0.070 0.037 0.384 1156 
Post-SOX 0.090 0.047 0.320 2992 
Total 0.071 0.039 0.329 5574 
Panel C Desciiblite slalistics qj'CAR 1-2,1+2 (*100) 
Mem Median Std. N 
Pre-SOX 0.531 0.637 6.560 1426 
SOX 0.664 0.574 6.105 1156 
Post-SOX 0.056 0.131 5,057 2992 
Total 0.304 0.327 5.703 5574 
The govemance sample is constructed by examining all S&P 500 cDmpanies with available cc)rporate governance 
information filed in the proxy statements on the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) website from 2001 to 
April 2006. Observations missed due to notavailable proxystatements orgovemance information in proxystatements 
at the fiscal year are deleted from the sample. Due to the missing information of 148 firm years to construct the audit 
cx)mmittee quality index, the final sample consists of 1459 observations. The A-Index is constructed following the 
method described in chapter 7. Quarterly actual earnings and financial analysts forecast (UE) data are collected from the 
Zacks Investment Research data file with 5574 observations. Stock price data is collected from WorldScope database. 
Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is derived from the market model with 120 days estimation period 
from 141 
trading days prior to earnings announcement. Unexpected earning is defined as the actual earnings minus 
financial 
analysts forecast deflated by the stod, price 2 days prior to the earnings announcement. 
Table 8-1 shows the descriptive statistics of sample distributions, earnings 
surprises ("UE" hereafter) and cumulative abnormal returns C'CAR" hereafter) 
of the sample. Panel A of Table 8-1 shows that the sample originally consists of 
1636 observations. After deleting 177 observations that do not have sufficient 
information to construct the A-Index, the final sample consists of 1459 firm- 
years with all available audit committee quality indexes 
(A-Index) data. The A- 
Index is constructed following the method described in chapter 
7. Quarterly 
actual earnings and financial analysts forecast 
data are collected ftom the Zacks 
181 
CHAPTER 8 SOXý EARNINGS INFORMATIVENESS AND AUDIT COlX%llTrEES 
Investment Research data file". Stock price data is collected from WorldScope 
database. The cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) is derived from the market 
model with 120 days estimation period from 141 trading days prior to the 
earnings announcement. Unexpected earnings are defined as the actual earnings 
minus financial analysts forecast earnings and deflated by the stock price 2 days 
prior to the earnings announcement (Teoh and Wong 1993). Matching the A- 
Index sample with the ERC sample the final sample yields 5574 firm-quarters. 
Both CAR and UE are winsorized at 1% level to MItigate the influence of 
outliers. 
Panel B of Table 8-1 shows the descriptive statistics for the unexpected 
earnings (UE) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) from pre- to post-SOX. 
Consistent with Kinney et al (2002), the price deflated UE range from -2% to 
2%, where the maximum of UE in this sample is 1.64% and the minimum is - 
1.51%. Both the mean and median price deflated UE were increasing from pre- 
to post-SOX. The mean UE jumped ftom 0.033% to 0.070% from the pre-SOX 
to SOX period, and it further increased slightly to 0.090% in the post-SOX 
period. 
Panel C of Table 8-1 shows the descriptive statistics of CAR from pre- to 
post-SOX. Assuming the magnitude of the CAR implies the information 
asymmetries between insiders and outside shareholders (Cai et al 2007), the 
significant drop in CAR from the pre-SOX and SOX periods to the post-SOX 
period indicates a substantial reduction in information asymmetries and this may 
be attributable to SOX. 
68 Abarbanell & Lehavy (2002) provide evidence that the I/B/E/S unexpected earnings is 90% correlated 
with Zacks unexpected earnings. In addition, 
both Abarbanell and Lehavy (2002) and Bradshaw and Sloan 
(2002) show that the stock market places more emphasis on 
Wall Street defined EPS than the Compustat 
EPS. Hence I chose the EPS in the Zacks file to construct the unexpected earnings. 
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Table 8-2 Descriptive statistics of earnings surprise and cumulative abnormal returns 
PaneIA: LTEIPt-2 (*100) UE>=O UE<O 
Mean Median Std. N Mean medIA11 -qrd N Pre-SOX 
I-east effective audit committee 
Medium effective audit committee 
Most effective audit committee 
SOX 
Least effective audit committee 
Medium effective audit committee 
Most effective audit committee 
Post-SOX 
Least effective audit committee 
Medium effective audit committee 
Most effective audit committee 
0.112 0.048 0.172 359 
0.114 0.044 0.207 667 
0.091 0.028 0.207 116 
0.196 0.088 0.302 319 
0.143 0.049 0.257 495 
0.191 0.074 0.301 124 
0.182 0.076 0.312 772 
0.142 0.059 0.264 1297 
0.147 0.079 0.185 412 
-0.325 -0.104 0.441 94 
-0.269 -0.081 0.403 151 
-0.209 -0.086 0.312 39 
-0.466 -0.153 0.563 79 
-0.305 -0.089 0.443 110 
-0.209 -0-096 0.226 29 
-0.259 -0.092 0.380 166 
-0.229 -0.081 0.359 274 
-0.163 -0.090 0.247 71 
PanelB: CAR, 
-ZI+2 
(*100) LE>=O UE<o 
Mean Median Std. N Mean Median Std. 
Pre-SOX 
I-east effective audit committee 0.562 0.547 6.992 359 -0.175 -0.410 8.103 94 
Medium effective audit committee 0.766 0.887 6.232 667 -0.365 -0.070 7.075 151 
Most effective audit committee 1.327 1.458 5.047 116 -0.985 -0.594 5.218 39 
SOX 
I-east effective audit oommittee 0.894 0.686 5.941 319 0.168 -0.512 7.295 79 
Medium effective audit oom mittee 0.973 0.946 6.008 495 -1.754 -1-139 5.995 110 
Most effective audit committee 1.883 1.543 5.291 124 -1.828 -0.714 7.068 29 
Post-SOX 
Least effective audit committee 0.732 0.676 5.201 772 -2.056 -1.638 5.985 166 
Medium effective audit committee 0.436 0.454 4.768 1297 -2.496 -1.955 4.919 274 
Nlost effective audit committee 0.416 0.484 4.718 412 -1.530 -2.036 4.170 71 
The governance sample is constructed by examining all S&P 500 companies with available corporate governance 
information filed in the proxy statements on the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) website from 2001 to 
April 2006. Observations missed due to not available proxy statements or governance information in proxy 
statements at the fiscal year are deleted from the sample. Due to the missing information of 148 firm years to 
construct the audit cc)mmittee quality index, the final sample consists of 1459 observations. 'I"he A-Index is 
constructed followMg the method described in chapter 7. Quarterly actual earnings and financial analysts forecast 
(UE) data are collected from the Zacks Investment Researdi data file with 5574 observations. Stock price data is 
collected from WorldScDpe database. Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is derived from the market model with 
120 days estimation period from 141 trading days prior to earnings announcement. Unexpected earning is defined 
as the actual earnings minus firiancial analysts forecast deflated by the stock price 2 day2 prior to the earnings 
announcement. 
Table 8-2 shows the descriptive statistics for UE and CAR for the three 
audit committee portfolios across the pre-SOX, SOX and post-SOX penods. 
Since investors may respond to good news differently from bad news 
(Roychowdhury and Watts 2007, Basu 1997, Givoly and Hayn 2000), the sample 
is further divided into a good news portfolio and a bad news portfolio. The good 
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news portfolio is defined as firms with UE that is not smaller than zero (LJE >= 
0), while the bad news portfolio is defined as UE that is smaller than zero (UE < 
0). 
Dechow et al (2003) find that there is a kink in the earnings distribution. 
Consistent with Dechow et al (2003), the statistics in Table 8-2 show that there is 
a kink in the unexpected earnings distributions. First, the average maginitude of 
positive UE is smaller than negative UE. The average absolute value of positive 
UE ranges from 0.1 to 0.2, whereas the average absolute value of negative UE 
ranges from 0.2 to 0.4. Secondly, there are more observations reporting positive 
UE than reporting negative UE. This is consistent with Kinney et al (2002) that 
more firms report positive UE from 1994 onwards. 
In addition, Table 8-2 shows that the difference in the average magnitude of 
UE between positive UE and negative UE became smaller post-SOX. For 
example, the absolute value of positive UE for the least effective audit committee 
increased from 0.112 pre-SOX to 0.182 post-SOX. Meanwhile, the average 
absolute value of negative UE decreased from 0.325 pre-SOX to 0.259 post- 
SOX. The medium and most effective audit committees have sin-. Lilar patterns 
that negative UE decreased from pre- to post-SOX. 
Panel B of Table 8-2 presents that the CAR for the most effective audit 
committees were much higher than the CAR for the medium and least effective 
audit committees in the pre-SOX and SOX periods. When UE is not less than 0, 
the mean CAR for most effective audit committee is nearly twice as that of the 
least effective audit committee pre-SOX. Incorporated with results in Panel 
A of 
Table 8-2 that UE is smaller for the most effective audit committees pre- 
SOX, the results imply a higher ERC for the most effective audit committees. 
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However, the CAR for the most effective audit committees dropped 
substantially post-SOX. The statistics suggest that SOX had a significant impact 
on earnings informativeness to investors. This is further examined and discussed 
again in the next section. 
8.4 Results and Analysis 
8.4.1 Model Spe(ifications 
Table 8-3 presents the results of the pooled regression of the two earnings 
response coefficient models. Observations with missing industry information are 
deleted from the sample. The first model is the ERC model that is employed in 
Teoh and Wong (1993), while the second model is Model 8-1, which controls for 
the S-shape earnings-return relation that was documented in previous ERC 
studies (Kinney et al 2002, Skinner and Sloan 2002). 
Comparing coefficients of the price deflated earnings surprise (UE) between 
the two models; coefficient for the UE is smaller when the S-shape relation is not 
controlled for. This is consistent with Kinney et al (2002) and Skinner and Sloan 
(2002) that the greater dispersion of the earnings surprises, the flatter the earnings 
response coefficients will be. Kinney et al (2002) and Skinner and Sloan (2002) 
also suggest that without controlling for the S-shape relation, the OLS estimate 
would be biased towards 0. Therefore the ERC that controls for the S-shape 
relation is steeper than the linear ERC model. All the three UE estimates in the 
second model in Table 8-3 are significant at 1% level and the adjusted 
R2 is higher 
than the first model". 
69 'ne reported R2 are low. However, these are similar to the 
level of R2 in Teoh and Wong (1993). 
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Table 8-3 Earnings response coefficient (ERC) model specifications - controlling for the S-shape return- earnings relation 
Model 1: CAR(1-2, 
t+2)Q =a+ J81UEQ + 
82LogMV,,, +, 83MKBV,,, +, 84ControlVars i'l + Ej, f 
Model2: CAA, 
-2,, +, ),,, =a+P, UE,,, +A 
UE'12 + P3 UE2,,,, Dum Uý, + P4 LogMV +E + P5 AKB V +& Control Vay ,,, ,,, 
Model 1 Model 2 
Pool Pool 
Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat 
Intercept 0.003 0.500 -0,007 -1.08 
UE 2.439 10.580 7.597 12.75 
UE 2 -368.448 -7.73 
UE 2 *DurnUE 899.417 9.50 
Log MV 
-0.063 -0.900 0.002 0.03 
Market to book -0.011 -0.420 0.010 0.40 
Industry Dummies yes yes 
Quarter Dummies yes yes 
No. Obs. 5574 5574 
Adjj. R2 2.28% 3.937% 
F-Value 9.98 15.18 
p-value <0001 <0001 
The governance sample is mnstructed by examining all S&P 500 c)Dmpanies with available cDrporate 
governance information filed in the proxy statements on the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) website from 2001 to April 2006. Observations missed due to not available proxy statements or 
govemancr- information in proxy statements at the fiscal year are deleted from the sample. Due to the 
missing information of 148 firm years to construct the audit oDmmittee quality index, the final sample 
mnsists of 1459 observations. The A-Index is oDnstructed following the method descabed in chapter 
7. Quarterly actual earnings and financial analysts forecast (UE) data are mllected from the Zacks 
Investment Research data file with 5574 observations. Stock pliCe data is collected from WorldScope 
database. Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is derived from the market model with 120 days 
estimation period from 141 trading days prior to earnings announcr-ment. Unexpected earning is 
defined as the actual earnings minus financial analysts forecast deflated by the stock priCt 2 days prior to 
the eamings announcement. DumUE is 1 when UE<O, otherwise 0. EPS is earnings per share. Market 
Value (NM is defined as the year-end oc)mmon stock prico multiplied by the year-end total number of 
mmmon stock. Market to Book ratio is defined as Market Value of Equity / (Book value of Equity + 
Deferred Taxes). Observations with missing industry information are deleted from the sample. 
and * indicate the estimates are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
In addition, the UE' and the UE'*UEDUM collectively show that the 
market's response to good news and bad news is asymmetric. For example, the 
estimate for the market's response to large positive earnings surprise is -368.448, 
whereas the market's response to large negative earnings surprise is 
530.969 
186 
CHAPTER 8 SOX, EARNINGS INFORMATIVENESS AND AUDIT COMMITTEES 
(ý2 +N =-368.448+899.471, as shown in Model 2 of Table 8-3). This is consistent 
with Kinney et al (2002) and Skinner and Sloan (2002) that the market's response 
to large negative earnings surprise is flatter. The results remain similar after 
dividing the sample into the positive EPS subsample and the negative EPS 
subsample. 
The variables UE, UE 2 and UE 2*UEDUM are significant, and the R2 is 
higher in Model 8-1. Therefore it supports that choosing Model 8-1 as the 
primary ERC model has additional explanatory power over the ERC model in 
Teoh and Wong (1993). 
8.4.2 The impact ofSOX on ERC 
Table 8-4 reports results for Model 8-1 to examine the impact of SOX on the 
ERC. Model 8-1 is examined in the pre-SOX, SOX and post-SOX subsamples 
respectively. First, Table 8-4 shows consistent results of the return-earnings 
relation with Table 8-3. Across the three subsamples, the S-shape relation holds 
and the stock market reaction to a large positive earnings surprise is small in 
magnitude relative to a large negative earnings surprise. Secondly, the Chow tests 
are performed to examine whether the sample should be divided into three 
subsam. ples. All the F-statistics from the Chow test show that the three 
subsamples are statistically different in estimating the ERC, so dividing the 
original sample into three subsamples yields significant improvements in 
estimating ERC. I therefore divide the original sample into three subsamples to 
examine Model 8-1 and Model 8-2 , instead of pooling the whole sample and run 
the regression with slope dummies that control for the time series effects". 
70 Since the regression needs to control for the effects of SOX, pooling the whole sample into one regression 
has to add the slope dummies to control for the time series effects. 
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Thirdly, the results show that in the SOX period, earnings informativeness 
decreased slightly since the ERC decreased from 6.297 pre-SOX to 6.076 during 
SOX. This is in contrast to Begley et al (2007), where companies' information 
quality was found to have increased temporarily after the passage of SOX. 
However, after SOX was introduced, earnings informativeness has improved. 
The ERCs in the post-SOX subsample is 8.853 and is greater than 6.297 in the 
pre-SOX subsample. Since all the Chow tests for the equality of coefficients 
across the pre-SOX, SOX and the post-SOX subsamples are significant at 1%, 
the results suggest that the ERC increased significantly from pre- to post-SOX. 
Therefore hypothesis 2 cannot be rejected. 
The result is also consistent with Cohen et al (2005) and Chapter 6 of this 
thesis that SOX has improved listed companies' financial reporting quality, and 
hence the informativeness embedded in earnings has increased post-SOX. This is 
also evidence that SOX in general is beneficial to corporate shareholders as it has 
enhanced the usefulness of accounting earnings. 
8.4.3 The impact of SOX on ERC Conditional on Audit Committee Effectiveness 
Table 8-5 reports results for Model 8-2, which examines the ERCs for different 
audit conunittee portfolios across the three periods. The table reports the changes 
in coefficients for the least effective, the medium effective, and the most effective 
audit committees respectively from pre- to post-SOX. 
189 
CHAPTER 8 SOX, EARNINGS INFORMATIVENESS AND AUDIT CO. NLL%IITfEES 
Table 8-5 The impact of SOX on the earnings response coefficient conditional on audit comnuittee effectiveness 
+ p2 I IV2 CAý', = ct + fil UE,,, +fl3UE, 2, DumUE+fi4LogMV+#3MKBV+fl6ControlVaA-fiAUDM*UE+fl7AUDM*UE2 
2 
+AAUDM*UE DumUE+#, AUDM*LogMY+AOAUDM*MKBV+fi6AUDM*ControlVa? ýAIAUDH*UE+A2AUDH*UE 2 
+A3 A UDH* UE 2 DumUE+A4AUDH*LogMV+A3AUDH*MKBV+fl6AUDH*ControlVapýE 
Pre-SOX sox Post-SOX 
Intercept 
-0.016 -0.49 0.000 -0.02 -0.026 -1.81 
UE 0.116 0.05 3.331 1.52 9.951 8.09 
UE 2 249.822 0.83 15.986 0.09 -559.332 -6.29 
UE2*DumUE -182.397 -0.39 294.463 0.90 1187.565 6.07 
Log MV 0.134 0.37 0.036 0.11 0.133 0.89 
Market to book 0.020 0.19 -0.316 -1.87 -0.022 -0.35 
AuclM 0.034 0.90 -0.003 -0.07 -0.007 -0.37 
AudM*UE 8.662 2.71 4.062 1.39 -1.369 -0.84 
AuclM*UE 2 -811.808 -2.29 -332.617 -1.43 182.777 1.54 
AudM*UE 2 *DumUE 1377.707 2.38 458.270 1.03 -297.620 -1.16 
AuclM*Log MV -0.262 -0.62 0.008 0.02 0.082 0.44 
AudM*Market to book 0.032 0.25 0.348 1.87 0.040 0.54 
Audl-I 0.025 0.32 0.020 0.35 0.016 0.52 
AuclH*UE 12.857 2.39 4.877 1.08 -0.891 -0.35 
AuclH*UE 2 -1145.069 -2.23 -294.074 -0.83 -218.050 -0.71 
AudFI*UE 2 *DumUE 2073.610 2.22 966.473 0.82 215.989 0.42 
AudH*Log 1\/fV -0.222 -0.32 -0.228 -0.40 -0.350 -1.17 
AuclH*Market to book 0.168 0.61 0.252 0.56 -0.018 -0.14 
Industries Dummies yes yes yes 
Quarter Dummies yes yes yes 
No. Obs. 1426 1156 2992 
Adj. R2 5.727% 6.569, o 8.097'/ o 
F-Value 1.71 1.59 5.29 
p-valuc 0.0019 0.0069 <. 0001 
Chow test Pre to SOX 1.1241 
SOX to post 1.3442 
Pre to post 2.1802 
SOX SOX 
The governance sample is constructed by examining all S&P 500 companies with available cc)rporate governance information 
filed in the proxy statements on the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) webste from 2001 to April 2006. 
Observations missed due to not available proxy statements or governance infori-nation in proxy statements at the fiscal year 
are deleted from the sample. Due to the missing information of 148 firm years to construct the audit committee quality 
inclex, the final sample consists of 1459 observations. The A-Index is constructed following the method described in 
chapter 7. Quarterly actual earnings and financial analysts forecast (UE) data are collected from the Zacks Investment 
Research data file with 5574 observations. Stock price data is collected from WorldScope database. Cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR) is derived from the market model with 120 days estimation period from 141 trading days prior to earnings 
announcement. Unexpected earning is defined as the actual earnings minus financial analysts forecast deflated by the stock 
price 2 days prior to the earnings announce. -ment. DumUE is I when UE<O, otherwise 0. EPS' 
is earnings per share. Market 
Value (MV) is defined as the year-end common stock price multiplied by the year-end total number of common stock. 
Market to Book ratio is defined as Market Value of Equity / (Book value of Equity + Deferred Taxes). Observations with 
missing industry information are deleted from the sample. and * indicate the estimates are significant at 
1%, 50'. 
and 10% respectively. 
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The table presents the following results. First, the results are consistent with 
all previous studies which find that a better governance structure is positively 
related to earnings informativeness In the pre-SOX era (Teoh and Wong 1993, 
Anderson et al 2003, Ahmed et al 2006, Vafeas 2000). There is a significant 
difference in ERC between the least effective audit committees and the most 
effective audit committees pre-SOX. The results in the pre-SOX subsample show 
that UE is not significant, but the two variables, "AudM*UE" and "AudH*UE", 
are positive and significant at 1%. This is consistent with previous studies that 
(before SOX was introduced) firms with superior governance structure, e. g. more 
effective audit committees, have a higher ERC than firms With poor governance 
system (Ahmed et al 2006, Vafeas 2000, Anderson et al 2003). Therefore in the 
pte-SOX subsample, hypothesis 1 could not be rejected. 
Secondly, the difference in ERC between more effective and less effective 
audit committees is smaller post-SOX. The results for the post-SOX subsample 
shows that the variable "AudM*UE" and "AudH*UE" are not significant. This 
means there is no difference in ERC between the least effective audit committees 
and the most effective audit committees. Therefore hypothesis 1 is rejected in the 
post-SOX environment. 
Further, the results support hypothesis 3a but not hypothesis 3, where the 
difference in ERC post-SOX is small relative to the difference in ERC pre-SOX. 
Since the variable "AudM*UE" and "AudH*UE" are not significant post-SOX, it 
indicates that difference in ERC between the least and the most effective audit 
conitmttees is zero post-SOX. Because pre-SOX, this difference is significant, the 
results suggest that the difference in ERC between most and least effective audit 
committee decreased from pre- to post-SOX. It implies that after SOX was 
introduced., the requirements in other sections, e. g. Section 404 and Section 302 
and Section 201, are sufficient to increase earnings informativeness to the 
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minimurn level that the Act intended to achieve. Therefore the changes in audit 
comrmttee effectiveness did not add significant marginal credibility to the 
earnings. 
I further perform the Chow test to examine whether the stock market's 
response to earnings announcements, conditional on the audit committee 
effectiveness, has changed significantly from pre- to post-SOX. I perform tests 
for pre-SOX to SOX, SOX to post-SOX and pre-SOX to post-SOX respectively. 
Except the test for pre-SOX to SOX, all F-statistics are significant. This suggests 
that the market"s reactions to earnings surprises are not different from pre-SOX 
to SOX, but are significantly different from pre-SOX to post-SOX. 
The results have the following implications. First, the insignificant relation 
between governance and ERC post-SOX implies that the relation between 
corporate governance and earnings informativeness may not hold post-SOX. 
Since the Chow test for the equality of coefficients between the pre- and post- 
SOX subsamples is significant, future studies have to separate observations in the 
pre-SOX era from their samples. Secondly, the result also implies that the Act 
may have increased the corporate managers' conservatism post-SOX. Corporate 
executives may not release information to the public until they fully verify the 
financial accounts due to the concern of higher reputation costs and legal 
liabilities. This has however increased the earnings usefulness to investors. 
In sum, this section investigates the impact of SOX on ERC conditional on 
audit committee effectiveness. My results show that firstly, the ERC model that 
controls for the S-Shape return-earnings relation better estimates the ERC. 
Secondly, earnings informativeness has improved after SOX was enacted. 
Thirdly, before SOX was introduced, earnings informativeness is greater for firms 
with a more effective audit committee. Finally, 
however, there is no difference In 
the ERC between more effective audit committees and less effective audit 
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comn-uttee post-SOX. Results generally imply that SOX was beneficial to 
investors by enhancing earnings informativeness, but this improvement may not 
be necessarily attributable to the improvements of audit committee effectiveness. 
8.5 Additional Tests 
8.5.1 Other Prox yforAudit Committee Effectiveness 
In order to test the robustness of the results, I further perform a similar test by 
dividing the sample into three sub-samples, a) firms with 0 financial expert; b) 
firms with 1 financial expert; and c) firms with more than 1 financial expert on 
the audit conunittee. Previous studies suggest that audit committees with a higher 
level of financial expertise are more capable of reducing financial fraud and 
earnings management (Krishnan and Visvanathan 2005, Krishnan 2005, Carcello 
et al 2006a). Therefore financial expertise could be utilised as another proxy for 
audit comn-littee effectiveness. I replace the audit committee effectiveness 
dummies with the audit committee financial expert dummies in Model 8-2 and 
the results show that the financial expert dummies are not significant in any 
periods. 
8.5.2 Wlitbout Controllingfor Industg andQuaiYer effects 
I try to remove the industry dummies and the quarter dummies from Model 8-1 
and Model 8-2 to see whether industry and quarter affect significantly the results. 
The statistics show that after removing these two types of dummies and 
interactive variables from the model, the results remain robust. 
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8.5.3 Different Measure of CAR and Une, %pecled Earnings 
I replace the 5 day CAR (t-2: t+2) with the three day CAR (t-1: t+1), and deflate 
the unexpected earnings by the price one day before earnings announcement in 
Model 8-2. The regression shows consistent results and the ERC is significand) 
higher where firms have higher quality audit committees pre-SOX, but not post- 
SOX. 
8.5.4 Re placinT Une, %, teaed Earniqs mýtb Eamin , gs 
Per Sbare 
I replace the unexpected earnings with earnings per share (EPS) In Model 8-2 in 
the right-hand side. The results show that the ERC is significantly higher for 
medium effective audit committees pre-SOX, but not significantly higher for the 
most effective audit conunittees. The interactive dummy for the most effective 
audit committee post-SOX is negative and significant at 10%, which is in contrast 
to my finding in Table 8-5. However, as shown in Equation 8-2, ERC is the stock 
market reaction as a function of earnings surprise. Since earnings per share not 
only reflect earnings surprise but also other information embedded in earnings, 
the coefficients derived from the model that replaces UE with EPS may have 
different explanations. 
8.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter, I investigate the impact of the SOX on the relationship between 
audit committee effectiveness and the earnings response coefficients (ERC) and 
draw out the following conclusions. First, the results of the descriptive statistics 
show that there was a kink in the distribution for earnings surprise. There are 
more companies reporting earnings to beat the market than companies reporting 
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negative earnings surprise. In addition-, the magnitude of companies having a 
positive earnings surprise is smaller than those having negative earnings surprise. 
Secondly, the results in Table 8-3 show that my modified ERC model that 
controls for the S-Shape return-earnings relation better estimates ERC. All the 
three earnings surprise variables are significant at 1%, and the estitmte of 
earnings surprise is less biased to 0. Further, the R-square and F-value of my 
model is greater than the ERC model that does not control for the S-Shape 
return-earnings relation. 
Thirdly, in contrast to Ahmed et al (2006) and Begley et al (2007), SOX has 
improved listed companies' financial reporting quality and thus increased the 
usefi: dness of accounting earnings to investors. The results show that the ERC 
increased significantly from pre- to post-SOX. This implies that SOX is beneficial 
to shareholders because it increased the earnings usefulness to investors. 
Finally, consistent with the hypothesis, firms with superior governance 
structures have higher earnings information quality. I find that before SOX was 
introduced, the ERC is significantly greater for firms with more effective audit 
connnittees. This is consistent with previous studies (Ahmed et al 2006, 
Anderson et al 2003, Vafeas 2000) and suggests that in a less strict legal 
environment, a more effective audit committee is better at reducing the noise 
embedded in accounting earnings. However, the results also show that after SOX 
was introduced, there is no difference in the ERC between more effective audit 
committees and less effective audit conu-nittees. 
The results imply that first, other sections of the Act e. g. Section 404, 
Section 302 and Section 201 of the Act rather than Section 407 enhanced 
earnings quality and thus the earnings informativeness. Other 
SOX sections may 
have improved earnings informativeness to the minimum required level, so that 
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the increased audit committee effectiveness post-SOX did not add significantly 
marginal credibility to the earnings. Secondly, the result also implies that the Act 
may increase the corporate managers' conservatism post-SOX. Post-SOX 
corporate executives are more concerned with the reputation costs and legal 
liabilities. They may therefore not release irrelevant information to the public 
until they fully verify the financial accounts, which in turn increased the earnings 
usefulness to investors. Finally, results also imply that the relation between 
corporate governance and ERC may no longer hold post-SOX. 
Bringing in all findings together, the study suggests that SOX is beneficial to 
shareholders because it increased earnings informativeness to investors. However, 
the findings suggest that the increase in earnings informativeness may not be 
attributable to the increased audit committee effectiveness, where it may be 
attributable to other SOX provisions such as Section 404,201 and 302. 
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9 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE 
RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES 
9.1 Introduction 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 aimed to improve listed companies' financial 
reporting standards and protect shareholders' interests. However, most of the 
provisions are perceived to be costly to U. S. issuers and the benefits of the Act 
has continued to be the subject of much debate. Some of the provisions (Section 
202) 204 301 and 407 of SOX, etc. ) aimed to improve issuers' audit committee 
effectiveness. However, whether these provisions are beneficial to shareholders is 
still subject to intense debate. This thesis utilises a unique corporate governance 
dataset that covers both the pre- and post-SOX periods and attempts to evaluate 
the impact of the governance provisions in SOX on listed companies. 
This chapter presents a summary and overview of the main findings of this 
thesis. It will also analyse future research opportunities in this area. The chapter is 
organised as follows. The next section will revisit the main objectives and 
research questions of the thesis. Section 9.3 sununarises and discusses the main 
findings of the empirical analysis. Section 9.4 discusses future research 
opportunities based on the limitation of this thesis and Section 9.5 concludes. 
9.2 Research Background and Objectives 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 aimed to improve listed companies' financial 
reporting standards and protect shareholders' interests. It brings Ma number of 
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provisions under 11 separate titles in order to improve issuers' financial reporting 
standards through a number of different channels. Section 404 aimed to enhance 
internal control over financial reporting. Provisions such as Section 201 and 203 
were meant to increase auditor independence. Section 202,204,301 and 407 
attempted to improve audit committee effectiveness, and provisions 302,807) 
and 906 increased corporate executives' and directors' litigation costs. The 
provisions especially Section 404, however, are perceived to be costly to U. S. 
issuers and are therefore subject of much debate in the academic community and 
industry. 
The most recent SOX studies focus on whether the Act as a whole package 
is beneficial or costly to listed companies. Although examining the Act as a whole 
is important in evaluating SOX, investigating the impact of specific provisions 
adds more value to regulators around the world because it provides more insights 
into the effect of specific facets of regulation. SOX attempted to improve 
financial reporting standards by placing more efforts on improving listed 
companies' corporate governance structure. Because of this, this thesis 
investigates specifically the impact of governance provisions in SOX, e. g. Section 
407, and its subsequent effects on financial reporting quality, firm value and 
earnings information usefulness. 
This thesis has two objectives. The first is to investigate what changes have 
there been in corporate governance structure since SOX was implemented. The 
second objective is to analyse the consequences of any changes in corporate 
governance post-SOX, and whether these changes are beneficial to shareholders. 
To achieve these two objectives, the thesis focuses on answering four 
empirical questions. These questions ate: 
198 
CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES 
1) Have the determinants of audit committee financial expertise 
changed after SOX? 
2) Have the changes in audit committee financial expertise led to better 
firm performance and financial reporting quality? 
3) Has overall audit committee effectiveness changed post-SOX? 
4) Have the changes in overall audit conu-nittee effectiveness led to 
more informative earnings? 
Investigating the first empirical question provides an insight of how the U. S. 
corporate governance system operates since the Act was introduced. It shows 
whether listed companies opted to follow a box-ticking procedure (regulatory 
compliance) in selecting their corporate governance structures post-SOX. If 
companies' decisions on appointing financial experts are completely determined 
by regulatory compliance post-SOX, it provides an environment to test whether 
self-determined corporate governance system (pre-SOX governance system) is 
superior to regulatory compliance (post-SOX governance system) for future 
research. 
Investigating the second question provides an evaluation of the success of 
some SOX provisions in improving issuers' financial reporting standards. This is 
important since it provides a feedback to regulators about whether their 
provisions, which are perceived to be costly, are useful to enhance financial 
reporting standards. If the results find that, although these provisions are costly 
but it can improve financial reporting standards, regulators should focus on how 
to cut the costs of the Act. However, if the results find that the provisions are 
costly but cannot improve the firm's financial reporting standards, regulators 
should revise their provisions and delete some rules if necessary. 
SOX paid considerable attention to a company's auditing function and 
placed specific requirements on a company's audit comn-uttee structure. The third 
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question therefore provides an assessment to regulators of whether the 
effectiveness of company's audit committee has improved post-SOX. 
The final question aims to provide more insight for the second objective of 
this thesis. It investigates whether the changes in audit committee effectiveness 
led to a higher standard of financial reporting. From the regulator's point of view, 
investigating this question addresses whether it is necessary to change audit 
committee composition to enhance financial reporting quality. If financial 
reporting standards and earnings informativeness were improved but not as a 
result of the changes in corporate governance, it brings a question, which is "Are 
regulations in corporate governance still necessary"? 
Bringing the four research questions together, the thesis can be viewed as 
trying to answer the question "Is mandated corporate governance necessary and 
useful to company shareholders"? Answering this question helps regulators to re- 
consider how to set rules that are useful to shareholders. 
9.3 Main Findings of This Thesis 
In undertaking an in-depth analysis of the impact of SOX on corporate 
governance and financial reporting quality, 9 chapters are included in this thesis. 
The thesis begins with an introduction and presents an overview of the main 
findings of the analysis. It then reviews the main academic literature in this area in 
Chapter 2. In Chapter 3a discussion of the main provisions of SOX is provided. 
Chapter 4 describes how the corporate governance data are constructed and 
presents descriptive statistics of how corporate governance and 
firm 
characteristics changed from pre- to post-SOX. The 
four empirical questions are 
examined in Chapters 5,6,7 and 8 respectively. The 
following section highlights 
the main findings of the analysis in the four empirical chapters. 
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9.3.1 Have the Determinants ofAudit Committee Finanaýl EVerfise Changed a, #er SOX? 
I examine the impact of SOX on the determinants of audit committee financial 
expertise in Chapter 5. 'Me descriptive statistics show that there were more 
companies including at least one financial expert in the audit conu-nittee post- 
SOX. However, companies that appoint financial experts to the audit committee 
mainly aimed to comply with SOX provisions rather than to fulfil the companies' 
governance requirements. The results also suggest that companies appointed 
financial experts to complement existing governance mechanisms pre-SOX, but 
to substitute existing governance mechanisms post-SOX. Further, the analysis 
suggests that the changes in the determinants of audit com=ttee financial 
expertise post-SOX were significant. 
9.3.2 Have the Cbanges in Audit Committee Financial E4ertise Led to Higher Firm Value 
, gQualýty? and 
Finandal Reportin 
In Chapter 6,1 examine whether the company's response to SOX Section 407, 
e. g. changing the level of financial expertise on the audit conunittee, has 
improved a firm's financial reporting quality and firm value. In contrast to the 
SEC's intentions, the results show that firms that did not appoint financial 
experts either pre- or post-SOX had greater improvements in financial reporting 
quality than firms that appointed financial experts both pre- and post-SOX. In 
relation to firm value, fi-rms that maintained appointing audit comn-Littee financial 
experts pre- and post-SOX had a greater increase in firm value over the sample 
period. Therefore the results imply that SOX did not achieve 
its objectives of 
improving financial reporting quality through the implementation of Section 407. 
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However, it has, albeit unintentionally", enhanced corporate value for some 
firms. 
9.3.3 Has OverallAudit Committee Effectiveness Cbangedpost-SOX? 
In Chapter 7,1 utilise three comprehensive discretionary accruals model and a 
unique sample of audit committee data, and provide a practical method to 
construct an audit committee effectiveness index (A-Index). The analysis shows 
that highly effective audit committees are larger, have a higher level of financial 
expertise and hold more comiriittee meetings. In addition, when comparing two 
audit conunittees, ceteris patibus, a larger, or more independent, or an audit 
conunittee with greater financial expertise, or more active is more effective. 
Further, after comparing a score constructed in previous studies (the SEC score) 
with the A-Index, it is found that the SEC score is weakly correlated with the A- 
Index. While the A-Index shows that overall audit comirlittee effectiveness 
decreased during the SOX period, the SEC score reports contrasting results. This 
implies that, the SEC score and the A-Index could not substitute each other in 
reflecting the overall audit committee effectiveness. 
9.3.4 Have the Changes in OverallAudit Commiltee Effectiveness 
I -ed to 
More Informative Earnings? 
Finally in Chapter 8,1 investigate the impact of SOX on the earnings 
informativeness (measured as the earnings response coefficients or "ERC") 
conditional on audit committee effectiveness. Results show that firstly, the ERC 
model that controls for the S-Shape return-earnings relation better estimates the 
ERC. Secondly, earnings informativeness improved after SOX was enacted. 
71 SOX airned at increase the financial reporting quality m order to recover investor's confidence. 
Therefore 
the intentional effects of SOX would be to increase the financial reporting quality, whereas other results 
such as changes in firm value would be unintentional effects of 
SOX. 
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Thirdly, before SOX was introduced, earnings informativeness is greater for firms 
with more effective audit committees. Last, there is no difference in the ERC 
between more effective audit committee and less effective audit comn-littee post- 
SOX. These results imply that SOX was beneficial to investors by enhancing 
earnings usefulness, but this improvement may not be attributable to the 
improvements In audit committee effectiveness. 
9.4 Future Research Opportunities 
9.4.1 Furtber Compan*son between the A-Index and the G-Index 
Gompers et al (2003) develop a corporate governance index ("G-Index" 
hereafter) to proxy for the overall corporate governance quality or the overall 
shareholder protection, and it is widely used in previous studies. The creation of 
the A-Index in this thesis is the first try to create a proxy for the overall quality of 
a subcommittee of the board. Further investigation is required to investigate first, 
the correlation between G-Index and A-Index; secondly, which 'index is a better 
proxy for corporate governance quality; thirdly, in which area are these two 
indexes better proxy for; and fourthly, whether these two scores can be combined 
to create a more powerful proxy. This can provide future research with guidance 
for choosing a better proxy for overall quality of corporate governance. 
9.4.2 CoVarison between US and UK Cotporate Governance 
To date, there has been no work to compare the impact of the -regulations 
*in the 
UK and the US on the developments of corporate governance. The major 
research in this area include Linck et al (2008), Lnck et aZ (2007) and Lit-', ak 
(2007). However, all the above studies focus on the US statutory regulations only. 
They did not compare the differences in the impact of regulations between the 
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US and the UK oil corporate governance and its consequences. Since the UK 
adopts the "Comply or explain" strategy, where the US adopts the mandatory 
requirements, the two regulatory requirements may have different impacts on 
governance practices and its developments. Tberefore research that compares 
UK and US corporate governance contributes to the literature by providing more 
insights of the differences in the two regulation systems and the impacts on 
corporate governance developments. The results of this analysis may provide a 
direction of developing a more cost-effective corporate governance regulatory 
system in the future 72 . 
9.5 Summary 
SOX has changed listed companies corporate governance structure, especially 
audit committee structure and activity levels substantially. Hence it has unproved 
the overall effectiveness of issuers' audit corninlittees. However, the 
improvements in corporate governance structures did not contribute to the 
changes in financial reporting quality and earnings informativeness as the SEC 
expected. First, firms that did not follow the spirit of SOX Section 407 had 
greater improvements and higher financial reporting quality post-SOX than firms 
that maintained following SEC recommendations. Secondly, improvements in 
earnings informativeness are not attributable to changes in audit committee 
effectiveness. Thirdly, firm value increased for companies that followed Section 
407 but it happened unintentionally. As a result, although the findings suggest 
that SOX was beneficial to shareholders in terms of Improving financial reporting 
72 For example, if Section 407 was not as effective as the SEC originally expected and other provisions are 
powerful enough to enhance financial reporting quality; it would be more cost-effective to employ only 
provisions that can enhance listed companies' financial reporting quality. 
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quality, firm value and earnings informativeness, there is still a weak link between 
these improvements and corporate governance. 
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